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This dissertation explains the causes of national differences in markets for 
technology. Different national approaches to intellectual property protection and use, 
market openness and market scope are the result of the process of creating technology 
standards in different countries. Technology Standards, in turn, are the product of two 
causal variables: the historically determined institutions of standardization - particularly 
the role of the state in the standardization process, and the position of a country in the 
fragmented global production system. The institutions of standardization determine the 
relative influence of different actors over standardization and market position. The 
position within the global economy determines these actors’ perspectives on intellectual 
property and market scope. Using case studies of standardization and technology market 
creation in the United States, Europe and China, this dissertation reveals the mechanisms 




THE THEORY OF POLITICS, STANDARDS AND MARKETS 
 
Thought Game: A World without Standards 
 Imagine browsing the aisles of a grocery store in a world with no standards. 
While everything might appear unchanged, the world without standards is a very 
uncertain place. With no standards, it is impossible to know at what temperature or level 
of moisture fresh produce is and should be kept. How do the employees know how 
deeply to freeze ice cream? How can you as a customer determine the quantity of beans 
in a can? Do you compare the sizes of cans or how they feel in your hands? How certain 
can you be of the quality and safety of the foods you attempt to purchase? How do you 
know if a store has better or worse prices? There is no common basis to judge between 
one set of items and another set from a different store.  
 Imagine building a house in this world with no standards. How thick will the slab 
need to be for a foundation built on given type of soil? How does the builder know the 
correct mix of aggregate and cement for the concrete in the foundation versus the cement 
for plastering walls or building driveways? How do the carpenters determine which 
screws to purchase or use for given types of joints? Finally, even if the team were able to 
put the home together, how do regulators determine if the structure is sound and 
habitable? Against what standard, literally, can your newly built home be compared? 
 Given the complexities of navigating a grocery store or construction site without 
basic standards, imagine trying to build a cell phone, a task many times more complex 
given the need to integrate the hundreds of intricate components that make up a mobile 
phone. To make a mobile phone, at a minimum, a manufacturer needs to first ensure the 
phone is able to communicate with a set of towers and that these towers can interface 
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with a broader telephone network. The phone’s signal must be received, interpreted, 
converted and relayed and then the entire process reversed at the other end. How can a 
manufacturer ensure that all of the thousands of components in a phone are able to work 
together – especially as most are produced by multiple independent vendors? Without 
standards specifically governing the capabilities and interaction interfaces among 
components, as well as between the phone and the broader network, it would be 
impossible to make a phone which the user can expect to work reliably. 
 To continue this thought experiment, imagine how people in a world without 
standards would cope. Grocery store employees could be carefully instructed by 
experienced workers. Experienced workers would know by sight, touch or smell how 
cold freezers would need to be and how often to wet down the fresh produce. 
Construction workers would be subject to long apprenticeships which could impart the 
tacit knowledge needed to work without established standards. For mobile phones, a 
single firm could attempt to control all stages of production from components to final 
phones and base stations as well as all network equipment and broadcasting technology. 
Keeping all technology in house could ensure interoperability, but it would massively 
increase costs as well as decreasing the potential efficiencies from having multiple 
vendors solving the same problem or offering substitutable goods to drive down costs. 
 Even if workers could be trained to compensate for a lack of standards, customers 
would still lack this knowledge. Further, any group of workers could define and teach 
tacit knowledge in their own way. Every store’s approach would be different; as 
customers moved from store to store, they would have to learn a new set of tacit 
information for selecting and comparing goods. Customers could overcome these 
obstacles through developing long and repeated relationships with a single vendor. 
However, the difficulty with comparisons would restrict the ability to substitute one set of 
goods with another thus undermining the basis for the price mechanism – the foundation 
of markets.  
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 An alternative approach would be complete vertical integration within a firm – 
from resources, through production, to operation and sales. The phone example would 
require a total vertical integration. While this would solve the problems of coordination 
and transaction costs, it would produce an absolute monopoly: an economic arrangement 
well-known for yielding socially suboptimal outcomes in price, quality, choice, quantity, 
and innovation. Further, without comparability, each store would effectively be its own 
monopoly since goods could not be substituted. Without standards, market activity would 
be difficult at best and impossible at worst. A world without standards would be 
confusing. It would be uncertain. High technology goods without standards would be 
essentially unworkable – outside a vertically integrated monopoly context. 
 Fortunately, we do not live in such a world. Standards for metrics, safety, quality, 
and technology definition are ubiquitous. Some are codified formally as written 
documents, and others are implicitly accepted and established by different cultural norms 
and practices (Busch 2011). Standards mitigate the uncertainties which would plague a 
world such as that described above. Indeed, standards are so ubiquitous that their 
presence is generally treated as a background condition, always assumed to provide a 
politically neutral framework within which market activity – and innovation – can take 
place. Given the assumption that standards always exist, there has been insufficient 
research into the role of standards in building markets. The critical question of how 
politics shapes the standardization process – and thus shapes the basic foundations of 
markets – is underexplored through systematic comparative research. This dissertation 
addresses this gap in the literature, looking explicitly at the role of politics in standards 
formation and how political processes thus shape markets across countries. 
Why Standards Matter 
 The thought experiment above illustrates a key principle. Standards are necessary 
for markets, as we understand them in the modern economy, to form and function. In the 
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modern global economy, markets for goods and services involve the buying and selling 
of components, subsystems and final products across long distances by agents who do not 
intimately know one another. The tight relations and tacit knowledge from the examples 
above cannot be shared or absorbed in such arms-length relationships. Instead, economic 
transactions, from a visit to the supermarket to wholesale purchases of screws for an 
electronics assembly plant, rely on multitudes of standards. These standards act to reduce 
uncertainty, build implicit trust and thus lower transaction costs, smoothing exchange and 
facilitating the functioning of the “invisible hand” of supply and demand. Given their 
importance, we must look closely and critically at standards since these market-building 
institutions are themselves the product of political processes. 
 While standards are assumed as a background condition today, the historical 
record shows that standardization has long been considered a critical government task. 
Throughout history – from imperial China to revolutionary France to the newly 
independent United States – one of the first tasks of a new authority was to ensure it 
alone had the power to define and enforce standards throughout its realm. Indeed, the 
Book of Proverbs, King Solomon’s collection of royal wisdom, declares that there should 
be a common set of standards: “Diverse weights and diverse measures – both are alike 
abomination to the LORD” (20:10, King James Version). 
 Newly minted governments do not neglect standards, even in their founding 
moments. In the United States, both the Articles and Confederation and the Constitution 
assign the power to set standards for weight and measure. Article Nine of the Articles of 
Confederation of the United States (1781) gave the national congress the sole authority to 
fix standards for weights and measures. In the later Constitution (1787), the ability to fix 
weights and measures was the fifth power delegated to the national congress.  From 1790 
– George Washington’s first report to Congress – to 1838 the United States worked to 
establish a single system of metrology standards, a project considered of critical 
importance by Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams. These early 
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centralized standardization efforts led to creation of the forerunner of today’s National 
Institute of Standards and Technology – a body still charged with developing efficient 
and standard units of measure and measurement instruments. For the early United States, 
the goal of common standards for weights and measure was to facilitate trade among the 
states. To enable a ton of South Carolina rice or Georgia Sea Island cotton to be sold 
efficiently in the warehouses and exchanges of New York, it was necessary to set 
common units to which all the states would adhere. Later, common standards of weight 
would be complemented by official standards for grading the quality of such 
commodities, allowing traders to purchase goods sight-unseen and know what they were 
getting, further reducing transaction costs (such as the need to have experts examine 
every individual shipment) and facilitating exchange. 
 Standards of weight and measure facilitate trade in all types of goods and 
services, but the importance of standards has only increased as technologies have become 
more sophisticated. The increased importance includes traditional standards for weights 
and measures as well. One of the most famous failures stemming from incompatible 
standards was the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter due to the use of imperial units by 
ground based instruction software and metric units by the on-board computer software. 
As the systems shared numbers, the differing units of measurement resulted in faulty 
calculations which caused the orbiter to pass too close to the upper Martian atmosphere, 
causing the probe to de-orbit and burn up entering the Martian atmosphere (NASA 1999). 
 High technology goods and services today generally rely on a specific subset of 
standards: technology standards. Technology standards are protocols defining the 
necessary functions and capabilities of different components and how these are to 
interact with one another to work as a single unit in the final product. Technology 
standards also define how technology products connect to and communicate with one 
another and with the broader networks through which interconnection takes place. These 
protocols are essential for the functioning of markets in technologies. In this dissertation 
 6
markets for technology and technology markets refer to the markets for high technology 
based goods. This differs from the definition in Gambardella, Arora and Fosfuri’s work 
on markets for technology which are defined as efficient systems for exchanging 
intellectual property rights (Arora, Fosfuri et al. 2001; Gambardella 2002; Arora and 
Fosfuri 2003). 
 Since technology goods are generally made from hundreds of components which 
are themselves produced by tens or hundreds of different supplier firms before being 
integrated, standards are necessary to ensure the final product works as intended. Final 
users do not know the providers of components such as the memory or digital signal 
processing chips for their phone, but users expect the phone to work smoothly. 
Technology standards are the means of coordinating such a variety of components and 
the vast array of vendors. In the absence of standards, hierarchy within a single vertically 
integrated monopolistic firm is an alternative, but one without the innovation and 
competition benefits of standardization. 
 Changes in the global trade and production system mean technology standards are 
more important than ever. With the rise of global markets and the fragmentation of 
production, the need to maintain arms-length economic exchanges has only grown. While 
this truism applies to all types of standards, advances in technology mean standards now 
go far beyond those traditionally made for definition and metrology. Technology 
standards, far more complex than traditional standards, are a major area of state and firm 
interest today. Technology standards define products, components, and their integration. 
Technology standards make it possible to reliably source goods and services globally, 
from multitudes of suppliers, confident in their ability to work together. 
 While standards-conforming components and products may be sourced from any 
number of firms, technology standards themselves are based on key underlying 
technologies, embedded as standards-essential patents (SEP). Standards-essential patents 
provide the contributing firms with royalties, the ability to limit market entry, and 
 7
intimate knowledge essential for defining subsequent developments of a standard. Taken 
together, contributing to the definition of technology standards, and controlling their 
content, is a source of market power.  
 The importance of standards for globally-organized production is not in dispute. 
However, standards are not black boxes or irreducible variables to be taken at face value. 
Since markets are the basis of economic activity – and economic activity the root of 
wealth and hence political power – there are interests from both firms and governments in 
appropriating the greatest returns from market activity. If standards are essential to 
market operation, it stands to reason that standards will be highly political. Therefore, 
taking a political economic approach to studying standards can illuminate the means by 
which different technology markets arise around the world. 
Dissertation Goal and Significance 
 The goal of this dissertation is to introduce a theory accounting for the 
differences in technology markets in different countries. As a first introduction of a theory 
using technology standards as the primary mechanism through which features of 
technology markets are determined, this dissertation is not attempting hypothesis testing. 
However, the mechanism presented here will be illustrated in case studies from different 
countries which show that the predicted outcomes from the theory are indeed born out in 
various technology markets shaped under different standardization systems. 
 The process by which standards are formed shapes the distribution of gains 
among participants and implementers of the standard. Both government and business 
actors actively seek to shape the standardization process to their own benefit. As market 
power – going back to the work of both free market champions like Smith and 
developmental statists like List – is considered the source of national wealth and power, 
control over technology standards is a means of seeking, grasping and controlling that 
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power (List 1841 (1991); Smith 1937).1 With so much at stake, the development of 
standards is a highly contentious and politicalized process. Accordingly, the actors with 
the greatest influence over the process of standardization will have the greatest ability to 
mold or even control markets for technology. 
 This dissertation looks at the politics of technology standardization by examining 
the processes by which standards are created in different countries. The institutions of 
technology standardization, both formal organizations and traditional practices and 
inclinations, privilege certain actors over others.  Privileged positions in standardization 
afford advantages and influence in technology markets. By studying the politics of 
standardization, we can come to understand how politics can shape markets and different 
avenues for control exercised by states and firms. 
 This is not the first research to claim markets are subject to political influences. 
However, the existing literature emphasizes the importance and role of formal 
government structures (locus of control, degree of federalism, autocracy versus 
democracy), government economic policies, or the structure of the world economy itself. 
There is also a rich literature dating back to the 1970s and 80s which argues that 
technology standards have strong market impacts (such as shifting the mode of 
competition from product differentiation to price) (David 1985; Besen and Johnson 1986; 
David 1986; David and Greenstein 1990; Besen and Farrell 1994). A related but 
disconnected stream of research also argues that political forces determine much of the 
outcomes in standardization. However, the literature does not engage with the question of 
how the political influences on standards are a vector through which politics shapes 
technology markets. This dissertation expands our understanding of the role of politics in 
markets by explicitly examining the role of politics in shaping standards and how this 
                                                 
1 Adam Smith’s “Wealth of Nations” argued that the exercise of free trade and limited government 
intervention in the economy would ensure greater economic development and wealth. List, on the other 
hand, argued that open markets were insufficient to ensure national wealth and that state intervention, 
protection, and sponsorship of critical segments of the economy – particularly industrial development – 
were essential to ensuring national wealth and power. 
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translates into differing technology markets across countries. For scholars to understand 
the emergence and divergence of markets for technology, and their salient features such 
as pricing for intellectual property, openness and scope in different countries, we must 
look at the politics of standardization and how this then determines these markets. 
 Argument and Theory 
 The puzzle being addressed in this dissertation is why technology markets have 
different features across countries. If science and technology were universal, there should 
be great similarities in markets based on them. Yet we find that technologies are created, 
bought, and sold very differently across countries. This dissertation accounts for the 
differences in technology markets through the mechanism of the process of technology 
standardization. Influences on technology standards in different countries determine the 
content of standards and thus the form and operation of national technology markets. 
While it may seem strange to speak of “national technology markets” in an era of 
globalization and global production networks, national features still strongly influence 
the development of technology standards and their influence on final markets for 
technology. Salient national features – historical institutions of standardization – remain 
greatly influential, even as firms are increasingly subject to globally determined 
pressures. 
 It is important to note that this dissertation and theory are not attempting to 
propose a normative ideal for standardization or technology markets. The reality is that 
there are coexisting approaches to standardization and types of markets. No single 
approach has proven over time to be universally more successful than others. The US, 
European and Chinese cases examined in this dissertation all show evidence of relative, 
or absolute, successes in creating highly lucrative markets through their standards. All 
three cases also have standardization efforts which failed to result in viable markets. 
Indeed, the same institutions and position in the global economy which yield spectacular 
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successes in certain standardization efforts have also yielded protection, fragmentation of 
markets and obsolescence of technology in others. Accordingly, the theory proposed 
here, unlike much of the standardization and markets literature, does not take a normative 
position comparing the relative merits of different approaches. It only seeks to account 
for why differences emerge. 
 My research finds that two salient variables – historically derived national 
institutions of standardization and the position of firms and national-level industries in 
the fragmented global production system – determine differences in the characteristics of 
national technology markets. These two variables shape the three defining attributes of 
technology markets as derived by standards: IP policies, openness and scope. Technology 
standards are intermediate variables between the causal variables acting on standards and 
the final technology market. Historical institutions and position in the fragmented global 
production system explain the arrangement of actors and distribution of power in a 
technology market – and hence the differences among countries. A simplified version of 





 Figure 1: Basic Model 
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 The combination of national institutions of standardization and the position of 
firms and industries in the fragmented global political economy determines the content of 
technology standards. As the intervening variable, the corresponding characteristics of 
standards determine the final values in the technology markets which emerge. Standards 
determine the distribution of power for various actors in the market, thus setting the 
values for treatment of intellectual property, the openness of the market, and its scope.  
 This is not a static unidirectional model. It must be acknowledged that the model 
has a degree of reverse causation and feedback as well. For example, technology markets 
dictate the profitability of different firms which will in turn shape their relative position 
in the global economy and their perspective on future generations of standards. Similarly, 
national institutions are not static but are subject to the pressures of the global market – as 
well as rapidly changing innovations and technologies. National institutions thus adapt to 
meet changes in global markets, even as they seek to shape these markets through 
standardization. 
 How does this model work in practice? A technology standard becomes the 
framework for the technology market. First, the standard sets the legally mandated 
requirements for technology licensing and royalty payments for a given standardized 
technology. This dictates the terms under which actors will be able to utilize the 
embedded intellectual property within the standard. The terms of this access determine 
pricing and profit positions of different actors and the viability or profitability of different 
business and innovation strategies. Where standards require that all technologies be 
included on a free basis, the market which emerges will favor firms with product 
development or manufacturing capabilities as such firms will be able to extract profits in 
the market while would-be technology licensors will struggle to earn returns. On the 
other hand, where firms are allowed to independently determine their licensing fees and 
practices, IP licensors will have great market advantages. Large IP contributors will pay 
less in licensing fees as they may be able to arrange technology sharing or cross-licensing 
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agreements with other contributors to the standard. This will enable them to offer 
standards-compliant products at lower prices – holding profits steady – than competitors. 
Further, where commitments to “reasonableness” or “non-discriminatory licensing” are 
weak, strong IP contributors may be able to shape the final market by limiting the number 
of participating firms. If a firm refuses to offer non-discriminatory licensing, it may 
choose which firms are allowed to produce standards-compliant goods. This undermines 
the price-reduction advantages of standardization and builds oligopolistic markets.
 Thus, the IP policies and practices of standards have real impacts on the viability 
of different firm’s business models. In recent debates over intellectual property and 
standards, leading corporations such as Apple and Qualcomm have vehemently disagreed 
over norms for intellectual property in standards.  
 Second, the openness of a standard is written into its protocols. Inclusion or 
exclusion of actors from a standard determines which actors are even allowed to 
participate in the market. Some standardization efforts are restricted to firms in a single 
industry, polity or industrial alliance. A wholly closed standard bars potential entrants 
from the market simply because the IP in the standard is not available for license to 
outside parties. Actors who were not party to the development of the standard are thus 
locked out of the market. They may consume technology goods but will be unable to 
become providers of these goods or to improve upon the standardized technology. 
 The degree of openness in a standard is a function of the type of standard being 
developed – whether formal or de facto – and the means by which it is developed.  
Openness is a measure of the number and breadth of different actors involved in the 
creation of the standard and the terms under which actors not directly involved in creating 
the standard can utilize the standard in their own products. In certain countries, 
standardization efforts are initiated by governments to serve strategic purposes. 
Depending on the goals of the standard, the standard which results may be highly 
restricted. Chapter four discusses the case of the WAPI wireless network security 
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standard in China which was legally closed to all but a small group of contributing firms. 
Other firms were not permitted to take part in development or license the core 
technology. Standards created by de facto processes – that is without formal 
organizations developing, approving and publishing the standard – may be highly 
restrictive or open depending on the desired outcome of the firm which created the 
would-be standard. Openness in de facto standards depends on the developing firm(s) 
strategy. If it seeks maximization of immediate profits by commanding royalties for a 
chosen set of intellectual property, it may keep the standard closed and charge any would 
be adopters. In other cases firms will opt for very open standards allowing as many other 
firms as possible to license and utilize a technology – often at very low cost – in order to 
preempt the emergence of a competing technological alternative. 
 In markets, openness matters for two reasons. First, openness helps determine 
which firms have early access to and knowledge of the standard. This helps provide early 
or first mover advantage in the market. First movers tend, all else being equal, to earn 
greater returns and market share. Thus, being included in the development of a standard 
is important and may afford a sustained competitive advantage. Second, where standards 
are restricted based on nationality, firms from the sponsoring country have great 
advantages – such as free technology access, lower licensing fees, or access to state 
subsidies and procurement markets – over outside firms.  
 The openness of a standard relates to the conception by firms and states of the 
ideal final market state. If the desired market is a protected one, participation and 
enforcement restrictions are likely to be onerous. However, as firms and states may not 
have the same interests in the nature of enforcement, the relative power of these actors 
will be important in determining how open a final standard will be. 
 Finally, the scope of a standard determines the geographic and industrial range 
over which a market will operate. The same market holds sway as widely as a standard is 
implemented; yet where incompatible standards are adopted, there is a different market. 
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When standards are set at the national level, the scope may be limited to the national 
borders of a state, particularly where the dominant actors setting the standard desire 
protection of the technology and market. Scope is also a factor of the decisions made by 
other states to adopt the same or other incompatible standards. If other countries adopt 
the same standard, the market extends across the broader range. Ensuring broad market 
scope is a major impetus behind the European Union’s project to ensure compatibility 
and uniformity of standards across all member states. Having a single standard makes the 
ideal of a single integrated pan-European market a reality. 
  Scope is a function of the degree of state involvement in standards creation and 
the firms or other actors given priority of voice in the development process. More statist 
standards will often have limited scope as protectionism is often a goal in creating 
national standards. Standards with limited scope are generally effective at providing the 
creating firms with a protected market but also limit these firms’ ability to sell goods and 
services in a broader global market based on incompatible standards. Indeed, the fear of 
facing higher compatibility costs is one reason when major Chinese firms often reject the 
central government’s attempts to impose standards with a limited national scope. 
 Once finalized, these attributes of standards lay out the conditions for markets for 
technology. The initial independent variables being presented here are thus national 
institutions of standardization and the position of a country in the fragmented global 
production system. Technology standards are the intervening variable which in turn 
shapes the dependent variable – technology markets. 
 Technology markets can be measured via the same defining characteristics as 
technology standards: intellectual property, degree of openness, and market scope. These 
three factors differ widely across technology markets both among and within countries. 
For example, both Korea and Japan are known for having highly interventionist 
governments, active in the development and promotion of indigenously developed 
technologies. However, the degree of protection in their markets for technologies such as 
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mobile telephony hardware differs widely. Japan’s markets have traditionally been closed 
to outside technology while Korea’s high technology industries are highly integrated with 
foreign developers of technology and open to international cooperation. The end result is 
that Korea’s technology market is open and globally integrated while Japan’s has long 
been highly isolated. What accounts for this difference? 
 Treatment of intellectual property, degree of openness, and scope in standards are 
the product of both the national institutions of standardization and the position of a 
national firm or industry  in the global economy. These aspects of standards go on to 
influence the same characteristics of technology markets. However, as mentioned above, 
standards are also shaped, particularly in their later revisions and updates, by the same 
markets they initially helped mold. 
 The national institutions independent variable is dichotomous – having two 
idealized categories into which a country may fall: statist or non-statist. Position for firms 
in the global economy can be reduced to one of three conditions: IP Creator-Licensor, IP 
Creator-Manufacturer, or IP Taker. The orientation of an actor between the six possible 
combinations of these different variable values determines the content of standards and 
their relevant technology market shaping aspects. 
 National institutions of standardization are the product of historical path 
dependent processes in which economic ideology, historical accidents or unique 
emergent conditions and motivations are strongly influential. These historically 
determined institutions shape the standardization process by giving more influence and 
power to certain actors (Hall and Taylor 1996). Accordingly, in different standardization 
systems, the state or firms, or certain sub-sets of firms such as large or state-owned 
enterprises, have differing degrees of influence. Therefore, national institutions of 
standardization can be categorized as either statist or non-statist. This characterization as 
statist or non-statist is based on the technology standardization literature which 
emphasizes the role of governments or firms as the leading actors in the standardization 
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process. Although government is involved in standardization in all countries, the nature 
of this involvement varies from ex ante definer and creator to ex post adopter and 
regulator. The differing levels of involvement by the state strongly determine which 
actors are involved and influential in the standardization process – and thus which actors 
are able to define the critical market-defining characteristics of technology standards. The 
statist versus non-statist distinction is based on whether or not the national government 
has a leading role in the standardization process.  
 The role of the state is a function of when a state began its industrialization and 
the conditions under which it did so. Using Gerschenkron’s logic of relative 
backwardness, the later a state began industrializing, the more active the government will 
be in shaping the industrialization process to achieve national political goals. As the 
varieties of capitalism literature has shown, the differences in relative state intervention 
in the economy continue long after the initial conditions of backwardness have been 
addressed. This historical role for the state means that reforms are unlikely to 
significantly alter the state’s role in the economy. While the nature of state intervention 
will change, the government remains an active – even leading – actor in the economy. 
 In standardization, the role of the state is similar to that throughout the broader 
economy. Where the government is not actively involved in managing or intervening in 
the economy, the government similarly takes a “hands-off” approach to technology 
standardization. Government will thus have a limited role in the direct operation or 
behavior of technology markets. On the other hand, activist staves have the tools and 
institutions with which to mold standardization and technology markets.  
 In non-statist cases, firms determine the outcome of the standardization process 
and thus wield greater influence over final markets. The state has a less prominent role – 
usually taking the position of basic regulator to ensure fair competition in the economy 
and to ensure that standardization processes do not become avenues for inter-firm 
collusion. Firms develop technologies and push these as standards, either independently 
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or through building coalitions of like-minded firms. This largely “market-based” 
approach to standardization, as discussed in the literature, tends to be faster than state-led 
standardization but can result in a condition where a standard fails to emerge or where a 
suboptimal standard becomes entrenched. 
 While two countries may have “statist” approaches to standardization, this does 
not mean the actions of the state will be identical. There are real choices available to 
states in standardization. Firm-led standardization will also not necessarily follow the 
same patterns. The role and policies that states or firms will adopt and push in 
standardization is constrained by the second independent variable – the position of firms 
in the fragmented global production system.  
 The power that different actors have over standardization – whether state or firms 
– affords them with the ability to push through their strategic normative vision for 
markets. This vision is a product of the actor’s position in the fragmented global 
economy. This vision determines the policy and strategy choices of actors in the 
standardization process and sets the stage for the conditions which will materialize in 
technology markets. 
 Firms can exist in one of three states in the fragmented global production system: 
as an IP creator-Licensor, IP creator-Manufacturer, or IP taker. A firm’s position in the 
fragmented global production system shapes  its approach to standardization. Position in 
the global economy determines the approach to standardization by molding the normative 
views of leading actors on the value of intellectual property, approach to licensing of 
technology, and the openness and scope of standards. With certain actors being 
empowered by their country’s statist or non-statist standardization institutions, they will 
then employ these perspectives when setting standards, thus defining their technology 
markets. 
 This three-part division takes into account that not all firms adopt the same 
business strategies even when their R&D, human resource, or capital capabilities are 
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similar. There is a commonly held belief that advanced economies with robust R&D 
sectors will all converge to a common set of interests, yet the empirical data reveals that 
firms primarily interested in manufacturing – even with strong R&D capabilities – push 
for different standardization policies than those more interested in earning revenues by 
licensing technology. IP Creators must be divided between those whose worldview is 
shaped by their licensing or manufacturing emphasis in the global economy. 
 The IP Creator-Licensor has robust R&D capabilities and is able to produce new 
or recreated and improved technologies readily. The IP Creator-Licensor seeks to set 
technology trends over time through ownership and control of access to IP. The firm in 
question is more concerned with technology independence and perpetuation of 
dominance over the highest value-added end of the production chain – architecture and 
definition.2 The IP Creator-Licensor also sees licensing fees as the major source of 
revenue. It does not emphasize manufacturing; indeed manufacturing may be seen as a 
lower value-added activity which should be outsourced. The goal behind standardization 
is to enhance the ability to extract royalties from other firms and ensure sustained 
technology dominance over time.  
 An IP Creator-Manufacturer, on the other hand, sees the real value of technology 
primarily in its incorporation into final products which can then be sold. Actors in this 
category still have robust manufacturing capabilities and view manufacturing as a 
strategic asset worthy of support and investment. In this instance, the firm will actively 
seek to develop technology but does so not to license but rather to improve the value 
added, profits, or desirability of its goods and services. It is important to note that this 
distinction between licensor and manufacturer is not necessarily predicated on the actual 
                                                 
2 Stan Shih, founder and CEO of Acer proposed the concept of the “smiling curve” in 1992 to account for 
why certain production stage activities were more profitable than others. Assembly and manufacturing lay 
at the bottom of the curve while patenting, definition and architecture for whole systems lay at the top of 
the curve. Technology standards, as long term determinants of market characteristics and technology 
trends, may be seen as the ultimate peak of the smiling curve – affording the most value added and 
strongest competitive advantage to firms.  
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production of goods. Due to its emphasis on products rather than monetization of 
intellectual property, Apple is decidedly an IP Creator-Manufacturer while Qualcomm is 
an IP Creator-Licensor as its revenues are entirely based on licensing fees. 
 The IP Taker is a firm with little independent R&D capability, particularly for 
definition of architecture and basic capabilities of a technology – the exact types of 
research which becomes the basis for technology standards. IP Takers are thus reliant on 
other firms – typically foreign – to produce the IP they will use in producing or utilizing 
goods and services. IP Takers are in a disadvantageous position when it comes to 
contributing to or setting international standards or attempting to improve their 
profitability in the face of mandatory licensing fees. IP Takers thus have very different 
perspectives on the value of intellectual property and the normatively “proper” role for 
technology standards. However, their ability to realize these normative goals is limited by 
their relative power. Relative weakness means the IP Taker will be forced to accept its 
position in the global standardization system – and disadvantaged market status. A 
stronger state, or globally influential firms by market share or production capacity, can 
help counteract this disadvantaged position by lobbying for better licensing terms. 
 Taking these two independent variables, we can construct a 2 X 3 matrix (See 
Figure 2). This matrix shows six possible conditions for countries to occupy in the 
standards and market creation ecosystem. The following paragraphs detail the possible 
outcomes before briefly noting how certain national cases fit into this typology. It should 
also be noted that these categorizations remain somewhat ideal. There are individual 
cases and specific technologies for which a country may appear to cross over – 
particularly on the Licensor-Manufacturer distinction. For example, while the United 
States generally de-emphasizes manufacturing, there are companies for which the 































































































































 The first category of country in this matrix is the Statist IP Creator-Licensor. The 
combination of strong R&D capabilities with a less manufacturing intensive strategy for a 
firm means there are strong incentives to support hard intellectual property rights 
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protection in technology standards. In the presence of a strong state, this means that the 
government will use its authority to ensure the success of indigenously produced 
technology on the national, regional and international stage. The state will aggressively 
promote international cooperation utilizing the indigenous technology in order to increase 
licensing returns for national enterprises. The strong state also means that technology 
markets will frequently be closed. The strong state is able to protect the interests of 
domestic IP holders and may bar foreigners from participation in standardization 
activities so as not to dilute domestic firms’ IP contributions and may discourage 
adoption of international standards. At the same time, however, the scope of the market 
will depend on the reaction of foreign markets to the indigenous technology standard. 
Where foreign partners adopt the national technology, markets will be broad and 
internationally integrated. However, national markets may be restricted if alternative 
technologies are adopted.3 
 The second category of country is the Statist IP Creator-Manufacturer. Such 
countries take a different approach to intellectual property. As firms active in the 
standardization process emphasize the value of physical production of goods versus just 
the production of licensable intellectual property, IP rights are treated flexibly. The state 
protects firms’ IP, but the firms seek to include this technology in products or use IP 
strategically to increase the acceptance of their products versus those of other countries. 
The strong state will promote the Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (RAND) licensing 
norms for intellectual property embedded in technology standards. Enforcement of the 
RAND norm will facilitate development of products incorporating proprietary technology 
and encourage production and sales of goods. In this case, standards development will be 
open to foreign participation and markets will be open to all comers – except in cases 
                                                 
3 In China, the TD-SCDMA 3G mobile telephony standard was successfully promoted by the state and 
developed sufficiently to receive international certification by the International Telecommunications Union 
as one of three international 3G mobile telephony standards. However, foreign regulators did not offer 
licenses to their telecommunications operators to use TD-SCDMA technology with the result being the 
market for TD-compliant goods is restricted entirely to China. 
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where the country’s manufacturers find themselves at significant competitive 
disadvantages. In such a case, the state may intervene to protect domestic industry. The 
state will also promote the development of standards it considers strategically important, 
using incentives to encourage firms to develop and utilize indigenous standards – but 
with a focus on products rather than IP licensing. 
 In the third case, the leading firms involved in standardization are largely IP 
Takers, albeit in the context of a strong state. Firm strategies emphasize the production of 
actual goods and services. Weak indigenous innovation capabilities limit the ability of the 
country or its firms to develop technologies capable of earning royalties or challenging 
existing standards. The country also has a strong tradition of state involvement in the 
standardization system and the economy more broadly. Here, the state must take an 
active role in shaping markets for technology in order to ensure what it considers to be 
favorable outcomes. The state will be inclined to promote indigenous technologies – even 
technologically inferior ones – especially if they are cheaper than foreign alternatives. 
The state will also encourage adoption of international technology standards in order to 
increase the potential market size for exporting firms but will seek the best possible 
licensing terms on behalf of firms. The state will use its influence to try to reduce or 
eliminate royalty rates for domestic firms and to secure access to foreign technology at 
nominal rates. Where indigenous standards are proposed, they will be open and even 
royalty free. The position as IP Taker means firms will seek to minimize IP costs in order 
to maximize their profits and enable them to seize greater profits and market share at 
constant low price points. Although the government will promote indigenous IP wherever 
possible, on the whole, technology markets will be open and conform to international 
standards. This is because the IP Taker needs access to foreign technology and will 
produce goods for foreign markets.  
 The fourth category of country is the Non-Statist IP Creator-Licensor. Here, the 
country has no tradition of strong state involvement in standardization or the economy. In 
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this case, technology markets will be dominated by firms. Technology standards 
governing the market will arise through de facto processes rather than formal ones. The 
state will largely limit its role to ratifying what firms have already put into practice. 
Indeed, firms will resist state attempts to intervene in technology development and 
standardization. State intervention will be ineffective due to a lack of state capacity for 
such actions. Where IP Creators dominate the standardization process, however, the 
country will have strong IP protection and property rights norms, giving firms the right to 
dispose of their intellectual property as they see fit. In extremis, the lack of state 
intervention may enable firms to flout RAND licensing norms. Technology standards, 
and hence markets, are generally open due to limited government regulatory action and 
the desire of firms to produce standards rapidly – frequently requiring cooperation with 
foreign firms. Without a strong state to select standards, however, firms may produce 
multiple incompatible standards, thus forming separate fragmented technology markets. 
In terms of scope, firms will seek to promote their standards as broadly as possible. 
However, these countries will occasionally fail to produce efficient technology markets 
as they will be plagued by excess inertia – where firms would be better off adopting a 
common standard but are unable or unwilling to agree upon a single standard from a 
given firm or alliance. 
 The fifth possible category is the combination of an IP Creator-Manufacturer with 
a weak state. As in the IP Creator-Licensor case, intellectual property is protected by the 
state legally but there is no push for the firms to license or manufacture. By tradition, 
firms emphasize deploying their own technology for product creation rather than 
licensing. Firms seek to build broad coalitions among themselves to facilitate access to IP 
on favorable terms so as to encourage high value products. Markets are generally open so 
long as firms are able to reach agreement on common sets of technologies underlying 
their products. However, without state coordination, the possibility remains for no single 
standard to emerge, thus creating competing blocks of firms with closed standards. The 
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scope of the market will generally be as broad as possible as firms seek to market their 
products worldwide. Without state support, protection is largely unavailable so firms will 
try to set or influence whatever standards are most widely adopted. 
 In the final case, leading, or simply globally oriented, firms have weak IP creation 
capabilities and no statist heritage or possesses a weak state due to disruptive historical 
events (like the fall of the Soviet Union or PRI governance in Mexico). The state is 
unable to dictate technology choices or to lobby for favorable licensing agreements on 
behalf of local firms. Firms must accept the licensing conditions of foreign IP holders as 
they lack the power to negotiate lower rates. At the same time, these countries will 
consistently seek to adopt international standards as this offers access to foreign 
technology markets. Firms emphasize adopting the broadest standards possible and do 
not challenge international standards. While firms are thus able to rapidly and efficiently 
scale up production and sales internationally, they lack the ability to influence the 
technology trajectory of standards or to push for alternative norms on IP pricing. 
 Using this model, it becomes possible to predict the form technology markets will 
take after different standardization efforts across countries. For example, France is known 
to have a strong government and a political economic tradition of state guidance in the 
economy and science and technology institutions. French firms are also producers of new 
technologies in an array of fields. According to this model, France would frequently 
belong in the first case: Statist IP Creator-Licensor. In France, we find that the state has a 
major role in shaping the technology standardization process. The country has strong 
respect for intellectual property rights but tries to use state power to encourage regional 
or global adoption of French technologies. The country licenses broadly to encourage 
adoption of French technology and return of royalties to French firms. On the flip side, 
however, where French technology is not internationally adopted, the state uses 
protection to ensure a market for French technologies. French technology standards are 
often closed, in the interest of promoting French firms and technology. 
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 At the other end of the spectrum, Mexico is known to have a weak state with very 
limited intervention in the internationally-oriented economy.4 Arguably, the lack of state 
intervention and direction makes Mexico an inviting place for foreign direct investments. 
At the same time, in technology-intensive industries, Mexican firms have little 
indigenous R&D and indeed remain low-value added manufacturers of foreign-designed 
goods. The result is that Mexico is resolutely an international standards taker. Its 
technology markets follow global trends and support whatever technologies have the 
largest global share. It contributes little to new standards development and does not 
oppose the licensing terms of existing foreign technologies.  
 Naturally, as the position in the global economy is firm specific, the results of this 
2X3 can vary for a country depending on the industry in question or which firms are 
participating in standardization. Accordingly, there are many countries for which their 
position in the global economy is neither completely as an IP creator nor as an IP taker. 
Similarly, there are many subtle levels of state involvement in the economy. A country’s 
position in this typology is also not static as it can change over time. For example, as 
recently as the 1980s, South Korean firms were technology takers, with low indigenous 
R&D capabilities and little ability to contribute sophisticated core technology to 
technology standards. However, South Korean firms have since become IP Creator-
Manufacturers. The legacies of earlier positions in the global economy remain influential, 
however. In the case of South Korea, firms and the state agree that intellectual property is 
important and the rights of IP holders should be considered inviolable. At the same time, 
however, Korean firms tend to view IP as secondary to production of goods and services. 
Hence Korean firms do not seek to monetize their IP through licensing or transfer of 
ownership so much as through the sale of actual goods and services, more like the 
approach of “IP Taker” countries. The heritage of being reliant on foreign technologies 
                                                 
4 Mexico effectively has two economies. The domestic economy is highly regulated and statist but the 
export-oriented sectors of the economy operate largely free of state intervention or heavy regulation. Some 
scholars attribute Mexico’s limited technology upgrading capabilities to this the laissez-faire approach. 
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and keeping their firms plugged into global markets continues; South Korea is disinclined 
to promote exclusionary standards. 
 As developed in greater length in chapter four, China is a rapidly progressing 
technology power. It has a very strong tradition of state involvement in the economy and 
institutions of standardization geared to ensure reliance upon the state for funding and 
strategic direction. It is also plugged into the global economy as an IP Taker. This means 
that even where the state is interested in promoting indigenous technology as a 
complement or replacement for foreign technology, many Chinese firms are disinterested, 
given their reliance upon global technology trends. Thus we see China as falling in the 
Statist IP-Taker category but with tendencies trending toward the Statist IP Creator-
Manufacturer as firms’ technology development capabilities become more sophisticated. 
Like South Korea, Chinese firms value production and seek means of producing at the 
lowest possible costs while also ensuring the broadest possible markets for their goods. 
Approach and Cases 
 To illustrate how this theory accounts for different technology market outcomes 
in different cases, this dissertation looks at the processes by which standards are created 
and the political influences on those processes in three countries and regions. I adopt a 
comparative political economy methodology approach to studying standards. To enable 
compatibility across cases, I narrow my observations to a sub-set of technology 
standards: information and communication technology (ICT). This set of standards 
provides a rich base of different cases to compare as the world’s major economies are all 
involved in the research, development, production and commercialization of ICT goods 
and the technology standards on which they are based. Further, ICT is a critical industry, 
both for its economic contributions but also as the infrastructure which binds together the 
global economy and has facilitated the rise of the information society. Based on field 
research and primary and secondary source documents, this dissertation proposes a model 
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for standardization and market formation which links politics to market outcomes 
through the lens of standardization. 
 This dissertation examines this model by considering the standardization 
processes and markets for technology in the United States, Europe and China. These 
cases provide rich comparison as all three are active in the ICT industry, and all seek to 
influence, set, and control the standards underpinning these technologies. These cases 
provide variation on two key causal variables: historical institutions and position within 
the global economy. In terms of historical institutions, China and Europe actually share 
more in common than they do with the United States as both have strong statist traditions. 
For economic position, however, the US and Europe are more similar as both are 
decidedly IP Creators. These overlapping positions on these two variables enable us to 
isolate the relative impact of each variable on the four aspects of standards and hence 
market outcomes. Where US and European technology markets differ, it may be 
attributed to different historical institutions. Where China and Europe differ, it results 
from different positions within the global economy. 
 Technology standardization in the United States is a product of historical 
institutions determined during the late 19th and early 20th century as well as a political 
economy with a traditionally weak state, particularly during the period of rapid 
industrialization (Cochrane 1966; Dunlavy 1994; Shapiro and Varian 2003; Russel 2009). 
Technology standardization institutions in the US thus evolved to emphasize voluntary 
association, leadership by firms and firm representatives and a minimum of state 
involvement. This means firms tend to be the most active agents in standardization and 
their interests are reflected more or better than those of the state. In terms of position 
within the global economy, US information technology firms are often innovative 
leaders, specializing in the generation of new technologies. US firms tend to support 
strong intellectual property rights in standards, and emphasize these rights over other 
interests such as dissemination. American firms have also become increasingly interested 
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in treating IP as a major, if not the predominant, source of income and wealth. This 
means firms are strongly inclined to create technologies and then license them rather than 
seek to incorporate the technologies in their own final products. 
 Europe’s institutions of standardization evolved at the same time as the United 
States but did so in a very different political economic climate. European governments 
during the late 19th and early 20th century – particularly France and Germany – were 
heavily involved in their economies (Gerschenkron 1962; Dunlavy 1994). European 
governments sought to use the forces of industrialization to build national wealth and 
power through strategic efforts (List 1841 (1991)). Even the United Kingdom opted to 
follow the German model for standardization by creating a single government-licensed 
body to coordinate standardization activities. This historic role for the state means 
standards do not necessarily reflect only the interests of firms. State interests in “ideal” or 
“fair” markets and competition are successfully voiced in standardization. Like the US, 
Europe is a global leader in innovation and technology generation. Thus, the major 
differences in technology markets with the United States arise due to the role of the state 
and the emphasis on either licensing or manufacturing. Countries such as Germany and 
Sweden emphasize manufacturing while France emphasizes protection and promotion of 
French IP. Across Europe, firms remain committed to strong intellectual property rights, 
albeit tempered by state and regional (EU-level) government desires for broad technology 
dissemination and access. 
 China’s standardization system is much more recent, having only been formed in 
the 1950s under Soviet tutelage. The Chinese standardization system was explicitly and 
legally mandated to be state-led (Wang, Wang et al. 2009). Firms had little role in 
standardization as efforts to develop standards were explicitly the responsibility of 
government industrial ministries. Under this system, standards had the force of legal 
regulations, thus being the polar opposite of the American “voluntary” ideal for standards 
(Ernst 2011; Ernst 2013). Although the Chinese system has been significantly reformed, 
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the changes made primarily in the 1980s still reflected state leadership and involvement 
in standards (NPCPRC 1988; SAC 2008-2010). Firms in China tend to resist taking 
positions in standardization without first being prompted by the state (Author’s 
Interviews). Firms in China also are mostly manufacturers of established or commodity 
technologies rather than technology creators (Cao 2004; Cao, Simon et al. 2009; Breznitz 
and Murphree 2011). As a result, Chinese standards tend to emphasize the importance of 
broad dissemination of technology for free or nominal royalties. Chapters three and four 
explore in detail how these different standardization systems emerged, the countries’ 
positions within the fragmented global economy, and how this determines the structure 
and operation of their technology markets. 
Defining the Terms: Markets and Standards 
 For the mechanism proposed here to make sense, it is necessary to define markets, 
institutions and standards. The description and definition of technology standards in this 
section serve as a brief overview of the material discussed at length in chapter two which 
offers an in-depth look at technology standards, the politics of standards, and the role of 
standards in market formation.  
Markets 
 To describe the influence of politics on markets through technology standards, we 
must first clarify what is or is not a market. In doing so, we must remember that markets 
are not self-generating but are, as Trigilia notes, “simply one out of many historically 
specific ways to arrange institutions of exchange” (Trigilia 2002). As there have been 
other non-market-based modes of exchange at various periods in human history, the 
market mechanism itself is a human creation. Since they are creations of human society, 
markets can be reformed or molded into different patterns of distribution. This is 
important when considering the relationship between technology standards and markets. 
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If markets are human creations, creating a market affords actors with opportunities to 
influence aspects of those markets, especially the distribution of gains, losses, and power. 
 Since the 18th century, economists have wrestled with the concept of a “market.” 
Smith defined the market as the set of human interactions governed by a price mechanism 
set by the “invisible hand” (Smith 1937). A market exists where there are multiple 
interchangeable goods so that buyers must compete with one another to gain the business 
of customers who are seeking the best price for their desired goods or services. Other 
scholars have looked at markets differently; they emphasize certain necessary attributes 
of markets. Cournot emphasizes in his “Researches” that: 
 
“It is well known that by market, economists mean, not a certain place 
where purchases and sales are carried on, but the entire territory of which 
the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted commerce that 
prices there take the same level throughout, with ease and rapidity” 
(Cournot 1838 (1897)), Ch 4., Paragraph 23).5  
 
 Scholars emphasize that a market is the geographic region throughout which the 
price mechanism achieves uniformity of prices for goods and services – mediated by 
competition and substitutability. Jevons argued that there was a certain amount of 
information necessary for a market to form: the stocks of the actors and their intentions to 
exchange and the ratio of exchange (price) had to be known to all (Jevons 1871 (1970)). 
Only so far as this knowledge is available can there be said to be a “market.” 
 More recent sociologists such as Fligstein have used a relatively simple definition 
of “market” – a “situation in which some good or service is sold to customers for a price 
that is paid in money” (Fligstein 1996). Fligstein continues, saying the market is an 
“abstract space of exchange in which frequent intercourse among buyers and sellers 
                                                 
5 Anyone who has ever purchased gasoline knows, however, that this range can be very small indeed – 
often limited to a single street intersection. Only a few hundred yards away – but out of sight – the prices 
will differ. Consumers require information in order to compare and thus induce competition. The advent of 
mobile “apps” which identify which gas stations have the lowest prices may – if they become widely used 
– increase the size of this “market” where prices are identical. 
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determines prices.” Menard argues that “a market is a specific institutional arrangement 
consisting of rules and conventions that make possible a larger number of voluntary 
transfers of property rights on a regular basis, these reversible transfers being 
implemented and enforced though a specific mechanism of regulation, the competitive 
price system” (Menard 1995).  
 The sum of these scholars’ definitions is a series of descriptive attributes which 
define a human institution as “market” or “not market.” If these attributes are present, 
however imperfectly, there is a “market.” Once the most basic elements of a market are 
clearly delineated, it is possible to describe how a market form and can be molded. This 
clarifies the role played by standards as the means of fulfilling these necessary attributes. 
There are at least two basic attributes necessary for a “market” to exist: presence of 
multiple buyers and sellers and trust among actors. When these features are present the 
“market” can be said to exist as Smith’s mechanism of the “invisible hand” will be able 
to function. 
 The most basic element of a market is the necessity of having two or more buyers 
and sellers. With only one buyer, there is no market as the price mechanism does not 
work. The buyer is able to dictate the price. Similarly, with only one seller, a monopoly 
condition exists and price is not determined through competition. For this dissertation, a 
monopolistic market is acknowledged. Indeed, these are often the results of de facto 
standardization where alternative technologies are completely eliminated or formal 
standards legally mandating the use of a single technology from a single or narrow 
alliance of firms. Monopolistic markets do not yield the sought after benefits of 
standardization and market competition – that is falling prices and arguably increased 
innovation. This further increases the political stakes in technology standardization. 
When done well, standards result in competitive technology markets, but they can also be 
used to create closed monopolies. Before the integrated development of GSM in Europe, 
different states each created national technology monopolies by only permitting the use 
 32
of indigenous mobile telephony standards. These national monopolies retarded the 
development of mobile telephony in France, Germany and Italy in particular (Funk 
1998). 
 Arguably most importantly, there must be trust among agents for there to be 
market exchange. Granovetter’s research found that embeddedness of institutions and 
actors was intended to increase trust among them and therefor enable exchange to take 
place (Granovetter 1983). Where buyers and sellers have neither faith in the medium of 
exchange (ie: will the money hold its value? Is the money being used counterfeit?) nor 
that the seller is not trying to cheat, there will be impediments to exchange. Although 
trust can be built over time and through repeated interaction, to even begin a market, 
there must be some degree of trust and hence certainty against cheating. Without a 
mechanism for certainty, the probabilities of different outcomes cannot be determined 
making it impossible for agents to exist as conscious utility maximizers (Beckert 1996). 
For a market to form, therefore, there must be means of mitigating uncertainty. 
Economists, sociologists, and political economists usually prescribe a set of “institutions” 
as the means of reducing uncertainty and building the trust necessary for markets to 
function. This dissertation lies within this strain of the research as standards are a form of 
uncertainty-reducing institution which enables market formation and operation.6 
 A primary means of mitigating uncertainty and hence enabling markets is through 
rules and conventions. These constrain the behavior of would-be market actors to ensure 
they compete fairly. While there are sanctioning mechanisms possible without formal 
rules and conventions such as the loss of demand for a seller’s goods or services after 
they are revealed to be defective or deceptive, society must first face injury before the 
mechanism self-corrects. To prevent such ills, and to draw lines around what sorts of 
pricing, marketing, production, and service practices are considered acceptable, a market 
                                                 
6 Standards are not the only institution able to furnish these attributes. Other institutions noted in the risk 
and uncertainty literature such as rule of law and property rights, and interpersonal trust as researched by 
Granovetter are also critical to market formation and function. 
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requires rules and conventions. Rules and conventions help agents to understand the rules 
of competitive games ex ante and to reduce the uncertainty over the intentions and 
behavior of other actors. Standards are on such trust-building institution.  
Institutions 
 Standards are a product of historical institutions and are also an institution in the 
formation of markets; hence it is important to clarify what is meant by “institutions”. 
Institutions for markets are formal and informal means of ensuring that agents have the 
confidence they need to enter exchange relations with one another. I take the Northian 
definition of institutions – formal and informal routinized patterns of behavior (North 
1990). This definition necessarily includes formal laws and regulations as well as 
established practices for which there are no written guidelines. Institutions can include 
cultural norms of behavior, established but informal channels through which influence or 
information are transmitted, as well as legally established hierarchies, rights and 
responsibilities. Some standardization scholars have argued for a broad definition of 
standards, such that would encompass informal but established institutions, defining these 
instead as a type of cultural or social standard instead of just as institutions (Busch 2011). 
For market formation, institutions are critical as they reduce uncertainty. Standards also 
set the rules of the competitive game in technology markets by establishing the positions 
and relative power of different actors. This helps determine market outcomes. 
 One of the difficulties with using institutions as a causal variable in research is 
that institutions themselves emerge through political processes involving other 
institutions. For this reason, I take a historical institutionalist approach in this dissertation 
(Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Hall and Taylor 1996). Historical institutionalism emphasizes 
that the formal and informal routinized patterns of behavior discussed by North are 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy and often 
reflect the long-term influence of historical accidents or crises. For my primary causal 
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variables, this is important as standards in different countries are the product of these 
embedded pressures coming from the position of firms or states in the global economy as 
well as the different historical circumstances in which they emerge. In discussing 
technology standardization and market formation in different countries, it is essential to 
consider the pathways through which institutions governing standardization were created. 
This helps explain the different values placed on intellectual property, openness and 
scope – the variables which determine technology markets. 
 Historical institutionalism emphasizes the asymmetries of power within and 
among institutions in their formation and operation. This is important for this dissertation 
as different levels of power shape the standardization process and the final position of 
actors. Where a state, or state sub-unit such as a ministry or even research group, has 
significantly more power than other actors, a standardization effort will reflect their 
interests to a greater degree than other actors’. It is these imbalances of power and 
influence that determine different patterns in standardization and, later, market formation. 
 Historical institutionalism argues institutions are the product of historical 
processes. This means the creation of institutions may be the result of specific historical 
conditions or crises, yet through path dependency these historical events shape the way 
organizations and individuals behave long after conditions have changed. It is extremely 
difficult to change historically derived institutions and power relations among agents 
within them, even with reforms. Thus institutions are an enduring force. For instance, in 
China, institutions of standardization were created when the planned economy was still 
dominant; thus the state remains the key actor in standardization. In the United States, 
however, standardization institutions developed during a time of weak central 
government. Government attempts to assert itself in standards have usually failed.7  
                                                 
7 The one major exception to this rule is in the area of telecommunications policy. As the national 
regulator, the FCC has the ability to impose standards through its control over the allocation of spectrum 
for use by broadcast industries and mobile telephony operators. At different times the FCC has been an 
active promoter of one standard or another, but it has also chosen in many cases to allow the enterprises to 
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What are Technology Standards? 
 Building on the definitions of standards used by international standards 
development organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and national standards bodies 
including the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the Standardization 
Administration of China (SAC), standards are formal written protocols, developed by 
consensus or a modified consensus principle in a formal or ad hoc body, that serve 
as a platform for interoperability, comparability and on which other applications 
and innovations can be built. This definition encompasses both the most basic 
metrological standards (standards of weight and measure) – developed by scientific 
consensus with political support – and highly complex and detailed technology standards 
defining the capabilities, qualities and functioning of high speed computer networks.8 
 A defining feature of standards is that once they are established, other firms – 
even those unrelated to the development and adoption of the standard – are able to use the 
standard as the basis for products or as the basis for development of related goods and 
services. Standards are thus a public good insomuch as one firm’s use of a standard does 
not diminish its value or availability to others (Kindleberger 1983). To make such a 
platform for competition, standards must define specific dimensions or capabilities. 
Where the specifications are sufficiently detailed, all a firm needs do is make sure their 
products or services conform to the standard and the firm – and its customers – can be 
confident that it will work with other components and networks in the same standard. 
However, although standards are public goods, they are more rightly considered “semi-
public” goods as the benefits of standardization accrue unevenly. As discussed above, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
decide for themselves whether or not to support one standard, or any standard, for their industry (Besen 
1986). 
8 Metrology is the science of measurement. Metrological standards are the formal agreements on values and 
conversion ratios for mass, weight, distance, volume, and time. Standardization bodies such as America’s 
National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) and Germany’s Imperial Physikalisch-Technische 
Reichsanstalt were originally created to develop standards and values for metrology. 
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IP policies of a standard in particular determine the profitability of different business 
strategies – IP licensing versus products. Thus, the degree of benefit a firm receives from 
a standard will vary depending on the standard’s content and the firm’s business strategy. 
While all firms have access to a standard, the benefits are not even. 
 Standards also have the effect of “freezing” the development of technology at a 
certain level, thus enabling peripheral innovations to be built around it (Kindleberger 
1983; Besen and Johnson 1986; Ernst 2009; Ernst 2011).9 This freezing of technology 
also effectively precludes development of alternative technologies as these have no 
market. Setting the standard for a new technology offers firms a major long-term 
technological and competitive advantage over others. As the masters of the core 
technology, they also have intimate familiarity with it which often translates into further 
innovations laying the groundwork for the next generation of standards. So long as a firm 
continues in this vein, they may be able to preserve a competitive advantage through 
multiple generations of standards. The challenge, however, for states seeking to 
normatively or strategically shape markets to achieve goals other than the smooth 
exchange of goods and services, is how to prevent control over standards from creating 
monopoly power or preventing the emergence of superior alternative technologies. 
 Standards are also highly dense. States interested in using standards to 
normatively mold markets in their desired form also face a difficulty from the relative 
impenetrability of standards which makes them incomprehensible to non-experts. The 
formal documentation for a standard usually consists of hundreds of pages of technical 
specifications defining terminology, outlining protocols and specifying the technologies 
necessary to make the protocols deliver the necessary performance as defined by the 
standard. This documentation makes standards dense and difficult for non-engineers to 
                                                 
9 The term “freeze” comes from the standards literature. It does not mean that technology development 
stops but rather that standards codify the state of knowledge and state of the art in a field up to that point. 
Standards thus lock technology at a certain level. New developments are then made on top of this locked-in 
platform leading to the next major upgrade or development. 
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understand or analyze for potential impact. The meetings for standards development 
working groups and technical committees use similarly obtuse language, making it 
difficult for non-experts to follow the discussions or understand the implications of 
various measures being debated.  
 Impenetrability enhances the influence of actors such as corporate IP lawyers and 
engineers while inhibiting the ability of untrained government experts or civil society 
representatives to influence the path of standardization. The complexity of standards 
makes it difficult for states to fully appreciate the implications of a given standard as well 
as the technologies incorporated in it. This complicates the political process of standards 
development. 
 Technology standards can be classified as de facto or formal (de jure) standards. 
De facto standards are set through competition where the winner pushes competitors out 
and acquires a technology monopoly. A technology monopoly forms when a standard 
pushes aside all alternative approaches. The backers of alternative approaches abandon 
their chosen technology and adopt the common standard. Most de facto standards are still 
open insomuch as firms are free to adopt and utilize the platform for their own 
innovations. This means that once the standard has been established, there will be 
competition, usually price-based, within the standard among firms confirming to it.  
 Formal standards are developed by institutionalized technology standards bodies 
whose decisions are based on consensus or majority vote. Formal standards development 
organizations can be non-governmental organizations, such as the Institute of Electric and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), or state membership-based bodies like the ITU and ISO.10 
At the national level, formal standards bodies include non-governmental bodies, such as 
ANSI or the European Technical Standards Institute (ETSI) that define national or 
regional standards. These bodies may or may not actually make the standards for which 
                                                 
10 IEEE is a professional organization made up of electrical engineering experts and sets standards for 
electronics. It has no independent enforcement capability. ISO and ITU membership is limited to 
representatives of different countries. These organizations also have no formal enforcement capability. 
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they are responsible. Some national standards bodies such as the German Institute for 
Standardization (DNI) and the French Standards Association (AFNOR) draft, adopt, and 
certify national standards. Others such as ANSI are administrative bodies that only certify 
standards and represent their states in formal inter-governmental standards organizations. 
 The type of standards organization used to create a formal standard has significant 
impact on the market which will emerge. De facto standardization is decidedly led by the 
private sector. It privileges established firms able to independently produce complete or 
nearly complete technologies. Small firms are often excluded from the developmental 
process or may only participate at a cost disadvantage as they must pay to license the 
leaders’ technologies. In contrast, formal standardization offers smaller firms, civil 
society, and government ministries an opportunity to voice their opinions and make 
submissions. Formal standardization may also include specific rules regarding the 
inclusion of technology, degree of openness in licensing and limits on costs. Thus 
different state preferences for de facto or formal standardization practices will determine 
the performance and nature of the technology markets in that state. If a state prefers de 
facto standardization, corporate interests will dominate. Formal standardization has the 
potential to constrain corporate interests in setting up a market to incumbents’ advantage. 
Nonetheless, even formal standardization is often criticized as beholden to the interests of 
incumbent large firms. Part of the reason is the cost involved in sustaining involvement in 
standardization – a process that takes years and is beyond the reach of smaller firms. 
 To develop standards, standards development organizations establish technical 
committees to draft the protocols for a given technology or area of interest. Some 
technical committees are disbanded after developing a standard while others become 
institutionalized organizations which continue to improve standards or draft new ones in 
the same industrial sector for years. Under technical committees, working groups of 
experts – sometimes based in single firms – propose, test, debate, and adopt protocols to 
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incorporate into the final standard. Inclusion of technologies or approval of protocols is 
accomplished through consensus and/or simple majority vote in the technical committee.   
How Standards Shape Markets 
  The development of the modern PC industry provides a simple illustration of 
how standardization shapes technology market conditions. Before 1984, there were no 
fewer than four competing personal computing standards: Apple, UNIX, CSIS, and IBM. 
At this time, the different approaches effectively constituted closed monopolies where a 
single provider sold to a captive group of customers. Software was limited to one 
platform and the range of hardware available was limited to a single company provider. 
This meant a consumer became a captive to whichever standard he or she adopted as 
parts and software were not interchangeable. Each standard effectively constituted a 
closed monopoly where users were bound to the parent company whose standard they 
utilized. 
 IBM’s PC took an alternate approach by accident, but the resulting open standard 
created a fiercely competitive PC market resulting in rapidly declining prices and 
increased market size. Although the IBM BIOS was proprietary, IBM decided to utilize 
an operating system from Microsoft rather than one developed in-house. By not requiring 
the use of its own software operating system, it was possible for other vendors to build 
IBM “clone” computers by reverse engineering the BIOS and shipping copies of the 
Microsoft operating system with the computer hardware. Ironically, the same Taiwanese 
firms that IBM sued for illegally copying its BIOS helped popularize IBM’s platform. 
Using Microsoft’s operating system also made it easier for software developers to create 
programs which worked on any PC clone. This effort at standardization was the first step 
to creating an international competitive personal computing market. With multiple 
vendors supplying effectively identical machines able to run the same software, 
consumers now had the freedom to choose among substitutable goods. Price competition 
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began, rapidly driving down the costs of personal computers. As costs fell, mass demand 
further increased which encouraged more firms to begin computer production and more 
vendors to develop software for the IBM platform. With IBM’s open platform, there were 
multiple vendors and buyers, thus creating a market. The act of setting a standard created 
a competitive market. 
 The standards literature often discusses competition between standards. There is a 
theory that a standard “wins” when it gains sufficient market share that there is a 
bandwagon effect and new adopters choose one standard over the other. Before a 
common standard emerges,  there are separate fragmented monopolistic markets. Victory 
occurs where a standard creates the largest market through its openness and availability 
as a platform for other firms to build upon – or simply when it becomes large enough that 
potential customer base entices late adopters away from alternative standards.  
 As discussed above, a major challenge for market creation is the reduction of 
uncertainty to allow agents to enter exchange relations with one another. Standards help 
reduce this uncertainty. For example, safety standards ensure products or services are not 
injurious to consumers. Standards for heat resistance in wire coatings for electronics will 
enable manufacturers to know in advance which wires they may source that meet 
regulatory requirements on fire prevention. Quality standards facilitate trade through 
lowered transaction costs (via decreased information asymmetry between sellers and 
buyers). The grading system for meats (Grade A, etc) allows buyers to know the quality 
of their purchases without having to visit the supplier’s factory or painstakingly inspect 
every shipment. Standardized measures of quality enable potential buyers to acquire 
goods or services sight unseen with a measure of confidence. At the same time, however, 
non-uniform standards can actually have the opposite effect. All international travelers 
know well the irritation of being unable to use different electronic devices due to 
different standardized voltages and plug styles. Non-uniform standards fragment markets 
and raise transaction and conversion costs undermining market formation and expansion. 
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 It is important to note that standards are not the only means of reducing 
uncertainty – that is lowering transaction costs. As Williamson (1983) argued, hierarchy 
– vertical integration within a single enterprise – is a means of facilitating clarity and 
understanding. Where a single firm conducts all R&D, manufacturers the components 
and declares its own internal standards by fiat, a formal external standard is not 
necessary. However, using single firm hierarchy produces suboptimal outcomes 
compared with using standardization as a means of reducing uncertainty. Hierarchy 
reduces uncertainty by at a cost to innovation – and usually higher costs to consumers 
due to less competition. 
 In Information and communication technology, technology standards are essential 
for market formation as ICT standards enable devices to communicate. Once multiple 
devices become compatible, products from multiple vendors can become interchangeable 
with ease. This even applies where the standard developing body is entirely private. For 
example, the Universal Serial Bus (USB), developed by a consortium of US computer 
firms including Intel, IBM, and Microsoft, has become the global standard for interfacing 
computer peripherals with the main system. The USB standard has eliminated the need 
for multiple incompatible jacks which had made it difficult to design peripheral products 
for any and all types of personal computers. Readers may recall the multiple ports 
necessary for attaching mice, keyboards, speakers, and other devices. USB makes it 
possible to guarantee compatibility, reduce space requirements, and simplify design. USB 
has helped alleviate market confusion and increased the market for peripherals. Buyers 
can confidently purchase hardware from different vendors and be assured of its 
compatibility.11 Attesting to the power of the standard, there have been subsequent 
updates and improvements to the capabilities of USB but no serious challenger has yet 
emerged – with the possible exception of the much higher speed HDMI standard for 
                                                 
11 The market success of USB is such that both Apple and PC-brands use it as the basic connection 
interface. 
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inter-device media transfers. The technology standard (USB) thus created a competitive 
global market in computer peripherals, one with greater choice and lower prices for 
consumers as well as ease of market entry by vendors and producers. 
 For firms, there is great value in creating a standard. Some firms, such as 
Microsoft, have invested heavily in technology development and lobbying in standards 
development organizations in the hope of having their technology established as a 
standard – and thus creation of a new market (particularly OOXML). Setting the standard 
can result in technology lock-in. For example, although there are competing software 
options including free open-source and online tools, Microsoft’s Office suite dominates 
the global market in word processing, spreadsheets, and presentation software. This 
effective monopoly enhances Microsoft’s brand value and makes it difficult for 
competing technologies to take root in the market.12 Firms whose technology is 
incorporated into a technology standard stand to earn massive returns, while those who 
supported a losing standard might find their R&D investment wasted. An illustration of 
the power of standards victory and defeat can be seen in the battle between Sony and 
Toshiba over high-definition optical disc players. The victory of Sony’s Blu Ray over 
Toshiba’s High Definition-Digital Video Disc (HD-DVD) was so complete that Toshiba 
exited the HD market. Facing significant losses, Toshiba licensed its technology at very 
low rates to Chinese firms in order to cut these losses. Chinese firms went on to use this 
technology as the basis for the indigenous China Brand High Definition violet laser disc 
standard. Expert analysis estimates 90% of the technology for the Chinese standard came 
from HD-DVD (Hsu and Hwang 2008). Firms without contributions to a standard are 
able to utilize the standard but must pay licensing fees for the right to do so, thus placing 
                                                 
12 Through the “network effect” in which more users adopting a given technology can exponentially 
increase that technologies’ value due to the number of compatible partners.  As such standards such as 
Microsoft Office become deeply entrenched. Known as “Metcalfe’s Law”, this method of valuation has 
been used to explain the value of social networks, computer networks and the Internet. 
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them at a price disadvantage vis-à-vis the firms which successfully continued technology 
to the standard. 
The Role of Politics in Standards 
 Technology standards development is neither apolitical nor necessarily 
technologically rational. Politics, the apportionment of scarce resources by non-market 
mechanisms, is very much part of the standards development process. As technical 
standards shape markets, control over the standards development process offers 
significant competitive advantages. Firms with controlling interests in standards (or 
major intellectual property contributions to them) earn licensing fees, brand recognition, 
and a price advantage in competition. Existing research also shows that control over 
essential core technology in standards grants firms an advantage in controlling the 
trajectory of technology development in future generations of a standard. This affords 
potentially long-term sustained competitive advantage. Thus firms and states have a 
strong incentive to take an active interest in standardization and attempt to control the 
standardization process or steer discussions and technology development toward a 
favored set of technologies or firms. Control over essential intellectual property also 
privileges licensing-heavy business strategies. 
 Control of technology standards has real sustained market impact, meaning firms 
and states have a strong incentive to seek control over standards. On the other hand, state 
involvement in technology standardization can also backfire. In the 1970s and 80s, the 
Japanese government famously used standards to protect its domestic market. Japanese 
standards were frequently mandatory and opaque. It was extremely difficult for foreign 
companies to receive the “JS” stamp certifying them as compliant with Japanese 
standards. While protection was effective in building a dedicated home market for 
Japanese firms, in globally oriented industries, it may have had a long-term negative 
result. Japan’s insistence on using unique technology standards for mobile telephony in 
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the 1990s arguably prevented the emergence of Japanese mobile phone firms as global 
leaders (Funk 1998; Funk 2002; Kushida 2011).13 While Japanese technology had been 
world beating in the 1980s, and many innovations in the 1990s were far ahead of foreign 
competitors, these were based on technology standards only used in Japan. As a result, 
Japanese firms were forced to divide their resources between producing for their 
domestic market and making a separate set of devices for the global market. This helped 
undermine their long-term competitiveness against firms able to concentrate solely on 
one standard. Despite the potential risks, states and firms increasingly understand the 
stakes involved in international technology standardization and take an active role in 
promoting and protecting their interests. 
 Since the 1990s, the incentive to shape standards has only grown. Enforcement of 
adherence international standards is accomplished through the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). In response to the use of technology standards as a trade barrier in the 1970s and 
1980s, the Uruguay Round of the trade negotiations incorporated language regarding 
technology standards into the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement.14 Under the 
WTO, the TBT agreement’s preamble notes that standards encourage and facilitate trade 
and that harmonious standards are to be encouraged wherever and whenever possible. 
The preamble states: 
 
“Recognizing the important contribution that international standards and 
conformity assessment systems can make in this regard by improving 
                                                 
13 Today, it appears Japanese mobile telephony firms (including Sony) are at their nadir of international 
influence. In the internationally dominant FDD-based 4G Long term Evolution standard for mobile 
telephony, only one Japanese company – NEC – has any standards essential patents. In contrast, the United 
States and Korea control 42% and 34%, respectively, of the standards essential patents. 
14 Since standards determine the terms of competition, they can easily be used as a protectionist device. If 
the terms of the standard restrict the ability of certain firms – whether foreign or just non-incumbents – to 
license necessary technologies or receive certification as compliant (necessary to reduce uncertainty when a 
user considers a new vendor), the standard fosters a market with limited participation. This will raise prices 
within the market but also ensure higher revenues per sale for protected participants. It can also limit 
adoption and retard technology dissemination and innovation. These negative impacts, however, are not the 
focus of standards developers or implementers whose primary focus is on creating markets to the benefit of 
specific interest groups. 
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efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade; 
Desiring therefore to encourage the development of such international 
standards and conformity assessment systems” (WTO 1995). 
 
 However, the experience with unique and incompatible standards also showed 
how standards could be used as highly effective barriers to trade. The preamble 
continues: 
 
“Desiring however to ensure that technical regulations and standards, 
including packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and procedures 
for assessment of conformity with technical regulations and standards do 
not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade” (WTO 1995). 
 
 To prevent the emergence of protectionist standards, the TBT agreement states 
that where international standards have been established, member states must adopt 
international standards as their national standards. In effect, the WTO requires member 
states to join the international market under an existing standard, not to create alternative 
protected markets using incompatible technologies. According to the 1995 TBT 
agreement text: 
 
“Where technical regulations are required and relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, members shall use them, 
or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations” 
(WTO 1995).  
 
 Stated directly, the TBT agreement requires WTO members to use internationally 
accepted standards. WTO members who adopt non-conforming technology standards 
may face retaliatory action by offended parties through the WTO’s arbitration apparatus. 
Unique compulsory standards can be used as trade barriers and are banned under TBT 
rules. Offenders can also be brought into WTO arbitration. 
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 While the TBT agreement makes compliance with international standards 
enforceable, the WTO arbitration mechanism is rarely used. The arbitration mechanism is 
universally agreed to be too slow and cumbersome to have meaningful enforcement 
ability. To date, only a single standards-based case has been brought for arbitration, 
concerning a European attempt to restrict use of the word “sardines” (WTO 2003). Under 
this case, the market for sardines was to be limited to fish sourced in the Mediterranean. 
Control of the supply for the market in sardines would raise the price for the fish in 
Europe but support the livelihoods of fishermen. The WTO courts agreed with the 
countries bringing the suit that the standard was deliberately protectionist. Accordingly, 
the WTO ordered Europe to repeal the standard. 
 Despite the ineffectiveness of the formal WTO arbitration mechanism, the TBT 
has created strong norms against exclusionary standards. These norms mean that more 
often than not, a single standard will emerge worldwide. Actors controlling this standard 
will have enormous economic and political power. This greatly increases the incentive to 
use all of the means available to ensure ones technology becomes the global standard. In 
such a winner-take-all environment, political pressures increase. To return to the sardine 
example, a standard mandating that sardines were only Mediterranean fish would grant 
market power to European fishermen and states.  
 A final aspect of technology standards, and one that differentiates them from 
standards more generally and contributes to the political wrangling in their development, 
is the incorporation of proprietary intellectual property. As a technology standard is 
developed, participating firms and organizations suggest specific approaches and 
technologies which address the general needs and requirements of the standard. Once 
written into the protocols of the standard, these technologies become essential. If the 
technologies are protected by patents, then conforming with the standard means that a 
firm will infringe upon the existing patent. The patent then becomes a “standards 
essential patent” (SEP). Contributing firms are expected to make good-faith declarations 
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of relevant patents that relate to proposed standards and to make the patents available for 
licenses under Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. This means 
the firm will not restrict the firms which would like to license their SEP and will make 
their SEP available at reasonable royalty rates. Control over SEP, however, yields great 
influence in the market created by a technology standard. When SEPs are protected, 
licensing becomes a viable business strategy – and one affording a firm the ability to 
largely control a standard. At the same time, however, standards which mandate free or 
low-cost licensing privilege product firms at the expense of firms using licensing 
strategies. This means there is a strong incentive for firms – whether licensors or product 
firms – to control the IP system of a standard. 
 With the terms and background of the debate on standardization and technology 
markets thus defined, the remaining sections of this chapter outline the research 
methodology used in this research and summaries of the remaining chapters. 
Research Methodology 
 This dissertation uses two methodological approaches. First, it follows the 
tradition of inductive theory-building (Ragin 1987; Eisenhardt 1989; King, Keohane et al. 
1994; Ragin 1994; Yin 1994; Van Evera 1997). This methodological tradition argues that 
the best way to develop rigorous and empirically sound theories is to first openly examine 
empirical reality and then through an iterative process going back and forth between 
theory and the field develop a theory. Rather than first deductively determine a theory 
and then check if it effectively describes empirical reality, this approach requires theory 
to grow from observation (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
 This research also makes use of the comparative case study approach (King, 
Keohane et al. 1994; Van Evera 1997). Rather than a purely in-case study of a single well 
developed and deeply researched instance, the theoretical implications are drawn from 
systematically examining the similarities and differences between cases. Using multiple 
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cases helps to show which variables are actually significant and thus likely causal. To do 
so, this dissertation has made use of Mill’s method of difference for inductive theory 
development, also known as Most Similar Systems Design (Mill 1843(2002)). The 
dependent variable – technology markets – differs between the three cases. I then looked 
back across a range of variables, noting the areas where the three cases differed, thus 
showing the likely causal source of this variance. 
 For data gathering, this dissertation used both field and book research. The China 
case is based primarily on inductive field research through semi-structured interviews 
supplemented by primary and secondary source material on Chinese standardization. It 
follows in the tradition of institutional-industry studies. This research tradition assumes 
that in order to understand industry practices – such as standardization, researchers must 
analyze regular patterns of behavior, interactions, competition, and cooperation that 
constrain and support certain capabilities, as well as the forces that motivate economic 
actors to behave in particular ways (Zysman 1983; Piore and Sabel 1984; Fligstein 1990; 
Powell and Dimaggio 1991; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993; Zysman 1994; Herrigel 1996; 
Kenney 2000; Lester and Piore 2004; Breznitz 2005; Berger 2006; Breznitz 2007; 
Breznitz 2007; Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Breznitz and Zysman 2013). The field 
research took place over 30 months in China between 2007 and 2012. In total, 307 semi-
structured interviews, site visits, and meetings were performed, not counting repeats. The 
research was conducted across China but primarily in Beijing, Shanghai, the Pearl River 
Delta region (Shenzhen, Dongguan, Guangzhou, Hong Kong), Xiamen, and Jinan. As the 
center of China’s political system and home of most standards-making bodies, the 
majority of interviews were held in Beijing. Some interviewees were interviewed 
multiple times – as many as six – over the course of the field research period which 
provides a dynamic picture of their changing perspectives regarding the structure, 
performance, and role of standards in China’s technology markets over the period. 
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 Interviewees included all of the actors involved in technology development, 
commercialization, regulation, and standardization in China. Eighty-one interviewees 
were from small and medium-sized enterprises. These interviewees were the founders, 
general managers, and chief technology officers of these firms. Seventy-seven 
interviewees were government officials representing levels of administration from 
townships (the rural equivalent of a county in the US administrative system) to central 
government ministries. Government officials included department heads and vice-heads, 
middle managers and bureaucrats working in specific functional areas such as technology 
transfer promotion. Forty-nine academics including university professors, university 
presidents, and lab directors also participated. Thirty-eight representatives from large-
scale and state-owned enterprises also participated in the research. For this project, a 
large-scale enterprise was any firm employing more than 500 workers. These 
interviewees included department managers, lab directors, government-relations 
managers, and technology officers. To gain the foreign perspective on technology 
development and standardization in China, thirty-four representatives from foreign 
invested enterprises were also interviewed. Representatives from foreign-invested 
enterprises similarly included lab directors, department managers, and government-
relations managers. Finally, twenty-eight industry and standards development association 
interviews were conducted. These provided direct insights into the daily operations of 
standards development and the business of lobbying for and against standards and 
government regulations in China. 
 The interviews were “semi-structured” allowing the interviewee to speak freely 
on topics in which they had greater expertise and interest. Each interview was structured 
around 8 themes. Unlike an oral survey with specific questions that are asked of each 
interviewee, the theme-based semi-structured approach allows the researcher to spend 
more time gaining insights from the areas where the interviewee has the most knowledge. 
The interviews, which lasted from one to three hours in length, were conducted in 
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English or Mandarin Chinese according to the participant’s comfort level. Roughly 60% 
of the interviews were conducted in Mandarin. 
 Interviewees were selected using public records of leading firms and agencies 
from which lists of interview targets were selected. Interviewees were also selected 
through contacts made at conferences, industry and trade association meetings. In each 
interview, the participant was asked to recommend other firms or specific contacts. Thus 
using a “snowball” approach, a large pool of critical and knowledgeable interviewees was 
constructed. While this approach may induce “success bias” as interviewees are likely to 
only recommend others with positive stories or with whom they agree, the large number 
of interviews as well as triangulation through other primary and secondary source 
documents mitigates this risk.  
 The time period during which the field research was conducted was particularly 
important for the study of standards in China as it reflected the final year of the post-
WTO succession boom (the era of 10-14% per year economic growth – by 2011, the 
Chinese economy was 2.5 times larger than it had been in 2000), the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, and the ongoing reforms attempting to reorient the Chinese economy away from 
reliance on commoditized manufactured exports and investment and towards knowledge 
intensity and value-added goods. Standardization and the development of standards, as 
will be detailed in the empirical chapter, are policy areas central to the planned and 
desired reorientation of the Chinese economy. The research was thus able to see the 
evolution of Chinese standardization practices and their relative impacts on technology 
markets over time. 
 The semi-structured interviews were supplemented with data gathered from 
public resources, conferences, industry associations, archival resources, and secondary 
literature. Information provided by the interviewees was substantiated wherever possible 
both by other interviewees and through the available literature. To protect the privacy of 
interviewees, all citations from interviews will be made as “Author’s Interview” or 
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“Author’s Interviews.” In accordance with the IRB protocols for the research grants 
which facilitated this research, all interviewees had to be guaranteed anonymity. Further, 
in the context of field research in China, privacy concerns are often paramount and 
participation by many interviewees was contingent on preserving their anonymity. 
 For the European and US cases, data was gathered from primary source 
documents including policy statements, strategy documents, plans and standard 
documents supplemented by secondary source material and peer-reviewed literature. 
These were supplemented with targeted questioning of specific authors and participants 
to ensure understanding and provide depth and context. Europe and the United States 
were selected to provide comparison and contrast to the Chinese case. The literature 
holds Europe as the archetype for state-managed and formal standardization while the US 
is considered the ideal-type of de facto standardization where companies take the lead 
and government plays little if any formal role in the technology standardization process. 
Both perspectives are necessary in order to highlight the relative market impacts of these 
two approaches. As China uses an awkward combination of state-led and non-state 
standardization, it is necessary to see the general market outcomes from each approach 
before considering how the hybrid system shapes markets. Further, the European and US 
cases provide a clear test for the theory that politicized standardization determines market 
outcomes since both regions are highly developed capitalist economies.  
Plan of the Dissertation 
 The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter two offers an in 
depth review of the state of the literature on the political economy of technology 
standards and the role they play in market formation. Chapter three examines the cases of 
the political economy of standardization in the United States and Europe. Examination of 
these two cases side by side enables the reader to see two ends of a hypothetical spectrum 
for how to use standards to influence markets – one where the effort is systematic and 
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strategic and the other where the self-interest of agents is allowed to lead. The two 
standardization approaches create very different markets for technology, market 
structures, and distribution of gains. The comparison thus illustrates how standards shape 
markets. 
 The fourth chapter examines in depth the political economy of standards in China, 
developing the overall theory of the role of politics in standards as a market determining 
force. It emphasizes the different approaches to and types of standardization in creating 
markets as China attempts to move from being a Statist IP Taker to a Statist IP-
Creator/Manufacturer. China presents a special case of a country that is both heavily 
bound by existing institutions and practices while also being flexible and attempting to 
incorporate new ones, producing a highly complex standardization system. The final 
chapter draws conclusions and implications for future research into the evolving role of 





STANDARDS AS MARKET SHAPING INSTITUTIONS 
 
 This chapter looks in depth at technology standards and the social science 
literature on technology standards. It provides a detailed background on standards and the 
role they play in market formation. It also illustrates the current understanding of the 
process of standards development and the various political forces acting on 
standardization in the hopes of shaping market outcomes. This chapter thus provides the 
theoretical background context for the empirical chapters which will show the different 
political influences on technology standards in the US, Europe and China and how these 
have translated into their national markets for technology. After reading this chapter, the 
reader will understand technology standards in greater detail and thus be able to see how 
political influences on standards in different countries translate into market outcomes. 
 The chapter first offers a historical background on the origins of standards in the 
pre-modern world and the role they played in pre-industrial markets. This is followed by 
a detailed definition of technology standards as developed during the industrial revolution 
and still in force today. The chapter then looks at the purported benefits and potential 
drawbacks of standardization. These benefits and drawbacks help account for the political 
importance attached to standards by many countries and firms. This is followed by a 
theoretical discussion of how standards actually form and the actions that firms or states 
can take to facilitate the development and shaping of standards. With this background, 
the chapter then turns to a discussion of the two different types of technology standards: 
formal and de facto. This section emphasizes that the different development paths for 
formal and de facto standards privilege different actors and thus create different 
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competitive features in markets. It further shows how certain national institutional 
arrangements encourage use of one form of standards or another. It then discusses the 
question of intellectual property in technology standards – a critical concern when 
examining technology markets and the distribution of gains within those markets. The 
chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the literature on “successful” standards 
showing the necessary conditions for standardization to take place. The section shows the 
potential role for the state in ensuring that standardization succeeds but shows, as will be 
developed in the empirical cases, that different regions approach this role from differing 
ideological and institutional perspectives. 
 This dissertation contributes to the political economy literature on institutions and 
markets by emphasizing the central role politics plays in standardization and how this 
shapes market formation. Standardization plays a critical role in facilitating the 
integration of national economies and promotion of trade. Indeed, as discussed in the first 
chapter, standards are essential for market formation. For the global organization of 
production systems, standards enable the fragmentation of production and arms-length 
relations among thousands of vendors and clients seeking to produce a final functioning 
good. With standards being so critical to markets and the global economy, standards and 
standardization is highly political and contentious for the actors involved. As their 
economic importance has grown, the potential gains from controlling standards have 
increased, as have the costs for supporting “losing” standards.  
 The processes by which states develop, adopt, and utilize standards are not the 
same. These differences are the product of the dual factors of national historical 
institutions and the positions of agents in the global economy. Divergent standards 
development processes become the basis of divergence in national markets. Knowing 
how different markets form and why markets differ has implications for economic policy 
development and the study of comparative capitalisms. Standards should be a new and 
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vital area of research into market formation and the comparative economic performance 
of firms and countries.  
Historical Origins of Standards: the Importance of Metrology 
 As noted in chapter one, setting standards was often one of the first tasks of a 
sovereign state. The standardization efforts in the ancient and pre-industrial world show 
that there has long been recognition of the importance of standards. The earliest 
conception of standards comes from the development of metrology – the study, creation 
and maintenance of units of measure. Declaring and maintaining a common set of 
standards for measurement has long been a focus of governments. Reliable metrological 
standards lower transaction costs and so facilitate exchange. Economic agents need 
reliable knowledge of units of weight, measure and volume in order to determine the 
value of the goods they seek to purchase. Lack of reliable metrological standards 
historically inhibited trade, particularly when different regions used different systems of 
metrology or the same system but with different values for given units (Hoppit 1993).  
 Governments require uniform measures in order to assess goods for taxation or, in 
societies where tax was paid in quantities of commodities rather than currency, to receive 
quantities of goods as tax. If peasants, for example, are required to provide payment in 
quantities of grain, it is essential that governments clearly stipulate these quantities and 
provide clear references (or standardized containers) for the collection of that tax. 
Without standard units, this process would be significantly more complicated. Having 
diverse weights and measures complicates exchange and leads to disagreements and a 
breakdown in exchange (Stampa 1949). 
 Beyond weights and measures, standardization of the purity and composition of 
metals was also important for controlling currency. In ancient China, the debasement of 
metals in currency during the Tang and Song dynasties – usually through the gradual 
decrease in the amount of copper in coins – undermined the value of the currency and led 
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to unproductive economic behavior – such as hoarding of older coins or melting them 
down (Cohen 2000). Rather than spending money, it was more profitable to hoard and 
melt down old standard coins to make even greater numbers of new coins. Lack of 
standardization of the purity of silver in ingots similarly plagued trade in later Ming 
Dynasty (Hansen 2000).  
 The importance of standardization has long been linked to the idea of state 
building and unification. In 221 BC, Emperor Qin Shi Huang unified China and 
established truly centralized rule and administration. Although mostly remembered for 
his military prowess and accomplishments in forcibly bringing China into a coherent 
centralized polity, arguably his greatest accomplishment was not the political unification 
but rather the economic integration of his empire through imposition of standardized 
weights, measures, writing, and currency (Cohen 2000; Hansen 2000). Where formerly 
the area known as China had a wide array of differing systems – each of the seven major 
states issued its own currency and used its own system of metrology – the Qin unification 
made long distance exchanges of goods predictable. Unified writing facilitated 
communications throughout the empire – and among distant merchants speaking radically 
different dialects.15 Common standards throughout the empire greatly reduced transaction 
costs for long-distance trade. Throughout the history of China, maintaining an integrated 
economy and networks for long-distance internal trade would be major goals of the state. 
Although written in the terms of modern diplomacy and technology standards, the 
European Union’s standards harmonization project is essentially a continuation of the 
policies and practices imposed by Emperor Qin. The goal in both places remains the 
integration of a continental polity under a single set of trade-facilitating standards. 
                                                 
15 The reader will do well to remember that while there is only one official Chinese language, it is divided 
into at least seven mutually unintelligible dialects that use a common written form for communication. 
Even today, speakers of different dialects can communicate in written Chinese as it adheres to a single 
standard, regardless of spoken dialect. 
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 In more recent history, foundational documents of state creation have paid 
specific attention to standards as well. In England, the Magna Carta proclaimed a single 
system of metrology for the whole of England:  
 
There shall be, through our Realm, one Measure of Wine, and one of Ale, 
and one Measure of Corn; that is to say, the Quarter of London; and on 
breadth of dyed cloth, russets and haberjects; that is to say, two yards 
culne within the lists: And it shall be of weights as it is of measures 
(1215). 
 
 Magna Carta called for unity in weights and measures according to a single 
centralized standard. Even for regional lords looking out for their parochial interests, 
enforcing common standards was important. As will be discussed below, however, 
England struggled to enforce common metrological standards until the 19th century. 
 In Renaissance Florence, cloth merchants’ guilds tightly controlled standards for 
measurement in their industry. Production and use of yard sticks was closely monitored 
to ensure fair sale of cloth (Kindleberger 1983). At a time where cheating would be easy 
and convertibility between non-standard systems of measure exceedingly difficult, having 
a reliable and honest system of measure greatly facilitated exchange in cloth. To ensure a 
good reputation for Florentine merchants, the guilds controlled the yard sticks to prevent 
short sticking and bad reputations. Being known for reliability in sales afforded 
Florentine merchants a competitive advantage in the cloth trade. 
 The Spanish Empire would similarly attempt to use common measurement 
standards as a means of economic integration. Showing the importance of clear 
metrological standards, in 1524, only three years after the conquest of the Aztecs and 
assertion of Spanish control over Mexico, Hernando Cortes declared the first 
metrological ordinance for New Spain. According to Cortes’s decree, each town was to 
maintain a standard set of weights and volume measures sealed with the town stamp. 
Further, each town was to have a formal sealer of weights and measures whose duties 
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included enforcing standard weights and measures, preventing merchants from selling 
goods without using approved weights and measures, and certifying the scales and 
measuring sticks used by merchants (Stampa 1949). As in imperial China, imposition of 
standard weights and measures was considered a critical part of the state-building process 
and essential for the operation of the polity and economy. It was also state-building in 
that stamping out traditional non-Spanish metrological systems would further cement 
Spanish authority.  
 Uniform standards yield real benefits, as shown in the case of China, but failure to 
enforce existing standards can undermine their intended good. Cortes’s ordinance was 
never fully implemented. During three centuries of Spanish rule, the colonial government 
repeatedly issued decrees and ordinances to unify metrology in New Spain. Insufficient 
control by the government over local merchants’ standards meant the Spanish never 
succeeded in eliminating the use of unique regional or trade-specific systems of 
measurement. Unofficial measures such as arms-lengths and hand-widths remained in 
common use. In 1831, an observer noted that:  
 
“The same diversity as always persists, not only in the different provinces 
but also in different paridos or districts of the same province and even, 
perhaps, within the same town, producing inconveniences, injuries, 
dissensions, and lawsuits in business” (Stampa 1949, 9). 
 
 Adding to the difficulties with metrology in New Spain, the broader Spanish 
Empire also had differing metrological systems in the Viceroyalty of Peru, the Caribbean 
colonies and the Philippines. Incompatible systems vastly complicated trade, taxation and 
integration, certainly perpetuating “inconveniences” to market formation and sustenance. 
 As the case of metrology in New Spain suggests, despite the promulgation of a 
single system of weights and measures throughout a region or country, standards require 
enforcement in order to be effective. Indeed, using common standardized terminology but 
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non-standard bases for measurement such as hollow weights, short yard sticks or non-
standard conversions such as five quarts per gallon is arguably worse than having no 
standard at all. Inconsistent standards increase uncertainty and risk since the agents 
involved believe they are communicating but are, in effect, using different languages.16 
 To illustrate, different regions and townships with the United Kingdom continued 
to use diverse and non-standard bases for measurement and conversion up through the 
mid-19th century (Hoppit 1993). In keeping with the dictates of Magna Carta, the British 
typically used a common set of terminology for their weights, measures and volumes, but 
the actual amount measured by these terms varied greatly. In 16th century England, a 
“bushel” could be 8, 10, 12, 16, or 20 gallons – depending on which town a merchant 
happened to visit. Such differences would, as noted in New Spain, complicate exchange 
as each merchant would believe their measure or conversion to be accurate and others’ to 
be either to large or too small. Further, before metrological standards in the 19th century 
took general effect, the value for a bushel could even vary by commodity: a bushel of 
oats, wheat or rye could use a different number of gallons within the same marketplace. 
Commenting on the problems of non-standard and uniform measurements, Sir John Riggs 
Miller noted in 1790 that: 
 
“(Bad weights and measures are) detrimental to our Commerce, 
disgraceful to our policy and injurious to our people…We cannot 
go…from one parish to another, or from one market town to another, 
without learning a new language, which no grammar or dictionary will 
enable us to acquire” (Hoppit 1993, 91). 
 
 Such conditions stifled inter-regional trade and made national-scale markets for 
goods much more difficult. Although by the 18th century royal edicts required each town 
                                                 
16 The same problem remains today in technology standards. Where there are multiple standards in use, 
consumers are confused and comparisons between products and the relative advantages become more 
difficult. For this reason, it is usually ideal for a single standard to emerge to which all agents agree and 
conform. When this occurs, standards realize their full potential for minimizing uncertainties and 
transaction costs. 
 60
keep a standard set of weights under lock and key, enforcement officers tended to seek 
out hollow weights or short sticks rather than attempt to eliminate non-standard unit 
conversion such as the number of ounces in a pound – which ranged at the time from 16 
to 36. As late as 1816, the Times of London was compelled to note the imperative of 
achieving uniform metrological standards: 
 
“We have observed, that the law, in fixing a standard of weight or 
measure, creates a language; but to create a language is to create mind. A 
language that is obscure, that is inconsistent, that is unintelligible, 
stupefies and confounds, as much as a clear, consistent, systematic mode 
of developing the ideas enlightens and animates the national intellect” 
(Hoppit 1993, 91). 
 
 Without standard weights and measures, the economy and market remain 
fragmented; uncertainty increases and transaction costs become prohibitive. In effect, 
different incompatible standards work like tariffs by imposing opportunity costs on 
agents seeking to enter into exchange. These higher opportunity costs inhibit the ability 
for long-range commerce and arms-length economic exchange to take place. 
 In the 19th century, European states began to unify their domestic systems of 
measure as part of their centralizing state-building projects. Many adopted the Metric 
System as their metrological standard – at times imposed by Napoleon’s armies. The 
Metric System was formally developed by French scientists during the 1790s. 
Development of the Metric System was a government project envisioned as a means of 
rational metrology that could also help integrate and unify France (LNE 2013). Before 
this attempted common standardization, France – like the other countries and empires 
described above – had a highly fragmented metrological system. In 1795 there were at 
least 700 different units of measure in use across France. The First Republic and First 
Empire invested significant resources developing standards to knit the country together 
including standards for language, education and measurement. 
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 One of the earliest non-metrological standards was the Bavarian Reinheitsgebot or 
beer purity law. This standard mandated that only water, barley and hops could be used in 
the production of beer. The Reinheitsgebot was intended to regulate competition for 
resources by restricting brewers to a single grain, thus reducing demand from brewers for 
the main bread grains wheat and rye. In terms of market, this would prevent beer makers 
from competing with bakers for the use of wheat and rye grain. It would also clarify for 
consumers exactly what they were purchasing when a brewer tapped a cask of beer. Use 
of hops was a safety measure to prevent the use of potentially poisonous plants as 
preservatives. Adopted in 1516, the Reinheitsgebot is arguably the oldest quality and 
health standard developed (Geitber Forthcoming). As a health standard, the 
Reinheitsgebot was legally enforceable. Those found violating the law’s precepts by 
selling beer made with non-standard ingredients could have their stocks seized without 
compensation. A second market influencing aspect of the standard was that its strict 
definition of what could be considered beer effectively protected the Bavarian and later 
German beer industries. Within Germany, imposition of the Purity Law across the empire 
was a prerequisite demanded by the Bavarian government before it agreed to join the 
German Empire in 1871. Widespread adoption of the purity law would help protect 
Bavarian brewers from competition by brewers in other Lander that used non-standard 
ingredients. In force until struck down by the European Court in 1987, the Reinheitsgebot 
later obstructed the import of many Belgian, English and American beers as these 
contained non-standard ingredients. Through two mechanisms – limitation of competition 
for commodities and barring of non-standard goods – this standard was able to shape 
markets in Germany. 
 To sum up this historical examination of standards, metrological and purity 
standards even in antiquity and through the pre-industrial age served to lower transaction 
costs and encourage market formation. Without standards, markets are restricted to the 
narrow ranges in which there is tacit agreement upon metrology. However, with widely 
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accepted standards, goods are mutually compatible and interchangeable. Writ large, this 
can enable a global-scale market. Historical evidence testifies to the importance of 
attaining and maintaining unified standards to enable economic exchange.  
Technology Standards 
 The most commonly discussed standards today define the protocols and 
capabilities of specific technologies in various industries or circumstances. The principles 
of facilitating market integration, reducing transaction costs, and advancing state interests 
remain central to modern technology standardization efforts. Indeed, because of their 
breadth and detail, technology standards can define critical aspects of markets as well. 
Studying technology standards, which are constantly being developed, allows researchers 
to study how the politics and process of standardization shapes market outcomes. 
 Technology standardization at the national and international level began with the 
development of mechanized international trade, transport and communications in the late 
19th century. The initial impetus for establishing common standards was the practical 
need to bring order to the chaotic and then-unprecedented growth of technology and 
industry in the late 19th century (Cochrane 1966). To enable efficient transport of goods, 
for example, railroad gauges had to be standardized. Without standardization of gauge, 
goods need to be transferred from one set of trains to another in order to continue on a 
different set of track. In the 19th century, the United States alone had no fewer than six 
different incompatible standards for railroad gauge, largely because of the dominant 
influence of state governments (rather than the national government) in alliance with 
private capital in promoting the development of railroads (Dunlavy 1994). As late as the 
1990s, Europe had not yet fully harmonized its track standards and the fact that Russia 
continues to use a unique narrow railroad gauge remains an obstacle to its international 
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overland trade (Puffert 1992; Murphree and Breznitz 2013).17 As science-based 
industrialization proceeded in the late 19th century, new fields such as 
telecommunications and electricity (both generation and transmission) required codified 
protocols which were common to both companies and countries (Russel 2009). From 
these demands arose the quest for uniform and widely accepted technology standards.  
Definition of Technology Standards 
 There are several definitions for standards in current use. The international 
definition of a standard is established and maintained jointly by the ISO and IEC. Guide 
2: 2004, Definition 3.2 defines a standard as: 
 
“A document, established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or 
characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of 
the optimum degree of order in a given context…(Standards moreover) 
should be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and 
experience, and aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits” 
(ISO/IEC 2004).  
 
 This definition has achieved widespread acceptance by formal national 
standardization bodies. ANSI adheres to the current ISO/IEC standard (ANSI 2013). The 
European Parliament and Commission accept the basic premise but add two concepts, 
continuous application and voluntary compliance. Specifically, EC Directive 98/34/EC 
defines a standard as: “A technical specification approved by a recognized 
standardization body for repeated or continuous application, with which compliance is 
not compulsory” (EC 1998). The Standards Administration of China also adheres to both 
the ISO/IEC definition and the note concerning the primacy of science, technology and 
experience for its definition of standards in GB/T 20000.1-2002 (SAC 2002).  
                                                 
17 At the Sino-Russian border, for example, special facilities have been built to lift train cars off their 
carriages and place them onto alternate carriages which meet the Chinese or Russian railroad gauge 
standards. This process adds time and cost to trade between the two countries. 
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 The common theme for definitions of standards is that they include the following: 
 
1. Formal written documentation 
2. Use of consensus for drafting, adopting or amending standards18 
3. Approval by a “recognized body” 
4. Science and technology basis 
5. Repeated, common and consistent use and application 
6. Voluntary compliance 
 
 It is important to differentiate standards from laws, regulations and policies. 
While they may appear similar, standards are distinct. First, although not included in the 
formal ISO and IEC definitions, the World Trade Organization, ETSI and many other 
standards development and approval bodies add the requirement that compliance with 
standards be voluntary. This distinction formally separates standards from regulations 
and laws as compliance with these is compulsory. It is possible, however, to cite 
standards in laws and regulations, thus making compliance effectively mandatory even 
though the standard itself is voluntary. Second, while standards must be based on 
consensus principles, regulations and laws have no requirement to reach consensus 
among stakeholders in their development and approval. Third, the definition of standards 
also differentiates them from government policies. Policies may encourage economic 
behavior through the provision or withholding of resources. Standards, in contrast, 
incentivize action through the creation of markets. Adherence to a standard provides 
access to the market for that standardized good while failure to adhere means an actor 
must create an alternate market using a different standard. Failure to conform to a 
standard effectively bars an agent from a market.  
                                                 
18 While ETSI does not explicitly adhere to consensus and instead uses a modified supermajority for 
adoption and amendment of standards, consensus is the generally accepted goal of standardization since it 
affords buy-in by all participants and should yield the best technology, not just the one with the most 
powerful backer. The United States Technology Transfer and Advancement Act mandates that the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) coordinate activities to encourage the adoption of private-
sector created consensus standards rather than unique proprietary standards by different government units. 
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 The voluntary compliance principle enshrined in the WTO Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement arose out of the increasingly widespread use of mandatory unique 
technology standards as non-tariff barriers to trade in the 1970s and 80s. Mandatory 
standards, opaque certification methods and secret details of national standards 
obstructed trade. Where compliance with a standard is mandatory, non-compliant goods 
may not be sold. If certification of compliance is done through unclear or biased methods 
– such as mandating goods be certified by an agency located in the target country – then 
it becomes difficult to export goods. The most famous case of such obstructions was the 
use of the Japan Standards label on goods. Japanese consumers considered the label to be 
a mark of quality and avoided goods without the label. Foreign companies would need to 
send their products to Japan for certification, a process that was slow and was widely held 
to be biased against foreign products (Kushida 2008). This added costs and difficulty for 
foreign goods trying to enter the Japanese market. Adding to the difficulties, some 
countries made the contents of standards secret. Without knowing requirements, it was 
impossible for foreign firms to make goods compliant, thus effectively barring them from 
the target market. 
 These obstacles were created by design as the standards in question were intended 
to foster closed markets in which only domestic firms could compete. In response to the 
increasing number of trade distorting standards, the WTO’s TBT agreement requires 
today’s standards to be voluntary and not create unnecessary obstructions to international 
trade. To ensure members’ standards do not obstruct trade, WTO members are expected 
to be highly transparent in their development of standards (WTO 1995). Member states 
are to make proposed standards available for comment by other WTO members and offer 
sufficient time for WTO members to review the proposed standards. WTO members must 
then make good faith efforts to address the comments they receive from foreign parties. 
The idea is to allow foreign countries to study proposed standards looking for provisions 
that could add extra costs or difficulties for their goods. Further, the WTO certification of 
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compliance with a standard – whether national or international – should be as easy as 
possible and ideally based on a principle of mutual recognition where member states 
acknowledge that certification of compliance made by a certification body in another 
state is legitimate. Under the mutual recognition principle, states will not include, or 
withhold, marks or other identifiers to discriminate against foreign manufactured or 
certified goods.19 The understanding is that such openness and transparency will mean 
standards result in markets open to broad participation and competition.  
 With this discussion in mind, for this dissertation, standards will be defined as: 
formal written protocols, developed by consensus or a modified consensus principle 
in a formal or ad hoc body, that serve as a platform for interoperability, 
comparability and on which other applications and innovations can be built. This 
definition deliberately omits the “voluntary” principle as well as the concept of a 
“recognized body” as both of these terms are subject to controversy. The selective use of 
mandatory standards and standards development through different bodies are often 
strategic moves intended to shape the markets which emerge from standardization. For 
example, while generally supportive of the ISO and IEC as standards development 
organizations – and their adherence to voluntary compliance principles, European 
standards organizations and member states reserve the right for regulations, laws and 
policies to reference formal European technology standards and thus effectively make 
compliance mandatory (EC 2012). In China mandatory standards are officially enshrined 
in the standardization law as a possible type of national standard (NPC 1988).20 Under 
Chinese law, mandatory standards have the same effect as law or regulations. Mandatory 
standards in theory should be restricted to health and safety or environmental standards 
                                                 
19 The inclusion of alternative certification marks for goods certified as standards-compliant overseas but 
not by the domestic certification agency is a contentious issue. Japan was notorious for its refusal to allow 
the use of the Japan standards mark unless goods were certified as compliant within Japan. This meant 
goods produced and certified abroad, even if compliant, would appear different to Japanese consumers, 
thus making it easier to discriminate against foreign goods. 
20 As will be detailed in the China chapter, until the reform of the standards system in the 1980s, standards 
and regulations were synonymous. All technology standards were mandatory for industry. 
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but China’s standardization system leaves open the possibility of mandating standards 
defining particular technologies for consumer or commercial products. Setting such 
standards results in a highly protected market for the products where participating firms, 
most likely indigenous Chinese ones exclusively, face little competition. 
 The definition for this thesis also avoids the concept of a “recognized” body 
because there is intense disagreement over whether certain standardization bodies are 
“recognized” or not. In some states, only formal organizations with state charters (such as 
the BSI) – or that are part of the government bureaucracy itself (such as China’s SAC) – 
can make standards. In other states – most notably the United States – ad hoc industry 
bodies which publish a standard for industry use are equally legitimate and their 
standards can become national standards with little or no revision. There are also 
professional associations such as the IEEE which publish many critical industry standards 
although their status as a “recognized body” is not universal. Although IEEE publishes 
standards, these standards do not have the legal status as national standards in all 
countries. In some countries – including Europe and China – IEEE standards still need to 
be introduced, debated and adopted through the formal standardization system before 
they become national standards.  
 Due to the wide array of organizations from which standards may arise, this thesis 
treats standards born of formal SDOs, professional societies and industry consortia as 
standards for comparison purposes. Whether a state accepts standards from different 
bodies as legitimate, and why, will be addressed in the individual empirical chapters. The 
legitimacy, or not, of different SDOs has a major impact on the way in which standards 
shape markets. The different developmental paths for standards – statist and non-statist – 
exert significant influence over the market which emerges. Standards developed by 
industry consortia can be captured and controlled by incumbent firms which attempt to 
structure standards to privilege their technologies and preserve their competitive 
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advantage. Formal government sponsored standards can similarly bias market outcomes 
through requirements on technology contributions or licensing rules. 
 This thesis mainly addresses a specific sub-category of technology standards 
known as “compatibility standards”. Compatibility standards are defined protocols that 
enable different equipment or components to work together in predictable ways, most 
commonly for use in telecommunications or information technology. Compatibility 
standards enable communication – that is the ability for devices or people to exchange 
information. For the modern economy, compatibility standards ensure that different 
communication networks and technologies will be able to exchange data. For 
communication technologies in particular, compatibility is critical to market formation as 
it increases the size of the potential user base. Through the network effect, compatibility 
also increases the value of that market to users and firms. 
 Given the economic interests at stake in standardization, potential market size is 
important. Furthermore, compatibility standards are among the most contentious 
standards in policy debates as these lie at an uncomfortable crossroads where 
international trade regulations such as those of the WTO are unclear. The WTO allows 
for countries to make unique standards where national security interests are at stake but 
whether this exclusion includes standards for information and network security is a 
contentious area. For these two reasons – economic heft and vague norms – the empirical 
chapters of this thesis concentrate mainly on compatibility standards.  
 The actual process by which technology standards are developed has some 
variation. When standards are developed by individual firms or small consortia, the 
standardization process can be as open or closed as the developing members wish.21 The 
development process may or may not be formalized into clearly delineated steps. In most 
                                                 
21 Here “open” and “closed” refer to the degree to which firms are able to freely join and actively 
participate in standard development. 
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established standards development organizations (SDO), the standardization process 
takes several steps and involves at least three levels of administration. 
 First, a call for a new standard is made in the secretariat or governing organ of the 
SDO. If members decide by vote to pursue development, the task of administering the 
development is passed to a relevant technical committee. Technical committees are 
groups of experts with a specific technological focus. For areas of interdisciplinary 
interest such as information technology, there are entities such as the Joint Technical 
Committees between the IEC and ISO. In the ISO, proposals are made directly in one of 
the 287 permanent technical committees. In the technical committee, the expert 
representatives divide the work by specific sub-discipline or task. These tasks are passed 
to working groups. Working groups negotiate and draft the protocols. Proposals are 
vetted by the working group and compromises reached. Different technologies need to be 
either harmonized or else certain technologies are removed from consideration – a 
difficult task as the submitter may have a strong vested interest in seeing their 
technologies included in a standard. Once a working group has agreed upon its protocols, 
they are sent back to the technical committee for deliberation and approval. 
 Once the full draft of the standard has been agreed via consensus, it is published 
for comment. After the comment period, the technical committee considers the comments 
and may make amendments to the standard proposal. It is then published a second time 
for comment. After a third (usually) round of comments and revision, the standard is 
ready for final submission to the SDO’s secretariat for final approval – usually by 
member vote – and adoption (ISO 2013).  The formal standards development process 
does not vary significantly among formal SDOs in different countries. The official rules 
for standardization are thus quite similar. However, as will be shown in the empirical 
chapters, there are other administrative rules and, more importantly, effective institutions 
in practice which change the dynamics of standardization significantly in different 
countries.  
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Standardization and Markets 
 As mentioned in chapter one, standards are necessary for the formation of 
markets. This section discusses the mechanisms by which standards shape markets as 
shown in the existing literature. The reader will see how these mechanisms increase the 
political importance of standards and the avenues though which political forces may 
determine market outcomes through standards. Since standards are created through 
political processes, they offer opportunities for strategic action by states and firms to 
influence market outcomes. To see how standards shape markets, this section explores 
the formative role played by standards in decreasing transaction costs and ensuring 
compatibility among products. It then discusses the way standards shape the structure of 
markets through influencing the size of the potential market, influencing the type of 
competition in the market, providing opportunities for collusion, and creating market 
orphans. Through these mechanisms of standards, the political influences on standards 
can be turned into market reality. 
 First, standards shape markets through the reduction of transaction costs (Carlton 
and Klamer 1983; David and Greenstein 1990). Transaction costs are difficulties and 
obstacles which complicate or interfere with economic exchange. There are three basic 
types of transaction costs: search and information costs, bargaining costs and policing 
costs. Standards can help reduce all three and thus facilitate the formation of markets. For 
information costs, standards reduce uncertainty. If a good or service conforms to a 
standard, would-be buyers can know its capabilities and quality ex ante. Standards reduce 
the need for consumers to investigate firms or goods. For consumers, standardization 
facilitates information accessibility, making it possible to compare products with 
confidence. In bargaining costs, standards ease the challenge of finding an agreeable 
price. It does so by enabling substitutability of goods which forces comparable goods to 
converge to a common price. Finally, the act of certification of goods or companies as 
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compliant with standards acts as a policing force. Non-compliant firms can be known ex 
ante (Dahlman 1979).  
 The second causal impact of standards on market formation is in the ability of 
standards to ensure compatibility. Compatibility shapes both the supply and demand sides 
of markets. For supply, Farrell and Saloner (1986) note standardization ensures 
compatibility and hence interchangeability of complementary products. Rather than 
allowing dominant firms to sell bundles of products which reduce consumer choice, 
standardization makes it possible to combine goods from multiple vendors (Braunstein 
and White 1985). Different component technologies can be sourced from vendors 
offering the best price, quality or features. Consumers can confidently recombine the 
products knowing they will work so long as the goods conform to the same standard.  
 For enterprises and would-be market entrants, this means that a standard opens 
new avenues and opportunities for investment. A firm does not need to be able to produce 
every technology or component for a standardized system in order to jump into a new 
industry. They can specialize in a sub-system or component knowing that it will be 
compatible with the whole. This changes the competitive dynamics of a market by 
encouraging more competition through wider participation. 
 As a simple illustration, the Universal Service Bus standard interface for 
computer peripherals made it easier for firms to specialize and produce peripherals such 
as mice, keyboards, headsets, speakers and other devices. These could now be used with 
computers of any brand. Hitherto, the myriad plug interfaces meant a product would need 
to include multiple adapters in order to work with different users’ incompatible systems. 
This increased final prices, or decreased profits at a constant price point, or else limited 
producers to manufacturing for specific computer models, thus locking in a manufacturer 
to a given brand. With USB, a single plug interface could work with any device. The 
consumer benefits from ease of use and certainty in purchasing a device while 
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manufacturers are able to specialize in peripherals, knowing their output enjoys a market 
the size of the complete worldwide installed personal computer user base. 
 On the demand side of markets, compatibility standards increase the size of the 
potential and actual user base for a market. Compatibility standards facilitate 
communication – the ability for devices or people to exchange information. Industries 
defined by exchange of information exhibit the network effect. The network effect simply 
means that a good’s value increases exponentially as the number of compatible users 
increases. This is because information sharing goods need other compatible goods with 
which to share information. The more compatible goods there are the more potential 
connections and hence greater value. Through standardization, the value of the good to a 
user increases as others have compatible goods (Farrell and Saloner 1985). A phone 
network or computer is more valuable when there are more devices with which it can 
communicate. A phone without compatible devices is useless but each new user increases 
the number of potential connections and hence value to all other users. As more users 
become available, the number of potential connections increases. This increases the value 
of the product. Greater value increases the demand for the product which encourages 
more adoption in a virtuous circle.  
 Further, the communication and businesses built upon the sharing of information 
are often far more valuable than the standardized goods themselves. It is in the interest of 
agents to adopt technologies which are compatible and useable. For later adopters, 
standards yield even greater benefits as there is already a substantial user base available 
which may consume a firms standards-compliant goods or services (Arthur 1985). The 
value of late adoption is greater because the stock of knowledge of a product and its use 
is a function of the size of the earlier existing user base. Hence, the marginal value of a 
product for later adopters is greater. This stock of knowledge is not reduced even if early 
adopters switch to a different system. Standards can thus be self-sustaining.  
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 Standardization thus increases the size of the user base through both increased 
demand and increased availability of complementary products (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
This applies both for final consumers and for firms operating or selling to networks. 
Standardization ensures there will be a large potential user base for goods and services 
compliant with that standard. This reduces market uncertainty and thus incentivizes R&D 
investment (See also: (Kindleberger 1983; Lecraw 1987; WTO 1995; Albrecht, Dean et 
al. 2003; Heddergott 2006; Manivannan 2008; Simcoe, Graham et al. 2009).  
 Standards help set the terms of competition in a market. Research finds that all 
else being equal, having a standard should be better than not having a standard. Without a 
standard, each firm offers a unique incompatible approach or technology. When this 
happens, each proprietary approach effectively creates a small fragmented monopoly. 
Unless adapter technologies are added, goods from different firms cannot operate 
together. The market effects of lower prices through greater competition and firm entry 
described above fail to materialize. 
 Before a standard is established, firms compete on the unique features of their 
technology. Firms can also, by virtue of their mutually exclusive systems, force 
customers to purchase bundled services and products since they have no choice but to 
stick with a given vendor. Standards turn these forces on their head. Standardization 
shifts the nature of competition from features and uniqueness to price (Farrell and 
Saloner 1985; Berg 1988; Berg 1990; Berg and Schummy 1990; Ozsomer and Cavusil 
2000; Yoo, Lyytinen et al. 2004). Once a general standard emerges, a single market also 
emerges. Firms now compete with similar goods targeting similar consumers. The result 
is intense price competition. To illustrate, consider basic voice telephony. Since the basic 
product is the same, there is really no advantage for a user to select one firm over another 
– since calls can be competed to any user with any carrier. Thus, there must be price 
differentiation in order to win customers. This enhances consumer welfare through lower 
costs. Even for proprietary technologies, standardization will lower the prices that 
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consumers will have to pay due to the increased number of competitors offering 
comparable and interchangeable products.  
 While firms may seek to limit price-based competition, the increased demands for 
their goods at a lower price point make standardization still beneficial. Even though the 
profits per unit decline, standardization increases the overall market size which makes 
standardization attractive even for firms which stand to lose some of their per-unit 
profitability. Further, under price-based competition, firms able to wield larger 
economies of scale will be more successful than firms which cannot. This may benefit 
incumbent firms and thus give an incentive to participate in and actively seek 
standardization. At the same time, however, since the basic technology is common to all 
vendors, new entrants can offer niche services or products built around this technology. 
They do not need to have the resources to develop the whole system but rather can work 
around its fringes. This also increases consumer choice and competition. 
 Adopting a common standard also changes competition dynamics throughout a 
supply chain. Standardization creates cost savings for manufacturers (Farrell and Saloner 
1986). Standardization of components or processes facilitates the development and 
expansion of mass production through building economies of scale by enabling supplying 
firms to amalgamate customers (Berg 1984). A similar dynamic has been noted in 
Breznitz’s work on the global fragmentation of production (Breznitz 2007). It is 
standards that make this fragmentation possible. The economies of scale are facilitated 
both for the production of components and complementary products (Berg 1984; Farrell 
and Saloner 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985). Standardization increases the availability of 
replacement parts and services which reduces some of the risk from building a large 
production base. Lack of common standards makes it difficult to realize these beneficial 
economies of scale. Additionally, standardization facilitates the entry of smaller niche 
market players (Berg 1990; WTO 1995). Standardization enables broader competition 
and innovation by defining a technology in such a way that all would-be agents are able 
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to participate. Where enterprises set their own standards or have proprietary formats, 
competition can be stifled as fewer actors are able to develop new goods and services. 
 In the analog era of mobile telephony, there were no fewer than seven competing 
mobile telephony standards. This meant there were seven different markets of various 
sizes for which producers could make compatible goods. A producer of transmission or 
terminal equipment or receiver chips would be limited to working with a single standard 
for a given dominant operator (usually a state monopoly). They would be reliant on the 
incumbent’s market – and marketing practices – including whatever prices the incumbent 
would be willing to pay. It also would increase costs by making it difficult to achieve 
economies of scale given the relatively limited market size for any given standard. In 
Japan, for example, manufacturers faced difficulty lowering the price of their equipment 
as there was little scale. The national telecommunications operator deliberately made 
mobile telephony prohibitively expensive in order to prevent the development of a large 
market (Funk 1998; Funk 2002; Funk 2006). On the other hand, in the 2G mobile era, 
there were only two major standards. Firms could produce for one standard or the other 
knowing both had global-sized potential markets. The lower costs from such competition 
helped facilitate global adoption of mobile telephony.  
 Standardization can shape the competitive dynamics of markets by facilitating 
anti-competitive collusive behavior as well. When this occurs, the markets formed by 
standards may fail to yield the lower prices, greater entrepreneurship and higher 
innovation that standards ostensibly foster. If one takes a highly pessimistic perspective, 
standards development organizations which permit corporate membership or 
representation are little more than institutionalized venues for collusion. In standards 
development, where core technology is shared and debated, the development of a 
standard is, in effect, the division of a market among stakeholders such that they all can 
benefit without having to compete with each other. Firms outside the standards 
development effort are likely to benefit less; firms which do not contribute or fail to have 
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their technologies incorporated see their technology or alternative products excluded 
from the market without having had the chance to compete for consumer acceptance. 
Among participants in standardization, the inclusion or rejection of submissions from 
different parties can appear to be anti-competitive. Standards development organizations 
can look much like the sorts of backroom anti-competitive behavior that much regulation 
is designed to prevent. As Adam Smith noted: 
 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or 
in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be 
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder 
people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to 
do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them 
necessary” – (Smith, 1776). 
 
 The potential for collusion can be seen both in terms of the products which can be 
developed and sold and the licensing of essential embedded intellectual property. By 
explicitly defining technology, a standard limits the range of products which can be sold. 
Firms with experience in these areas will be better placed to compete than others. As the 
technologies to be developed and sold, or not, are determined through discussions and 
debate in working groups, this may be considered collusion. The case of standards as 
avenues for collusion is even clearer for the inclusion of proprietary technologies. Firms 
which are able to have their proprietary technology included as essential IP benefit from 
standards more than firms which do not. Competition in the market is determined partly 
by the inclusion of essential IP. In some standards alliances, firms which contribute large 
portfolios of IP arrange technology sharing agreements with other large contributing 
firms. These technology sharing arrangements are facilitated in the context of 
standardization, often as part of the agreement on terms for including proprietary 
technology in the standard. These patent sharing agreements give participants royalty-
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free access to one another’s technology. Firms which contribute little or no technology 
will not be part of these sharing arrangements. These firms must pay for licenses placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis firms with royalty-free access through 
patent sharing agreements. In some cases, firms with large portfolios may be unwilling to 
license their technology to firms without patent sharing agreements. When this occurs, 
the standard – which mandates the use of that firm’s technology – effectively bars certain 
firms from participation in the market while granting exclusive access to others. In this 
way, incumbents can shape the structure of the industry which emerges from 
standardization to their advantage while limiting the ability of other firms to compete. 
 Standards may thus pose a very real challenge for encouraging and sustaining 
competition. With the opportunities for collusion and using standards to limit 
competition, standards can foster markets which are far from fair and open. Standards 
development organizations, both private and state sponsored, are the “assemblies” Adam 
Smith warned about. Their mandate to seek a cooperative solution to technical problems 
necessitates the reliance on negotiation for setting a standard, but this means the type of 
market which emerges from the standard is established by non-market or competitive 
means so SDOs are at pains to avoid appearing to be colluding or anti-competitive (Besen 
and Johnson 1986). This is particularly challenging when there are participants within the 
standard development organization with strong interests in a given technology approach 
that the majority no longer favors. As a standard usually necessitates a single technical 
solution, the standards development process necessarily eliminates technology options 
without allowing market forces to determine the fate of a given technology. This appears 
close to anti-competitive behavior designed to limit consumer choice. 
 To prevent the coordination efforts in technology standardization from creating 
anti-competitive and restrictive markets, states must be vigilant in policing standards 
bodies. As Berg (1990) notes, ensuring that standards do not become a venue for 
collusion, price fixing and other anti-competitive behavior is a major function of state 
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policy in technology standards. This is a delicate balancing act, however. While guarding 
the public interest, it is important for standards bodies not to be overly taxed by state 
supervision. Where anti-trust laws are rigidly enforced, would-be participants in 
standards development may be discouraged from participating for fear of attracting 
unwanted regulatory attention. This reticence impedes standardization and, hence, market 
formation for new technologies (Besen and Johnson 1986).  
 A second area of concern for market formation through standardization is the risk 
of sub-optimal technology lock-in and creation of technology orphans. Although the 
literature argues that standardization is typically better than fragmented markets for 
incompatible technologies, technology standardization can result in a single market based 
upon an inferior technology. When this happens, all actors are actually worse off than 
they would have been had an alternative standard, or no standard, been chosen. 
Emergence of technologically sub-optimal standards is possible when there is a standard 
(or set of specifications able to become a standard) that has no originator with proprietary 
interest or specific sponsor but which through serendipity becomes established. This 
occurred in the case of the QWERTY standard for keyboards (David 1985; David 1986; 
David and Greenstein 1990). Although the QWERTY keyboard is ergonomically inferior 
and yields a slower typing speed than alternatives such as the Dvorak keyboard, it 
remains the industry standard for all typing devices. This is because the size of the user 
base is so large that the standard has become effectively “locked in”. Changing the 
standard will require retraining hundreds of millions of typists, a cost which industry is 
not willing to bear in the interests of improved typing efficiency. Thus, despite the sub-
optimal outcome, the standard remains. Further, with so many typists using the same 
standard, a manufacturer which produced a non-QWERTY keyboard would have 
difficulty attracting customers. 
 Although standardization usually results in market integration which creates a 
single market for a technology, there is also the possibility in standardization of creation 
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of “technology orphans” (Ozsomer and Cavusil 2000). Orphans are early adopters of one 
standard that are left isolated when an alternative standard is adopted more broadly and 
thus enjoys a larger real and potential consumer base and a larger ecosystem of 
participating firms making compatible goods and services. Technology orphans can 
emerge when there are multiple competing options for a standard which are different 
enough to make their integration into a single compatible standard difficult or impossible.  
 In the pre-standardization phase of an industry or technology era, there are usually 
multiple technologies or systems from which to choose. At this early stage, it can be 
difficult to know which standard is more likely to be broadly adopted, especially where 
the technologies have similar capabilities. Firms or consumers with strong interest in 
adopting a technology will make early selections. Their choices lock them in to one or the 
other of the fragmented markets for the different incompatible technologies. Should a 
single standard emerge, those early adopters who chose the alternate formats will become 
technology orphans. Orphans are left in an isolated niche market with limited growth 
potential and usually higher costs. However, due to switching costs, it can be difficult for 
orphans to get out of their isolation by switching to the alternate standard (Matutes and 
Regibeau 1987). The innovation, scale, cost, and complementary goods benefits accrue to 
adopters of the dominant standard but not to the “orphans” in their isolated markets.  
 Orphans may eventually switch to the dominant standard as happened with the 
victory of Sony Blu Ray over Toshiba’s HD-DVD. However, firms which must switch 
face higher costs and are thus at a competitive disadvantage versus firms which 
developed the winning standard or adopted it from the beginning. Further, any 
capabilities the firms had developed while using the now orphaned standard may not be 
transferrable. Governments and firms, thus have an incentive to avoid adopting the 
“wrong” standard or allowing the “wrong” standard to be developed.  
 Politically, this means governments have the option of allowing standards to be 
selected through competition between their markets or to proactively try to pick winners 
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and thus ensure early selection of a single standard without orphans. Successfully picking 
winners is difficult even for the most sophisticated government sponsors. For choosing a 
standard, the overall market size for the chosen standard must be initially large enough to 
get global attention. When this occurs, other countries and firms will be attracted to the 
protected standard. A protected standard without sufficient market gravity will become an 
orphan by political choice. Such was the case with many Japanese standards, particularly 
in telecommunications, throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Kushida 2011). 
 The potential for becoming or creating technology and market orphans contributes 
to the problem of “excess inertia.” There is likewise the opposite problem where a 
standard emerges so quickly that suboptimal technologies become dominant. This is a 
situation of “excess momentum.” The next section looks at how standardization takes 
place and the potential market impacts of different speeds of standardization.  
Process of Standardization and Market Impacts: Excess Momentum and Inertia 
 Economics, business and policy analysts studying technology standards have 
postulated several circumstances under which standardization is likely, or not, to take 
place. By standardization, the literature means the selection of one technology solution. 
The literature emphasizes the importance of information, signaling and market guidance 
for the emergence of technology standards. A review of the literature finds four 
conditions under which standardization can be expected to take place: 
 
1. Clear industry demand for standardization 
2. Rates of technological change have stabilized, slowed or plateaued 
3. Options for standardization are clearly differentiated 
4. A strong industry or government actor clearly favors one technology over 
another 
 
 When these four conditions are met, early adopters will cluster around different 
technologies in separate markets. When one standard achieves a “critical mass” of users, 
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suppliers or third parties, it usually is considered the victor. It has the largest potential 
consumer market and ecosystem of participating and producing firms. Agents which 
adopted alternate technologies then switch to the winning standard or become orphans. 
While the literature agrees that there is a tipping point after which a single market 
becomes dominant compared with others, there is no clear indication of what level of 
adoption for a standard amounts to a tipping point. For example, in the early years of the 
PC industry, the standards war arguably ended in 1984, the year IBM (and clones) 
achieved 26.4% of the PC market (Ozsomer and Cavusil 2000). At this point, software 
developers and hardware manufactures began gravitating toward the IBM standard. 
Alternate standards were abandoned or became niche markets.  
 The next standard shift will only take place once technology has clearly leapt to a 
new level. This can be seen in the case of the VHS-Betamax war. Once VHS achieved 
critical mass, Betamax users were orphaned, restricted to an increasingly limited variety 
of difficult to access content. The VHS standard was so entrenched from the 1980s that 
until the advent of inexpensive DVD players, none of the alternative technologies 
including laser disks and VCDs, managed to build a large market.22 Only the clear sound 
and image quality improvements of DVDs managed to change the standard. 
 In order for standardization of an industry – and creation of a single market to 
occur, a bandwagon effect must be initiated. To get a bandwagon started, however, 
certain conditions must be met. As noted above, if there is universal attraction to one 
technology – or a lack of alternatives – then any actor will adopt the default standard. If, 
however, there are different options or different levels of interest, information becomes 
important. Where actors know the interests of others they can easily decide whether to 
move forward with standardization or not. Since perfect information is only possible in 
                                                 
22 There are exceptions. VCDs were widely adopted in Southeast Asia and China where VHS had never 
established itself since mass markets for consumer electronics in these countries only began developing 
rapidly in the 1990s. In countries such as the United States where VHS was broadly adopted in the 1980s, 
alternate technologies did not establish significant challenging markets.  
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abstract, firms actually must act under uncertain conditions of incomplete information. 
This can yield excess inertia or excess momentum. 
 Excess inertia means standardization fails to take place even though all actors 
would benefit from creation of a single compatible market. Excess inertia can occur 
where the technologies from which to choose are not clearly differentiated or none of the 
firms has a particularly strong desire for standardization. Even though all of the firms in 
an industry would benefit from standardization, none have sufficient interest to take the 
risk of acting first without certainty that other firms will follow. Here firms fear making 
an early market choice and becoming orphans if others do not follow their lead. 
 If there is no clear difference between technologies, it becomes difficult to 
choose. Unless a firm has a strong interest, usually due to proprietary technology, in one 
standard over another, it will most likely not act. Since firms fear being orphaned, they 
may only be willing to adopt a technology if they feel confident that other firms will 
follow suit and adopt the same standard. This signaling can be accomplished by 
prompting from a large dominant firm. Large firms may feel they are able to act 
independently of others – particularly if they have vertically integrated production and 
marketing capabilities. Their move will bring their allied companies into the new 
standard. This may be sufficient to start the bandwagon effect and form a standard (Besen 
and Johnson 1986).  
 Companies may not always be able to independently overcome the problems of 
excess inertia. Here, politics can again play a role as government can push firms onto a 
bandwagon and overcome excess inertia. Governments do so by adopting a standard 
through a formal standardization process or establishing a binding regulation that in 
effect mandates the use of one standard or another. For example, although the US 
government had no official preference for standards in stereo television, the radio 
spectrum allocated for stereo would only work with one of the competing standards. This 
provided the clear signaling necessary for the bandwagon effect to take over (Besen and 
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Johnson 1986). Only one standard was legal and thus firms adopted it. This created a 
market in stereo-capable televisions as the common standard had been set. 
 The opposite problem of excess momentum is also possible. This can create 
market outcomes that are both socially and individually (for firms) suboptimal. If 
technology is still rapidly developing, early selection of a standard may not be ideal as 
this could stifle other potentially better avenues for innovation. If a dominant firm pushes 
for a standard they can start the bandwagon effect and produce a standard even though all 
actors would have been better off with an alternate standard. Where firms have differing 
levels of commitment to a technology – or to standardization in general – the strong early 
adopter can produce excess momentum as even disinterested parties will adopt rather 
than remain outside the standard. Excess momentum is also likely to yield unequal 
distributions of benefits as late adopters will have a difficult time establishing their 
presence in the market once early switchers have established themselves. 
 Attempting to start a bandwagon for creating a single market to the advantage of 
one firm versus another can also lead to anti-competitive behaviors. One of the most 
effective strategies for firms attempting to start a bandwagon is predatory pricing. 
Predatory pricing is purposefully undercutting alternative technologies even to the point 
of selling at a loss for a time. By underselling their competition, a firm can build a large 
enough market to produce critical mass. Once the alternatives have been pushed out of 
the market, however, the standard-setter – which now controls the market – is free to 
demand high royalties from other firms or charge high prices to consumers. Although a 
standard has been set which creates a desirable single market, the outcome is socially 
sub-optimal as the market has higher costs for all participants and privileges some firms 
more than others. For firms to achieve this level of dominance, however, takes significant 
commitment and willingness to take losses. Research has shown that in order to create a 
monopoly through standards, a firm needs to charge prices that are even lower than 
would be necessary just to drive out the competition by encouraging competitors to 
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purchase licenses. To preserve a monopoly, alternatives must be completely removed. In 
order to keep competing firms from developing alternative technologies, a monopolist 
needs to set their prices even lower. This level of commitment is difficult for firms to 
sustain unless they have significant resources. As a result, predatory standardization 
privileges established incumbents or firms with significant and consistent state support 
over all others.  
Categories of Technology Standards 
 Technology standards can be divided into two general categories: formal 
(sometimes called de jure) and de facto (also called market). These categories are 
significant as their different developmental processes privilege different actors and give 
varying degrees of influence to governments, firms and other non-state actors. It is 
therefore important to clearly define these categories of standards. In the empirical 
chapters, we discuss specific standardization efforts in the case study countries and look 
closely at the political influences on standards of both types. 
 Formal standards closely follow the general definition of standards as established 
by the ISO/IEC. Formal standards are those established by recognized standards 
development bodies. These development bodies use consensus or modified consensus 
procedures to amend and approve standards and their various protocols. With very few 
exceptions, compliance with formal standards is voluntary as most formal standards 
organizations have no independent enforcement powers. In addition to general consensus 
principles, formal standards bodies have policies governing the inclusion of IPR and the 
means of settling disputes over IPR inclusion or use. Generally, formal standards bodies 
utilize the (F)RAND principle (detailed below) for technology inclusion. Formal 
standards can be further divided into government formal standards and organizational 
formal standards.  
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 Government formal standards are set by national and regional standards bodies – 
usually with the sole right to develop or publish such standards in a given polity. At the 
international level, government formal standards are developed by the ISO, IEC and ITU 
as these standards development bodies have national representation. Different states 
appoint their own organizations to represent their interests in the ISO and IEC. These 
organizations include ANSI (United States), BSI (United Kingdom), DNI (Germany), 
AFNOR (France), and SAC (China). A state’s telecommunications regulatory body or 
ministry (sometimes foreign affairs ministry) sends delegations to the ITU. These 
international formal government standards bodies have existed since the 19th century (the 
ITU was created in 1865). Throughout much of the 20th century formal government 
standards were considered less important or influential, particularly in major network 
industries like telecommunications and broadcast media. Until the 1980s, many countries 
had national state-owned or private monopolies in these industries. A monopoly operator 
is able to dictate national standards by virtue of whatever technology it chooses to adopt 
with or without the involvement of formal standards organizations (Berg and Schummy 
1990). Vendors must also adopt the same standards in order to sell compatible equipment 
to the monopoly operator. Formal standards development organizations in ICT began 
gaining influence and attracting scholarly attention in the 1980s and 90s as regulatory 
authorities introduced competition in these national markets.  Only once regulatory 
authorities introduced competition in various industries did formal standardization 
become necessary. Multiple firms would need to be able to interconnect their networks 
and ensure compatibility of goods. This necessitated coordination. The mission of 
government formal standards was to accelerate the development and approval of national 
or regional standards in the absence of firms able to set these standards by default (Berg 
1990; Berg and Schummy 1990; Bogod 1990; Rankine 1990). Under newly competitive 
markets, government formal standards were intended to ensure compatibility and access 
for users who adopted one company’s solution or another. In telecommunications in 
 86
particular, government mandated standards were essential for ensuring roaming and 
compatibility among different operators.23 
 Some states only have a single legal body which makes formal standards – 
usually those which become formal national standards. China only allows standards 
developed and adopted by the Standards Administration of China (SAC) to be considered 
as national standards. Industry standards can be developed under the auspices of different 
industrial ministries, particularly the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 
and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, but these must still be 
submitted through SAC before they can be classified as national standards.24 As will be 
detailed in the empirical chapter on China, industry standards, although developed by the 
state, must still go through the SAC apparatus before they can be considered as Chinese 
submissions for international standards in ISO or IEC. In France, the French Standards 
Agency (AFNOR) develops and enforces national standards and coordinates the activities 
of different sector-based standardization bureaus (AFNOR 2013). AFNOR has been 
historically quite powerful and it continues to promote French interests – and the French 
approach to standardization – at the European and international level (Crane 1979). At 
the European level, however, there are three formal recognized government bodies 
charged with making standards for different types of technologies or industries: CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI (Besen 1990; CENELEC 2010; EC 2012). CEN makes general 
standards; CENELEC makes standards for electronics and information technology, and 
ETSI sets standards for telecommunications. Under EU law, only CEN, CENELEC or 
ETSI standards can be referenced for mandatory compliance or government procurement. 
Even where industry universally accepts a standard from bodies such as IEEE, the 
                                                 
23 In mobile telephony, for example, it is important that a phone from one carrier be able to work on the 
infrastructure of another. While this incurs extra charges, it must also be made technologically feasible. 
This requires a common standard for the transmission, receiving and handset equipment. 
24 The difference between “industry” and “national” standards is not just academic. In China, a national 
standard applies to all industries. Industry standards are only applicable in the industry for which they were 
adopted. Further, for China to make submissions to international standards bodies, an industry standard 
must first be made a national standard. 
 87
standard must first be processed and adopted through the formal apparatus before it can 
be referenced.25  
 Since the 1980s, there has been a general awareness in industry and academia that 
the government formal standardization system takes longer to develop standards than 
does the de facto standardization system (Berg and Schummy 1990). International bodies 
such as the ITU, ISO and IEC are often criticized for their sluggishness in the face of 
technological change and the pressing need for more rapid development of standards. In 
Europe and in the ISO, there have been reforms to enable “fast track” procedures for 
more rapid standardization. However, the need to ensure consensus before standards can 
be adopted means rapid standards development and approval remains difficult. 
 Despite this criticism, formal government standards development organizations 
remain influential normatively as “legitimate” authorities for standardization. ITU, ISO 
and IEC standards are also clearly mandatory under the terms of the WTO’s Technical 
Barriers to Trade agreement (WTO 1995). To accelerate development of standards in 
government formal standardization bodies, some formal bodies, notably ETSI, have 
modified the consensus-based approach. By adopting different voting structures, usually 
a form of supermajority, it is possible to accelerate the process of standards creation by 
preventing small blocks of motivated parties from stopping the entire standards 
development process. 
 A second type of formal standard is the organizational formal standard. These are 
standards developed by an established body outside the purview of government or 
international organizations with national memberships. The most important of such 
organizations is the IEEE. These bodies are non-profit organizations without state 
                                                 
25 Reference in law means that legally binding statutes mention a standard or portion of a standard 
explicitly. For example, a law on information security could mandate the use of goods minimally compliant 
with a data security standard. In Europe, however, a data security standard must be adopted by CEN or 
CENELEC before it can be referenced in law. This added layer of bureaucracy has led to recent reform 
attempts. These have introduced a fast-track procedure for approval of existing and generally accepted 
standards which were not developed or adopted through Europe’s formal standards structure. 
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sponsorship or membership. These bodies exist to produce standards for the benefit of 
industrial clarity and development. These groups are “self-organizing” in the sense that 
companies or experts perceive the need for standards-based technological coordination 
and form a group within these bodies to achieve that goal. Standards development by 
these organizations is often faster than that by government formal standards bodies. 
Organizational formal standards bodies also produce standards for which there is clear 
demand as the standards efforts are initiated by industry actors in the first place.26 
Industry groups such as the Moving Pictures Expert Group (MPEG) develop standards to 
advance the interests of member companies. 
 Although arguably faster and more “market relevant,” organizational formal 
standards are subject to criticism as being beholden to the interests of incumbent firms or 
established national powers. Emerging economies in particular see these organizations as 
biased against newcomers in favor of established powers (Author’s Interviews; Ernst 
2013). Organizational formal standards also have different levels of “legitimacy” by 
national standardization bodies. In the United States, standards drafted and published by 
these bodies can be adopted as voluntary national standards. Industry is free to use such 
standards as it sees fit; these standards can also be easily adopted as national standards 
with little or no change by ANSI. In contrast, China’s national standards law accords no 
legal standing to organizational formal standards. While industry may adopt and utilize 
these standards, the standards cannot become legal national or industry standards unless 
they have gone through the formal adoption process under SAC or an industrial ministry. 
A similar situation exists in Europe concerning the need for all standards – with the 
                                                 
26 Trade groups such as USITO and the American Chamber of Commerce frequently criticize China’s 
government formal standardization system for working on standards for which there is little or no demand 
by industry. The United States government has also been criticized for pushing standards development or 
adoption without industry support. The FCC in particular has selected standards for nationwide adoption 
when industry preferred alternative technologies or the pace of technological development meant 
standardization was “premature” (Besen and Johnson 1986). 
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recent exception of ICT – to pass through the formal government standardization 
apparatus (EC 2012). 
 The two types of formal standards facilitate different levels and types of political 
influence. Government formal standards bodies, particularly those with developmental 
tasks in addition to administrative ones, are vehicles for state policy in standardization. 
Government formal standards bodies allow a state to push for its technological 
preferences and to shape market outcomes in accordance with their desired vision for a 
market – whether open or closed or domestic or international in scope. Even if formal 
standardization is slower than the market alternative, some states favor the formal process 
as it affords the state the opportunity to participate and direct standardization to realize 
strategic goals. For a state like China, dealing with the problems of Gerschenkronian 
backwardness, the state will see a compelling need for standards everywhere and for a 
strong state role in developing them. In more established economies, the use of strategic 
standardization is generally more limited.  
 Organizational formal standards bodies can become vehicles for strategic action 
by firms. Dominant enterprises can strongly influence the shape of the standard in order 
to gain competitive advantages in the market which emerges. Smaller firms or late-
comers may have greater difficulty advancing their interests in organizational formal 
bodies. For this reason, many emerging economies – most notably China – often prefer 
formal government standards bodies where state power can be utilized to offset the 
relative weakness of individual firms. 
 The second broad category of standards is de facto (market) standards. De facto 
standards are defined by the fact that the standard only becomes a “standard” when 
competing alternative products have been eliminated or reduced to niche market status. 
De facto standards are not adopted and codified as national or international standards 
through formal SDOs. These standards emerge through competition between alternatives. 
De facto standards can be sponsored or unsponsored and can be difficult to change due to 
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network effects. Research has noted that firms frequently seek to establish their products 
as de facto standards for their industry but actually prefer less standardization – 
particularly monopoly-producing de facto standardization – at other stages of production 
in their industry.27 
 Some strains of the literature argue that market standards most commonly result 
from monopolistic conditions where a single firm has an overwhelming market share and 
thus can dictate the standards for its industry (Berg and Schummy 1990). As mentioned 
above, before the wave of deregulation and privatization in telecommunications in the 
1980s and 90s, monopoly operators in each country could effectively dictate standards 
since they were the only consumer for equipment in that market (Funk 2002). In certain 
industries, monopoly dictate of standards remains possible. Through the early 2000s, 
Microsoft’s Windows operating system had nearly total dominance in computer operating 
systems. This control over a de facto standard gave Microsoft the ability to set 
compatibility standards and demands for software development to other vendors. 
 With the spread of deregulation in the 1980s and 90s, however, scholars at the 
IEEE and elsewhere began sounding alarms that de facto standardization would become 
less common and more difficult due to the breaking up of national monopolies and 
introduction of competition (Berg 1990; Sherif and Sparrel 1992). These scholars argued 
that without monopoly, de facto standardization would not work since companies would 
need some degree of coordination and cooperation in order to ensure broad compatibility. 
This would require organizational or government formal standardization.  
 The rise of government formal standardization in the 1980s, however, also gave 
increased impetus for industry consortia to develop standards (Berg 1990). These 
consortia sought to compensate for the slow pace of standards development through the 
formal process and more efficiently produce the standards they wanted for their 
                                                 
27 Formal and de facto standards processes can both feature in companies’ strategies. If a firm is unable to 
establish its goods or technology as a standard on its own, it may seek to control or influence formal 
standards processes in order to achieve the same result. 
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industries. However, there remain fears that self-organized industry standards consortia 
(organizational formal standards bodies) can violate anti-trust laws.28 If organizational 
formal standards bodies are banned, standardization is impeded since neither 
organizational formal nor de facto standardization by a dominant actor is possible. Only 
government formal standardization processes would remain but these, as noted above, are 
frequently slow. The result would be a sub-optimal level of standardization, particularly 
in fast moving industries where market-creating standards are needed in a timely fashion. 
 There are two subsets of de facto standards: unsponsored and sponsored. 
Unsponsored standards have no formal promoters or at least none with proprietary 
interests in the standard. The QWERTY keyboard standard had no formal sponsor or 
developing organization but succeeded in the market due to an advantageous combination 
of manufacturers, typing schools and trained human resources. Since QWERTY has 
become established, despite having no formal codified rule which requires keyboards to 
use this layout, few firms would consider utilizing an alternative keyboard layout. This 
holds true even for mobile device keyboards where – for the sake of typing efficiency and 
ergonomics – a better layout would be more rational. Although the initial technological 
reason for QWERTY has long been resolved (as was even in the early days of the 
typewriter), the standard remains since hundreds of millions of users have grown entirely 
accustomed to typing in this way. To unlearn it in order to use an alternative standard 
would be prohibitively difficult (David 1985). Although difficult to dislodge, 
unsponsored standards are also unpredictable in terms of which, or whether a, standard 
will emerge as dominant. 
 Sponsored de facto standards are those developed for the purpose of defining a 
product or technology to facilitate the dissemination, sale, and adoption of the product or 
technology. Industry consortia for developing sponsored de facto standards include the 
                                                 
28 Recent statements from the US Justice Department have confirmed these fears. The emerging position at 
DoJ appears to be that unless industry is willing to abide by fair and open processes in developing 
standards in consortia, these groups may be deemed anti-competitive and banned. 
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DVD alliance and Sony’s Blu Ray alliance. Unlike industry consortia which create 
organizational formal standards, these groups are explicitly for-profit. For-profit industry 
consortia need not adhere to the consensus and openness principles of formal standards. 
They also devise their own rules for technology sharing or licensing and develop regimes 
for the maintenance of the standard, upgrading and promotion of the technology. De facto 
standards established by firms with proprietary interests can also become the basis for 
anti-trust action if the dominant firm appears to be using standardization to thwart the rise 
of competitors or alternatives. For-profit consortia can create monopolies without the 
openness or fairness principles of formal standards. After de facto standards become 
established, their sponsors may attempt to use this monopoly position to extract “unfair” 
rents from licensees or consumers, thus opening them to anti-trust concerns (Langlois 
1999). 
 Formal and de facto standards can also be sorted based on the level at which they 
are adopted and enforced. Formal (government and organizational) standards can be 
international, regional or national. International standards arise within government formal 
bodies with national memberships such as the ISO, IEC and ITU. These bodies formally 
divide standardization work by specializing in long-range communications (ITU), 
information technology and short-range wireless (IEC) and most other engineering and 
health standards (ISO). International standards also arise within organizational bodies 
with international private or corporate memberships such as IEEE or the Organization for 
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards. The standards produced and 
adopted at this level are generally obligatory for WTO members to adopt or conform to. 
There is disagreement, however, over whether the standards developed in non-
governmental bodies such as the IEEE are, or should be, legally binding in the same way 
that government formal bodies such as the ISO are. European member states in particular 
value the ISO, IEC, and ITU since their national membership basis gives the European 
Union a strong voice which benefits standards developed in Europe or containing 
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technologies from European companies. Regional standards are mostly an issue within 
Europe although the adoption of certain standards as national standards (explained 
below) can create de facto regional standards blocs. In Europe, three bodies: CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI define standards for the entire European Union. These standards 
supersede national ones, and national governments are required to conform with EU-level 
standards. Finally, national standards are those adopted by the national standards bodies 
of different states. These include ANSI, BSI, DNA, AFNOR, and SAC. The exact 
standards development and adoption processes – as well as strategies and ideologies – of 
these bodies differ. Some such as AFNOR and SAC are government agencies funded by 
the national budget. Others such as BSI are government granted monopolies for the 
development and adoption of standards but are not formally part of the government. 
National standards bodies are usually the representatives to government formal 
standardization bodies such as the ISO. 
 There are other levels for standards as well. In China, for example, there are 
industry standards. Adoption of these standards is determined by the relevant industrial 
ministry. There can also be regional standards set by provincial governments. Lastly, 
there are enterprise standards set by individual firms. The iPhone and Android app 
development interfaces are examples of enterprise standards. There are no formal 
agreements or consensus principles used to define these standards, yet vendors must 
comply with the standards in order to develop applications for Apple or Android 
products. Given the global popularity of smartphones, application developers are 
effectively obligated to use these standards. Thus, in industries dominated by major 
companies, it is still possible to independently set enterprise standards to which vendors 
must adhere.29  
                                                 
29 Alternative app environments such as Windows Mobile and Blackberry remain limited niche markets. 
App developers seeking rapid market development are forced to develop for the de facto Apple and 
Android standards. 
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Comparison of Different Categories of Standardization 
 All types of standardization influence the markets which emerge. Formal and de 
facto standardization practices create different types of standards which build markets 
with differing features and organizations. First, formal standardization approaches are 
generally more “open.” In the case of standardization, “open” refers to the ability of any 
actor to participate in standardization, make contributions and review and comment on 
others’ contributions. So long as membership in a formal body is not restricted based on 
nationality, participation is generally quite open. In Europe, for example, formal 
standardization procedures frequently undergo review in order to increase the ability of 
consumer groups and other civil society actors (non-academia and corporate) to 
participate in standardization. This broader participation has several impacts. Broader 
participation ideally means formal standardization efforts will have larger pools of 
technology submissions on which to draw and the final standard will be more broadly 
representative of different interests. Conversely, in sponsored de facto standards, 
membership in a developing consortium can be closed or restricted based on any number 
of criteria.30 Since formal standards have open participation, all else being equal the 
market which forms should be the largest possible as more firms have already accepted 
the standard and agreed to participate. De facto consortia may or may not have a large 
number of participants. This is partly why de facto standards usually must fight to 
establish themselves as the dominant standard. The relative size of the developing 
coalition is a major influence over final market performance. In the case of VHS versus 
Sony Betamax, the more “open” and participatory nature of VHS meant it was able to 
develop more quickly and assert market dominance. 
                                                 
30 Some Chinese standards development industry consortia assign different categories of membership based 
on payment of dues and technology contribution. Members who contribute more technology have more 
influence over the development of the standard. Naturally, this practice privileges large established 
enterprises to the detriment of small ones.  
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 The second area of market influence stems from the means by which protocols are 
approved and technologies incorporated into the standard. In formal standards bodies, 
incorporation and approval is done through consensus. Final standards protocols are more 
likely to incorporate divergent ideas because the members of the organization will have 
to reach consensus in order for the standard to move forward. This means the standard 
will ideally have a broad base of participants and wide support, thus facilitating early 
emergence of a successful market. For de facto standards consortia, decisions on 
technology incorporation or standards approval can be made by methods other than 
consensus. While standards consortia do have means for vetting and incorporating 
technology from non-founding members, there is no need for the group to reach full 
consensus on technologies. That many sponsored de facto standardization bodies do not 
use consensus is an area of concern for government bodies which wish to reference and 
utilize standards in regulations and laws. 
 Third, whether or not a standards development organization needs to reach 
consensus determines the speed at which standards can be developed, approved and put 
into effect. Formal standards often take years to develop, even when the technologies are 
fairly well defined. Reaching consensus is a difficult process, particularly when firms 
have strong vested interests in one technology. De facto standards consortia are able to 
develop their standards faster since opposition can be overridden. Strong actors – usually 
those with large patent portfolios and extensive R&D resources able to be devoted to 
standardization – are better able to push for their preferences in consortia while weaker 
actors have little influence. Both of these features contribute to the speed of de facto 
standardization. According to the literature, standardization always has a “window of 
opportunity” in which standardization can take place and serve a useful economic 
function. This means the greater speed of de facto standardization may be beneficial. 
 Naturally speed will come at the cost not only of consensus or openness but also 
at the expense of potential rival technologies. In a formal process, all possible 
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technologies should, in theory, be given a fair hearing and equal opportunity. A working 
group will run simulations and tests to compare the results on a set of constant metrics, 
thus determining which technology is superior. The superior technology is then expected 
to be adopted – perhaps incorporating elements from the alternate proposals. In 
sponsored de facto standards consortia, there are explicit economic interests in the 
creation of the group. Consortia are sometimes formed by incumbent firms as vehicles for 
building ecosystems to support and build demand for their technology. Thus there is no 
mandated need to consider alternative technologies.  
 Once the basic technologies of a standard have been adopted, standards can be 
very difficult to change. This lock-in effectively closes the door on alternative areas of 
research inquiry. Stated directly – standardization determines the path that future research 
in an industry sector will take. In mobile telephony, for example, selection of one 
technology such as frequency division multiplexing necessarily prevents adoption of a 
rival technology such as time division multiplexing. The incentives to have technology 
become the basis for a standard become even greater when actors consider long-term 
consequences. Firms which developed the technologies incorporated into a standard have 
an advantage in understanding that technology and experience working with it. This tacit 
knowledge affords a long term advantage both in producing standards-compliant products 
and in conducting research which builds on the standard. Tacit knowledge and experience 
with the basic technology makes it more likely that a firm will again lead technology 
contributions in subsequent standards. 
 Formal standards processes tend to emphasize established technologies over more 
novel alternatives. This means that a formal process may succeed in producing a standard 
with broad appeal and acceptance, but the technology adopted may not be the most 
cutting-edge. Thus the consumer may be hurt by a relative slowing of the pace of 
technology upgrading. The preference for established technologies may also privilege 
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incumbent and large scale firms which are better able to develop and test new 
technologies themselves before bringing them to the table for standardization.   
 Formal standardization, particularly when led by a government, can also create a 
circumstance where there is a “blind giant.” Standardization is most effective when it 
defines the parameters of a new technology or industry before many of the specific 
technological details have been sorted out. This means, a technical committee must act 
without full knowledge of the implications of their decision. Since poor choices have 
long term consequences, there is a risk that formal processes will either pick technologies 
that are outdated or else will choose unproven and potentially unsuccessful technologies. 
Either outcome is unfavorable. De facto standards tend to avoid the risks of the “blind 
giant” since the technologies have usually been developed to commercial viability before 
being released as a prospective standard. 
 Here it is important to note that while the typology of formal and de facto 
standardization is useful, it is still an abstraction. By necessity, nearly all standards will 
be developed through a hybrid process. In some cases the hybrid process is clear: a 
company or industry consortia develops or even completely drafts a standard which is 
then adopted by a formal standards body through a fast track procedure. The standard, 
although developed outside the formal system, has become a formal standard. In other 
cases, standards are developed in and maintained by formal standards bodies but the 
standard is represented in the market through an incorporated organ whose role is to 
promote the use of the standard and to collect royalties on behalf of the actors which 
contributed to its development. Most standards projects involve such hybrid actions. 
 Furthermore, all standards unless they are legally binding, are ultimately de facto 
standards in the sense that success (defined as adoption and use) is arbitrated by 
consumer selection. Whether a given system is technologically superior (Betamax) or 
more user and producer friendly (HD-DVD) does not necessarily lead to the broadest 
adoption of a standard. Formal standards must compete for global market share, at times 
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producing a single global monopoly technology or isolating certain countries which 
adhere to unique standards.31 Market competition has limits, however, for formal 
standards. As government controls the licenses to operate businesses, use broadcast 
spectrum or build on public lands, the state has ultimate authority over many standards. 
This makes it difficult for market forces alone to select a single global standard. Where 
international standards bodies also fail to do so, costs are imposed on industry and final 
consumers.  
Essential Patents and Standards 
 The protocols defined by technology standards today almost universally involve 
the use of proprietary technologies, usually protected by patents. For a standard, an 
“essential” patent is one which necessarily will be violated if the standard is to be 
implemented by a user. In recent years the number of these “essential” patents has grown 
rapidly. The only way for a standard to not utilize an essential patent would be to 
completely redesign the protocols. However, some patents are so broad or basic to the 
technology in question that it is virtually impossible to perform such a workaround. This 
means technology standards necessarily require obtaining licensing agreements from 
essential patent holders. This section explains essentiality and then discusses the different 
terms on which licenses are usually granted. 
 Essential patents pose a number of potential risks in standardization. If an IP 
holder refuses to license their technology during the developmental phase, a standard will 
have to be redeveloped. As mentioned above, some broad or fundamental patents make 
such workarounds impossible. If a firm refuses to license, a standard can be blocked. 
                                                 
31 In the battle over color TV standards in the 1960s, two of the competing standards: SECAM and PAL 
were government formal standards. With international standards bodies unable to adopt a single 
international standard (as happened at the ITU for 3G mobile), the standards would have to win support 
from suppliers and broadcasters, thus turning political into market competition. In the case of color TV, 
three standards – SECAM, PAL, and NTSC – effectively divided the world between them. Being non-
compatible, there were costs imposed in sharing broadcast content and producing TV sets and broadcast 
equipment. 
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After a standard is developed and published, an essential IP holder may belatedly emerge 
to assert their patents and claim the essentiality of their IP. This threat, known as patent 
holdup, can prevent the implementation of a standard. With the sunk costs in developing 
the standard having already been made, it is even more difficult to change or redesign the 
standard. The ex post asserting firm thus has significant leverage to demand high 
royalties or restrictive licensing terms. A third risk of essentiality comes when firms 
transfer their patents to other companies. Under current law, there is no provision 
mandating the licensing agreements for standards be upheld when IP is transferred to a 
new owner. The new IP holder can then engage in ex post holdup even though terms had 
already been negotiated and agreed for the IP under its previous owner. This latter 
category has been the cause of lawsuits in recent years as new IP owners – such as 
Google after purchasing Motorola Mobility patents – change licensing terms which other 
firms consider very unfavorable. 
 The vast majority of standards development bodies adhere to the hard IPR 
protection norms of the industrial West. As in other debates over the cost of intellectual 
property, supporters of strong IPR argue that without strong protection of IPR, firms 
would have no incentive to innovate. Since standards are desirable, they must include and 
compensate for the existing proprietary technologies of firms. These firms thus have a 
right to expect fair compensation for the use of their technology. In the US, this norm is 
broadly held and upheld by ANSI and American companies. In Europe, this norm is 
similarly supported.  
 However, there have been attempts by government formal standards bodies to 
limit the range of options for IPR holders in the interest of getting the widest 
dissemination of technology possible. In China, IPR protection is not directly challenged 
formally or informally, but the premise that IPR is an end in itself worthy of protection 
and monetization is challenged. As IP Takers, Chinese firms do not directly benefit from 
hard IPR norms. Rather, their interests are in the reduction of all input costs, including 
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those for IPR. Arguably, a low price for IPR would earn more money for all – IPR 
holders and users – than a high price because of the broader potential adoption of an 
inexpensive technology. More fundamentally, however, Chinese firms see production and 
sale of actual products as their goal, not the monetization of technology. Thus, to make 
and keep their products competitive, they need to control costs. Keeping costs for IPR 
low is a means to this. For standards, this means that Chinese standardization bodies will 
strongly encourage – or require – members to offer free or extremely low-priced 
licensing options. 
 There are four basic types of licenses for essential intellectual property used in 
standards. Most standards organizations require that participating members make good 
faith promises to declare any potentially relevant patents. This declaration is to be made 
early in the development process and be accompanied by a clear statement of a 
commitment whether or not to license the technology. Promises to license can take three 
major forms: (Fair) Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory ((F)RAND), RAND-Royalty 
Free (RAND-RF) and license without commitment to non-discriminatory principles. 
 RAND commitments are the most common method for declaring intention to 
have intellectual property incorporated into technology standards.32 “Reasonable” refers 
to the licensing fees that the IP holder will demand from firms which produce goods or 
services compliant with the standard. Firms are not expected to ask for high rates that 
would negatively influence adoption of the standard or limit the abilities of firms to 
successfully produce standards-compliant goods or services. “Non-discriminatory” means 
that IP holders agree that any firm, regardless of ownership, size, industry or nationality 
has a right to license and use the technology, so long as the reasonable royalty is paid.  
 While RAND commits the firm to licensing its technology, the specifications of 
the terms of that commitment are quite vague. The RAND principle is frequently 
                                                 
32 The acronym is usually RAND in the United States and FRAND in Europe. This dissertation uses the 
RAND acronym for simplicity and consistency except in the European Union chapter. The FRAND and 
RAND commitments are the same. 
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criticized as “reasonableness” of licensing rates is ill-defined, and the means of 
determining reasonableness vary from one legal jurisdiction to another. Further, there is 
no clarity about whether RAND commitments are binding when patents are transferred to 
other companies. A great fear for standards developers is that protocols will include 
essential patents and then the ownership of those patents is transferred to a firm which 
refuses to license or demands unreasonable fees for usage. Such ex post patent holdup 
significantly increases the power of the firm demanding a new licensing agreement since 
the sunk costs in the standard make it very difficult to change the protocols so they no 
longer include those patents. 
 Royalty Free (RF, RAND-RF) licensing guarantees access to essential 
technologies without raising the costs for would-be adopters of the new standard. 
Although the use of intellectual property as a potential source of revenue is increasingly 
considered a valuable strategy for many firms, in some cases firms find that the RF 
approach is economically rational. For firms hoping to establish a technology standard 
for which they have a competitive advantage in design or production, offering their 
solution on an RF basis makes it more likely to be adopted. Arguably, where two 
competing technology submissions for a protocol are roughly equal in performance, the 
RF submission is more likely to be accepted. Indeed, the success of Ericsson’s 
submission for the GSM standard for mobile communications is often attributed to 
Ericsson’s RF commitment of its intellectual property for the standard. In contrast, the 
joint German-French proposal for GSM was heavily proprietary (Funk 1998; Funk 2002). 
To keep licensing costs down, and encourage adoption of GSM, Ericsson’s proposal was 
adopted. This gave Ericsson an advantage as it had more understanding and experience 
working with the technology. 
 Another reason that firms agree to RF licensing is that not all firms see the 
monetization of intellectual property as part of their business model. For firms centered 
on the sale of value-added services or the hardware or software of the standard itself, an 
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RF offering can increase the chance of having their technology incorporated into the 
standard and keeping the overall licensing rates low. Over time, an initial RF offering can 
improve the competitive position and financial opportunities for a firm following this 
business model. For more pure technology firms, however, an RF license would deny an 
important source of revenue. This makes many, if not most, R&D-intensive firms hesitant 
to agree to RF licensing agreements. At times, formal standards bodies have attempted to 
mandate royalty free licensing for any technologies that will be included in their 
standards. Companies tend to vociferously oppose these efforts. In recent discussions, 
even Ericsson has argued that any move toward mandatory RF commitments for essential 
intellectual property would erode a valuable revenue stream (Author’s Interview). Firms 
may thus agree to RF based on their own strategic calculations but resist potential moves 
to mandating RF licensing. 
 Finally, some firms in consortia or formal standards bodies are willing to license 
their intellectual property but refuse to do so on non-discriminatory terms. Such firms 
choose to license to different actors on a case by case negotiated basis. The IP-holder in 
this case seeks to maximize their leverage – either for IP sharing arrangements (cross-
licensing) or by maximizing their revenue by negotiating different rates with certain 
actors. This type of discriminatory licensing can also be used to limit competition by 
restricting the number of firms actually able to produce for the standard. In the case of 
GSM, Motorola’s refusal to offer a non-discriminatory license for its IP shaped the 
industry structure for the standard by limiting the production of equipment to major firms 
which were able to negotiate technology sharing agreements with Motorola. Smaller 
firms which may have been able to use the standard as a platform for development and 
market entry were unable to participate as Motorola refused to license its GSM patent 
portfolio to these firms. Strategic use of limited discriminatory licensing can be an 
important tool for firms seeking to enhance their competitive position or maximize 
revenues. In their strategies, however, firms must be careful when making restrictive 
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agreements to license as doing so may result in their technology being rejected by a 
standards development organization in favor of a less restrictive alternative. Where a firm 
has absolutely essential basic technology patents it will be able to use this strategy. 
 There are firms which have potentially relevant IPR but refuse to make an ex ante 
commitment to license on any terms. Ex ante refusals to license are usually followed by 
formal procedures by technical committees. The committees seek explanations and ask 
the firm to reconsider. Refusals to license also lead standards development organizations 
to halt development of the standard until an agreement is reached. Where a firm refuses 
to license under any terms, the SDO is forced to either abandon development of the 
standard or return the standard to lower level working groups to redesign the protocols 
without reliance on the offending technology. 
 Ex post refusals to license are the greatest fear for many standards development 
organizations. In some circumstances, an IP-holder may innocently, or deliberately, fail 
to declare ownership of relevant intellectual property until after a standard has been 
drafted, approved and implemented. The IP-holder may then choose to assert a given 
patent and demand high royalties from any adopters of the standard. This process, known 
as patent holdup, is fairly rare. However, the fear that it will take place – particularly 
given the increasing presence of so-called “patent trolls” – is a source of concern to many 
standards development organizations.33 Some SDOs have responded by attempting to 
make a promise to license on RAND terms a prerequisite for participation in standards 
development. Alternately, some organizations obligate members to ex ante agree to 
license in some form of their own choosing or else their intellectual property defaults to a 
RAND-RF license after a certain period of time. 
 While these licensing principles generally respect the rights of IP holders to 
dispose of their intellectual property as they see fit, there are limits to their freedom of 
                                                 
33 While not the subject of this dissertation, patent trolls are companies which acquire intellectual property 
– specifically patents – through direct purchases with the express purpose of asserting those patent rights 
through lawsuits or demanding high royalties from companies performing established industry activities. 
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action. In some countries, particularly those with jurisprudence in the English tradition, 
there is legal precedent that even a legally acquired monopoly – such as through a patent 
on a key technology – cannot be used to harm the public welfare. Thus, there is a case to 
be made that governments could charge firms which refuse to license standards-essential 
technology (or demand “unreasonable” rates) with anti-competitive behavior. Under anti-
trust laws, governments could legally force recalcitrant firms to license their technology. 
This would, in effect, eliminate the risk of ex-post holdup. However, Langlois (1999) 
argues that using anti-trust laws to force licensing in standardization is not necessary. 
Using a Schumpeterian perspective, Langlois argues that even patent holdup is a 
temporary concern. Standards can and will be changed as the gales of creative destruction 
bring about new solutions to existing problems. Since innovation will eventually make 
existing proprietary technologies superfluous, state power should not be used to prevent 
patent holdup. Nonetheless, for governments and standards development organizations, 
patent holdup remains a real concern – especially in light of the increasing need for 
timely development of standards. In brief, the threat of patent holdup remains a real 
concern in standardization, one that different governments and SDOs seek to address.  
Defining a “Successful” Standard and the Role of the State 
 The literature argues there are different pathways to success for a standard but any 
successful approach must meet several criteria. For this dissertation, as in the literature, a 
successful standard is one that is broadly adopted by industry for use in goods and 
services. A standard that passes through the formal development process but fails to be 
utilized is not a successful standard. 
 For a standard to succeed there must be broad participation in the development of 
the standard. Having both equipment manufacturers and operators involved in the 
development process speeds implementation of a standard since all of the necessary 
actors agree upon a standard and are able to act in concert. This coordination can be done 
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under state guidance as it frequently is in Europe but it need not necessarily be state-led. 
Industry consortia, through self-interest can achieve the same results if the consortia’s 
membership is broad enough. 
 Second, there must be rapid deployment at scale. As noted above, in standards, 
the key to success is the “network effect” so would-be standards setters need to achieve 
scale to realize these benefits. Once a certain scale has been reached, there is a tipping 
point. After this, there is a bandwagon effect where more and more actors pile in, thus 
locking in the standard. For an SDO, it is thus important to have a major market player 
throw its weight behind the standard. This can induce others to jump on board as well. 
Where market forces will not do this, it is possible for the state to try to compensate by 
mandating a standard, making policies or regulations that effectively require the use of 
the standard, or using its procurement power to create early demand and scale. Early 
achievement of large scale in real or potential adopters is essential for ensuring rapid 
adoption of a standard. 
 Third, successful standards should have backwards compatibility with earlier 
technologies. In some cases, a standard that completely wipes out earlier technologies can 
be successful if it is a standalone technology that does not need to interface with the 
earlier devices. For example, DVD players could (and did) replace VHS because the 
value of one device is not diminished by its incompatibility with the earlier technology. 
For network technologies, however, backwards compatibility is particularly important 
since the new system needs to be able to connect and work with the old in order for the 
value of the new system to immediately have enough users to encourage adoption. In the 
case of telecommunications, backwards compatibility can also be used as a competitive 
weapon. Europe and Japan’s 3G standard, WCDMA, was not backwards compatible with 
cdmaOne. This meant there was no incentive for non-committed countries to build 2G 
networks using cdmaOne since it would afford no benefits when moving to WCDMA 
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which was partially backwards compatible with GSM. Compatibility with GSM would 
encourage adoption of GSM and limit the spread of the competing cdmaOne. 
 The ability of standards to succeed is also partly determined by the degree of 
openness in the development process. Open standards are those which permit many firms 
to join, contribute technology, and shape the final protocols. All else being equal, the 
protocols of open standards are completed faster than closed ones and also tend to be 
more successful in building markets. However, open standards are also problematic 
insomuch as having many firms involved means there are many potential veto players. 
This makes it difficult to achieve consensus. Closed standards do not face those problems 
but may have the problem of limited contribution. Unless the sponsoring actor is 
particularly well-endowed with human and financial resources, having fewer participants 
means standard development will take longer. Having a smaller development group also 
means it is harder for the standard to gain broad acceptance fewer firms have a stake in 
the standard or its success. More closed standards will need to build broad acceptance 
through extensive advertising or demonstration. 
 The potential success of any new standard can be very difficult to determine ex 
ante. In the 1980s, the ISO-developed OSI standard for computer networking appeared to 
be the standard which would define computer networking. It was open and developed by 
formal standards bodies with high degrees of legitimacy and international support. 
However, in the end, Cisco’s 5 layer approach actually won out over the 7 layer OSI 
proposal. Cisco’s standard, moreover, was based on proprietary technologies, not the 
open OSI approach. Thus, even though open standards have real advantages, when a 
closed competing standard creates a market first or has overwhelming technological 
advantages, the closed standard may be able to win out over an open one. 
 Given the advantages of standardization, and the difficulty individual firms – or 
even consortia – may have in establishing a successful standard, government arguably 
has a real and substantive role to play in standardization. Although, it would stand to 
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reason that technology standards, being highly useful, would have enough intrinsic value 
for companies to invest in their development, unless it is a monopoly, a single firm is not 
able to reap all of the benefits from the market for the standardized good. Since standards 
are a platform, firms which did not contribute can also benefit from the standard and 
make use of it. These firms produce goods or services for the market and may thus be 
considered “free-riders” benefiting from the efforts and investments of others. Even with 
licensing fees, the creator is unable to appropriate all of the returns from developing a 
standard. 
 This discussion is not purely economic. Since the decline of national monopolies 
in industries such as telecommunications, there has been a gradual decline in corporate 
investment in standardization. In the late 1980s, this trend became very clear: non-
corporate actors would have to become more active in developing, or encouraging the 
development of, standards for emerging technologies. There is an argument that 
standards, like R&D, are a social good that under pure market competition will be 
produced at a socially sub-optimal level. Thus there is a need for approaches to 
standardization which do not entirely rely upon market forces to ensure standards are 
developed. In brief, there is a case to be made that governments should be active in 
encouraging standardization. 
 In the US, faith in the value of the market means the government does not 
mandate standardization. The dominant US perspective is that where there is truly 
demand for a standard and technical rationality demands it, individual firms or 
coalitions/alliances will form to develop and implement the needed standards. This means 
government efforts will either be unnecessary or else intrusive and likely to create 
standards where there is no need. In Europe, there is no such general faith in the power of 
the market. Government’s coordinating and guiding role is considered essential for 
building and sustaining markets. There is also very conscious awareness of the limited 
size of European states and their domestic markets. European firms which rely solely on 
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their domestic markets will struggle to become globally competitive. Together, however, 
European states and companies can be globally successful. Thus, there is a need to 
encourage coordinated efforts to produce pan-European standards. The European 
Commission, drawing on the statist heritages of its member states, uses non-market 
coordination mechanisms to get European firms to work together on common strategic 
goals, arguing that this way they can be more globally competitive. In China, firms are 
small and fragmented and generally lack the fiscal and human capital resources to carry 
out technology standardization activities. That firms are small and weak means they will 
struggle to set standards by themselves as they are unlikely to be able to start the 
bandwagon effect. Further, the strong tradition of state leadership in the Chinese political 
economy means that if the state does not lead, firms will hesitate to take independent 
action. Thus to ensure provision of the public good of technology standards, the 
government must lead and intervene. 
 These different national approaches to standardization all attempt to ensure the 
success of standards and the firms which produce goods and services compliant with 
them. Each approach allows for political forces and actors to influence the standard in 
different ways and to different degrees. In the coming chapters, I explore the 
standardization systems in the US, Europe and China. The chapters each first outline the 
formal and de facto standards development systems in each country. This framework 
shows how standards are developed and where different agents are able to influence the 
standards development process. Case studies of different standards development efforts 




THE GLOBAL STANDARDS: THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
 
  
 As the first regions of the world to industrialize, the United States and Europe 
were also the first to create modern technology standards. Although their standardization 
systems emerged during the same period – mostly the second half of the 19th century – 
the United States and European countries developed very different standardization 
institutions which continue to influence their technology markets to the present day. The 
differences in their institutions of standardization and the market influences these create 
are the subject of this chapter. 
 The US and European cases reveal that different roles and degrees of influence 
for the state in standardization result in very different standardization institutions and 
technology market structures. In Europe, the statist tradition of many countries – notably 
France but also corporatist Germany and Sweden – has been elevated to the regional level 
through the organizations of the European Union and its formal standardization 
institutions. Indeed, examination of the European-level standardization bodies such as 
ETSI (telecommunications), CEN (general standards), CENELEC (electronics 
technology standards), and CECC (Electronic Components) reveals strong support for 
leadership and control over standardization by government bodies. While German 
economic orthodoxy dominates EU policy making, in standardization, the French system 
of coordination and formal standards led by experts in the employment of the state holds 
sway (Crane 1979; Hall 1986; Ziegler 1995; Borraz 2007). State power allows for 
interests other than pure profit maximization to be expressed in market structured. 
 The American approach emphasizes leadership by firms and professional 
associations. US government action in standardization tends be reactive and serves to 
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ratify the standards which industrial alliances or experts groups have already adopted. For 
the US, standardization accomplished through formal but non-governmental bodies such 
as the IEEE is legitimate and should be considered equal to formal standards (Berg and 
Schummy 1990; Dunlavy 1994; Shapiro and Varian 2003; Hart 2005; Russel 2009; ANSI 
2010). The result is technology markets which reflect the interests of firms with little 
influence from the state or other non-state and non-firm actors. Internationally, the United 
States supports standards created through groups such as IEEE, arguing that their 
standards are equally valid as international standards as those from the ISO and IEC. 
 This chapter explores the operations of the American and European standards 
systems, discussing how their historical origins and structure determines technology 
market outcomes. The next section details the history of and most powerful actors in 
standardization, fitting the countries into the statist/non-statist framework proposed by 
this dissertation. The third section looks into the current position of European and 
American economies in the fragmented global economy, emphasizing the technology 
leadership role enjoyed by both. This discussion is followed by two brief case studies of 
standardization efforts: television standards and mobile telephony. These cases showcase 
the role of the state and firms in different standardization efforts over time and the types 
of technology markets which ensued. 
Historical Background 
 Since standardization has traditionally been one of the first tasks of a sovereign 
state, the United States and European countries have long had formal standardization 
bodies. As explored in chapter two, these early bodies played a major role in setting the 
basic terms of trade and facilitating market creation through reduction of transaction 
costs. Today, bureaus of weights and measures, while still active and important, have 
been supplanted by formal and informal organizations devoted to creating technology 
standards. Technology standardization emerged as a result of the specific political 
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economic conditions in the United States and Europe at the time they industrialized, thus 
creating deep legacies for the role of the state, firms, and professional societies in setting 
the terms of technology markets. 
 In the United States, technology standardization efforts began in the mid-19th 
century (Dunlavy 1994; Shapiro and Varian 2003). Throughout the 19th century, the 
central government (sometimes referred to as the federal government) was relatively 
weak. It was only with the rise of Progressivism and later the New Deal in the first half of 
the 20th century that government power began to intervene forcefully in the economy. 
While there had long been calls for stronger government action to encourage economic 
growth – as early as Hamilton’s “Report on Manufactures” in 1791 (Hamilton 1791), the 
central government largely shied away from playing a major economic role. Firms and 
industry were thus allowed to self-regulate and perform as they wished. 
 In this climate, the first major technology standardization effort concerned 
railroad gauge. During the early years of railroad expansion, firms set their own gauge or 
else the state governments sought to regulate the gauge in their territories. Without 
central government supervision, a plethora of different standards spread. By 1860, there 
were seven different gauges in use, only 50% of which adhered to the “standard” gauge 
of 4 feet, 8.5 inches (Dunlavy 1994). The second most popular gauge was the five foot 
wide gauge most popular in the South. Inconsistent railroad gauges made transportation 
inefficient and more costly, but firms were unwilling to take on the costs of rebuilding 
their rail lines to meet a new standard. Workers employed loading and unloading trains 
where tracks shifted gauge even rioted against adopting standard gauge in order to protect 
their jobs. 
 For the US, railroad standardization took place in the midst of the Civil War. As 
rail transport was critical to the Northern war effort, Congress mandated use of standard 
gauge to make logistics more efficient. Southern states voiced no opposition as they had 
no representation in Congress at the time. Had all of the states been present in Congress, 
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however, their local interests may yet have been able to block imposition of a national 
standard.  
 After the brief expansion of central government power during the Civil War, in 
the period of rapid industrialization which followed, the United States’ central 
government shied away from intervening in the economy. Firms were free to select 
standards as they saw fit. The growth of networked industries such as electricity 
transmission, however, meant a means of common technology standardization would be 
necessary. Strident competition such as between Edison and Westinghouse over Direct 
versus Alternating current had shown that some form of coordination would be necessary 
to prevent incompatible systems. In the case of DC vs AC power, the government played 
no role in the eventual transition entirely to AC, the switch came as adapters made DC-
designed plants and grids compatible with AC, thus reducing resistance from DC 
technology orphans. Industry settled on its own (Shapiro and Varian 2003). 
 To prevent incompatibilities like those seen in rail and power generation, industry 
in the United States settled on a series of standardization institutions later termed 
“industrial legislatures” (Russel 2009). The American system that emerged in the late 19th 
century (during the electrification and communication phases of the second industrial 
revolution) is one of: 
 
“loosely affiliated networks of institutions, featuring government 
participation but lacking overarching government control, that helped 
engineers and executives in a wide range of industries reduce 
inefficiencies and create platforms for further innovation and production.” 
(Russel 2009) 
 
 The system emerged from a conscious choice by electrical engineers in the late 
19th century to create professional associations for the purpose of debating and adopting 
standards. At the time, American electrical engineers observed the trends in Europe 
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toward centralized state-led research and standardization bodies which the engineers 
feared would place responsibility for standardization in the hands of bureaucrats. 
 In the early 1900s, industrial associations proliferated for civil, mechanical, 
electrical, chemical and other engineering fields. These bodies faced some of the same 
challenges with inter-group coordination that are seen today. Different groups issued their 
own standards for the same or overlapping functional areas. Reforms in the first half of 
the 20th century gradually integrated the standardization functions of these bodies, with 
the IEEE becoming the most powerful – as it remains to this day. By the late 1920s, 
standardization by voluntary institutions made up of individual experts was so well 
established that it became the main channel through which American standardization 
took place. Even in the face of greatly enhanced government power and regulation in the 
economy throughout the 1935-1975, standardization remained the task of these 
professional societies. With the coming of deregulation, these standards bodies became 
even more influential as lower regulations opened up more areas of industry to control by 
non-state actors. 
 Although standardization by professional organizations had been allowed 
throughout the 20th century, federal regulators discouraged alliances created to develop 
and promote standards since these alliances, which consisted primarily of firms, 
suggested collusion. With deregulation, however, alliances of firms for the purpose of 
standardization are again permitted. Since the 1980s, there has also been a conscious 
effort to allow a more “market-based” standardization mechanism to emerge in the 
United States. The central government has consciously loosened anti-trust regulations to 
allow private industry actors to meet and collude on standards. This is an important 
consideration in the US model for standardization. The state consciously allows firms to 
collude so long as doing so is limited to standardization activities. The results of 
standardization, whether from the long-standing professional societies or alliances of 
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firms are generally allowed to stand without intervention from the Department of 
Commerce or the Department of Justice. 
 Intensifying global competition in high technology industries, particularly from 
Asia has led to attempts since 2000 to increase the strategic approach to technology 
standardization in the United States. In 2010, ANSI released the “United States Standards 
Strategy”. However, rather than being a document detailing a step-by-step plan or 
targeting strategic technologies, the document affirms the benefits of the current US 
system and poses only that the central government play a better “coordinating” role in 
standardization, but denying it the power to lead or direct standardization. In one area, 
however, the government has attempted to assert leadership. NIST has been active in 
trying to coordinate development of standards for smart electrical grid technologies as 
part of broader efforts to upgrade and improve the efficiency of America’s power 
infrastructure. However, the lack of a traditional leadership role for the government has 
made industry disinclined to follow NIST’s direction, making coordination difficult 
(Ernst 2013). The United States standardization system remains robust and skilled at 
producing technologically sophisticated standards with strong industry buy-in and 
interest. However, it is very difficult to coordinate actions under state leadership in areas 
where excess inertia prevents standardization or industry cannot agree upon a common 
standard. Further, the domination of the US standardization system by professional 
associations and alliances of firms runs into international difficulty as European and 
Chinese authorities do not recognize the legitimacy of standards produced in this way, 
much to the chagrin of US trade officials (Author’s Interview). 
 Technology standardization in Europe developed in a distinctly different political 
economic climate. In the mid-19th century, continental Europe was rocked by a series of 
revolts and aborted revolutions and wars of national unification. Throughout this period, 
the continental countries became increasingly aware of their relative backwardness 
compared with the industrialized United Kingdom. In order to ensure political 
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independence, the continental countries needed modern – that is industrial – economies. 
However, these countries faced problems of insufficient financial capital, lack of inter-
personal trust, and low levels of human capital. Nationalistic modernizing central states 
thus opted to use their power to marshal and apportion capital and push through 
industrialization. This logic, first outlined by Gerschenkron, argues that the more 
backward the country, the stronger the state role would have to be (Gerschenkron 1962). 
In extremis, European states turned to despotism to accomplish their industrialization 
goals (Moore 1966). 
 Early efforts at centralized standardization of railroads such as occurred in Prussia 
revealed the efficacy of strong state leadership and direction. In standardization, the same 
forces toward centralized, government-pushed industrialization would drive the creation 
of centralized standardization apparatuses. One of the first centralized successes was the 
Imperial Physikalisch-Technische Reichsanstalt in Germany, a research institution 
developing metrology and technology standards for German industry established in 1887 
(Hentschel and Hentschel 1996). The success of this approach was such that even non-
statist economies like the United Kingdom copied the approach of having a single 
centralized and powerful standardization authority (Russel 2009). In Britain, the initial 
standardization body – the British Standards Institution (BSI) – was originally a 
professional engineering society like those created in the United States. Through the early 
20th century its authority over different areas of standardization grew, and BSI was 
granted a royal charter in 1929. In 1942, under the pressure of issuing “War Emergency 
Standards”, BSI became the sole provider of British national standards, thus allowing this 
formal organization to become the sole basis of standardization efforts (BSI 2014).  
  In France, the post-World War II government took an active role in promoting 
high technology research and industrialization, incorporating technology standards as a 
key component of this overall strategy (Crane 1979). France built its standardization 
system around a series of formal government-based institutions including the Union 
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Technique D’elictricite (a centralized body uniting the professional associations and 
engineering experts in all electrical industry areas – 1907) and AFNOR (French 
Association for Standardization - 1926) (AFNOR 2013). In the French standardization 
system, all standards must pass from these formal bodies up to the government 
Commissioner for Standardization. With the approval of the Comissioner’s office, draft 
standards are then distributed among the government ministries. After final approval, all 
government bodies in France are obligated to abide by the standard. Private industry can 
be compelled to adhere to specific standards such as the “Controlled Designation of 
Origin” system. This system mandates strict geographic, processing and quality standards 
for agricultural products and dates back to the 1919 Law for the Protection of the Place of 
Origin. As will be explored in the case studies, the French government also uses 
professional associations, lobbying and promises of resources to get all government 
branches and private industry to agree to a common set of standards.  
 The French perspective on standardization plays a major role in determining the 
terms and balance of trade. The French government argued that technology independence 
was essential for ensuring political independence. This meant that even at the risk of 
duplicating research and technology development performed elsewhere, France must 
invest in its own unique and domestically controlled technologies. Under Charles De 
Gaulle, France embarked on a series of high profile government-sponsored research and 
high technology industry projects sometimes referred to as “New Cathedrals.” These 
included development of a computer industry, the Concorde Supersonic Transport, 
nuclear reactors, tidal power plants, and electronics. Many of these projects were fully 
funded by the government and remained reliant on state subsidies to stay solvent. Where 
uniquely French technologies including those which were world-leading such as Minitel 
and SECAM were developed and standardized, France often created closed protected 
markets. Even if not internationally popular or accepted, these protected markets ensured 
French technology could earn revenues and remain independent of foreign influences. 
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 As the European Economic Community increased its integration and traditional 
approaches to protectionism became untenable, the French government increasingly 
turned to technology standards as a means of protecting a dedicated market for French 
firms. Much of the European standardization system is based on a combination of the 
German emphasis on scientific basis for standards backed by solid research and the 
French emphasis on formal organizations and centralized leadership, even using 
protectionism if necessary to ensure a market for domestic goods. 
Major Actors 
 This section introduces the major actors involved in standardization efforts in the 
United States and Europe. The history of standardization section above began the process 
of introducing the standardization systems of the United States and Europe. The United 
States is primarily a non-state standardization system. While the government is 
understandably always involved in standardization, it does not usually take a leading role. 
On the occasions when government bodies in the US have attempted to strategically 
guide standardization, the result – as explored in the case studies below – often backfired. 
Thus, in the United States, we find that the leading actors in the standardization system 
are professional associations and private firms. Unlike many countries, the United States 
does not have a standardization law. Thus the institutions of standardization are those 
which have emerged out of traditional practice such as professional associations – and 
government units involved in industry regulation, and hence responsible for selecting 
standards even if the unit did not develop the standard itself. 
 For information technology standardization in the United States, the most 
important government body is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The 
FCC is responsible for administration of the radio spectrum, issuing of licenses to offer 
broadcast media services, and regulation of telecommunications (among other tasks as 
assigned in the 1934 Communications Act and the 1996 Telecommunications Act). The 
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FCC is an independent regulatory body (FCC 2014). Although created by Congress and 
officially part of the executive branch of the government – with the five leading 
commissioners appointed by the President and approved by the Senate for five year terms 
– the FCC is independently funded through its regulatory fees and is thus independent of 
budgetary constraints from Congress. In standardization, the FCC has the authority to 
authorize or prohibit use of certain broadcast technologies and to parcel out the radio 
spectrum for specific tasks (mobile phones, radio, television, military, etc) (Funk and 
Methe 2001). These two tasks can mandate or prohibit use of one standard or another. 
The FCC also has the authority to set national goals such as deadlines for the transition 
from analog broadcast to digital-only television broadcasting. The deadlines for these 
transitions can force private firms to adopt whatever technology is currently available – 
even if the FCC itself choses no standard. Historically, the FCC has taken a direct leading 
role in standardization on only a handful of occasions – in broadcast color television and 
AM stereo in particular – but has had generally negative responses from industry when it 
does so (Besen and Johnson 1986; Shapiro and Varian 2003). The FCC thus tends to 
allow multiple standards to co-exist or alternately sets general guidelines which industry 
may use any standard they desire to meet. 
 As dictated by the historical origins of technology standardization in the United 
States, industry and professional associations in the United States are powerful and 
important. Groups such as the IEEE, which has individual membership, allow large firms 
and research groups to push for adoption or inclusion of their technology. Voting systems 
in these bodies also allow large organizations like firms to wield significant influence 
over the decision-making process. Since the 1980s, the US Department of Justice and the 
Federal Trade Commission have increasingly tolerated collusion among firms to set 
standards (Besen and Johnson 1986). Although firms walk a delicate line between 
dividing a market and restricting competition and realizing the public good of 
standardization, the US government generally takes a tolerant perspective, preferring to 
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let “the market” decide issues of standardization, rather than seeking to use state power 
(Shapiro and Varian 2003). 
 The Department of Justice, however, has taken a stronger position against 
collusive activity in standardization by seeking to strengthen and better enforce RAND 
norms for standards-essential patents in the interest of preventing patent holdup of 
standardization by firms threatening injunctions (Microsoft 2012; Kuhn, Morton et al. 
2013). Nonetheless, American firms have stridently resisted any attempts by the 
Department of Justice of the Federal Trade Commission to formally regulate or define the 
nature of RAND even if they generally support the goals of preventing patent holdup 
(Qualcomm 2012). The power of the state is constrained in the US system such that firms 
are often able to set standards and intellectual property policies as they see fit, even if this 
is to the detriment of consumers and other firms (Apple 2012; Microsoft 2012). Given the 
weaknesses of the state, suggestions for how to normatively limit firms’ ability to control 
standards and markets through intellectual property are channeled through standards 
development organizations, rather than being directed at the state (Contreras 2012). 
 Because of the traditional influence of the state, there is a much wider array of 
empowered actors involved in standardization in Europe. Owing to the preference for 
formal standardization and use of deliberative bodies, European standards must pass 
through multiple formal bodies before being adopted. The three most powerful pan-
European standardization bodies are CEN (European Committee for Standardization), 
CENELEC (European Committee for Electronics Standardization), and ETSI (the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute). CEN and CENELEC operate much 
like the ISO and IEC. Both are based on national membership and develop technology 
standards for general use (CEN) and electronics and information technology (CENELEC) 
(CENELEC 2010). According to the European Commission, standards may only be 
referenced in laws and regulations by member states once the standards have been 
approved by CEN or CENELEC (EC 1998; EC 2011). With membership based on the 
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different national standards bodies (Like BSI in Britain and AFNOR in France), these 
bodies adhere to consensus principles. The goal of both CEN and CENELEC is to 
harmonize all European standards with the interest of promoting intra-European trade and 
helping firms acquire large economies of scale through increased potential market size. 
 ETSI is a significantly different body. ETSI was created in 1990 as the 
institutionalized version of the various committees which had met to create the GSM 
mobile telephony standard (Besen 1990; Brenton 1990; Bekkers, Duysters et al. 2002; 
ETSI 2010). ETSI seeks to ensure telecommunication standards are synchronized across 
Europe. It also coordinates the development of long-range wireless electronic 
communication and other broadcast technology standards. Voting on proposed standards 
in ETSI varies depending on the current level of development for a standard. States have 
the final approval vote for new or amended standards. However, to prevent holdup, ETSI 
does not use the traditional consensus approach of most formal SDOs. A proposal needs 
only 71% of the vote in order to be approved. Voting is also weighted by the size of the 
member country. There are 423 total votes for member states in ETSI, of which the top 
six members control 170. Since 300 votes are necessary to pass a proposal, the smaller 
member states cannot pass a standard without at least two of the larger states. Similarly, 
the larger states need cooperation from the smaller states in order to reach the 300 vote 
threshold. At lower levels, firms, universities, research institutes, and national 
telecommunications regulators can be members of ETSI and participate in the expert 
groups (working groups) creating and debating ETSI standards. As of 2012, there were 
255 member manufacturers (33.8% of the total membership). Manufacturers make up the 
largest block of lower level and working group votes in ETSI, followed distantly by 
network operators (Deutsche Telekom, Orange Telecom, etc) with 8.3% of the total 
membership. Large European companies – the national champions of many states – thus 
wield great influence over ETSI. However, the European standardization system 
constrains the abilities of these firms to act independently. They must still seek to create 
 121
standards through the formal apparatus, not independently or in an alliance operating 
outside the scope of ETSI. ETSI’s voting procedures also constrain the ability of firms to 
act unilaterally without marshalling the support of governments from both the large and 
small European states. The necessity of forming a broad coalition – though not 
necessarily a universal one – ensures a broad representation of interests in ETSI 
standards. 
 ETSI’s approach to intellectual property is largely internally set (Bekkers, 
Duysters et al. 2002; Bekkers and West 2009; Bekkers and Updegrove 2012). The 
European Commission never gave clear instructions on what form the IP policies of ETSI 
should take even though it clearly outlined its overall strategy for integration and 
harmonization of telecommunications standards. As a result, the IP policies in ETSI 
standards such as GSM and UTMS reflected a combination of the interests of firms and 
states. The initial Memorandum of Understanding on GSM attempted to make all 
essential patents royalty free. Resistance from Motorola, however not only undermined 
the RF proposal but even the non-discriminatory licensing promise. European firms’ 
interests over time have gradually come to more resemble those of American firms – that 
IP should be licensed under whatever terms and conditions the IP holder desires. 
European states, seeking to influence standards through ETSI and other formal bodies, 
however, still have managed to shape a norm of lower licensing fees and broad 
dissemination of technology among European firms (Ericsson 2012). Discrimination 
against technology from outside of Europe is also central to ETSI standards – again as a 
result of state pressure to protect the European market and technology. 
Position in the Global Economy 
 Both the United States and Europe are justifiably seen as global leaders in high 
technology industries. Inventors based in the US and Europe account for the vast majority 
of global patent filings (WIPO 2012). They account for 72% of global R&D spending 
 122
(measured as a percent of R&D spending among Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development member states) (OECD 2014). Their companies are brand names in 
high technology, famous for their sophistication in design and quality engineering. Both 
the United States and Europe are technology producers and aspire to be standard-setters, 
both through the formal and de facto approaches to standardization. 
 In the global economy, both the US and Europe are able to produce their own 
globally competitive and technologically sophisticated products. They also have strong 
histories of protection for intellectual property and decades of experience filing and 
monetizing patents. For these reasons, both the US and Europe can arguably be 
considered global standard setters rather than takers. This means there are multiple 
avenues of potential profitability available to US and European firms. They can choose to 
develop and monetize IP as a major or sole source of revenue – as practiced by firms like 
Qualcomm. Alternately, they can develop IP but use it strategically at nominal fees while 
concentrating on the production and sale of goods and services embodying or enabled by 
that technology as practiced by Nokia, Ericsson and Apple. Of course, many firms such 
as Microsoft and IBM opt for a hybrid of the two approaches. The main point is that 
because both the US and Europe have advanced positions in the global economy, there 
are real choices available to firms and governments for strategies that can yield profits, 
growth, and international power. 
 For shaping perspectives of government and firms, however, there are some 
constraints. While multiple mutually acceptable avenues for business exist, European and 
American government and firms all support strong norms for intellectual property 
protection. Firms may opt to license on a free or nominal basis but they do not desire to 
have their ability to choose how and when to license constrained. Governments thus face 
resistance from firms should the state attempt to make RAND commitments mandatory. 
That being said, Europe’s strong state and formal standardizations institutions are better 
able to enforce the RAND norm through the formal policies of their SDOs.  
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 In the US, many firms quietly believe – or even explicitly state – that RAND is 
toothless and meaningless (Author’s Interview). Intellectual Property is the private 
property of firms and may be disposed of, or not, on whatever terms they see fit. The US 
state lacks the authority to force firms to comply with RAND norms although the Justice 
Department is growing increasingly concerned that the RAND norms are being ignored – 
or at least the possibility of ignoring those norms. 
 Taken together, the position of the United States and Europe in the global 
economy mean that their standards will tend to protect intellectual property, meaning 
licensing of IP is a viable strategy in the market. However, the differences in the relative 
power of the state in the two cases mean that the ability to bend or shape firms interests to 
match those of the state differs significantly. The result is that in Europe, firm interests 
are constrained by the state, meaning the government has the ability to substantively 
shape technology markets (Winn 2005). 
Technology Market Status in the United States and European Union 
 The technology markets in the United States and European Union share some 
common features, particularly as regards intellectual property. However, they differ 
widely in their degrees of openness and the value of scope. Generally speaking, the 
weaker state in the United States means technology markets look superficially more like 
neo-classical markets as economic agents set prices and compete according to the logic of 
the invisible hand. On the other hand, the stronger European state means the mechanisms 
of market operation – particularly price are more subject to state control. In the United 
states, firms decide which technologies to adopt, and they shape standardization by their 
independent economic heft. Technology markets occasionally fail to emerge as a single 
standard may remain elusive. The result is two incompatible but monopolistic markets, 
thus resulting in overall lower levels of innovation and certainly lower consumer welfare. 
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 The European market, in contrast is molded by the fact that government has a 
strong ability to independently control which technologies are permitted. There is an 
explicit desire to protect and limit penetration of foreign technologies in the domestic 
market. Exclusionary standards may be created in order to ensure the emergence of 
closed markets. European firms’ IP interests are also frequently tempered by their 
emphasis on manufacturing and desire to have a single European market and set of 
standards.  
 For IP policies, both the United States and Europe adhere to strong norms of IP 
protection. In the United States, firms are allowed to set IP policies for standards 
independent of state pressure. While firms may express a general support for RAND 
norms, American firms usually reject attempts by the state to intervene in technology 
markets by forcing changes in licensing and pricing for IP. In extremis, the US 
technology market allows for the emergence of patent non-practicing entities, so-called 
“Patent Trolls.” (Luman and Dodson 2006; McDonough 2006; NPR 2011; NPR 2013). 
Not all non-practicing entities qualify as “trolls” but in markets which emphasize the 
monetization of IP, the incentives encourage the development of firms such as so-called 
“Patent Trolls.” On the contrary, while Europe also protects IP and firms are able to 
monetize IP as a possible supplementary or even primary revenue stream, there are forces 
mitigating the possibility of “trolls” emerging. The emphasis by European standards on 
broadly disseminated standards makes it difficult to assert narrow IP interests which can 
harm the broader standard and would-be adopters. Further, the emphasis by major 
European firms on manufacturing means they too have an interest in ensuring access to 
IP so they can produce, buy and sell technology goods with ease. This somewhat 
constrains the ability to use patents in a “troll-like” manner. 
 For the openness of technology markets, the United States is generally quite open. 
The lack of strong state intervention in standardization or technology selection means 
foreign firms are free to participate in standards development and contribute their 
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technologies to the pool which will be utilized in the United States. At the same time, 
however, the reliance on firm- or professional organization-led standardization means it 
is possible to arbitrarily exclude firms from the market. This tends to be a greater 
problem in firm-led standardization efforts. Professional organizations have broad 
enough memberships that a variegated assembly of firms is able to participate and ensure 
access to a technology standard and its market. 
 In Europe, formal standardization organizations seek to promote open standards 
across the whole of Europe. Attempts to develop unique or exclusionary standards are 
generally crushed by European Commission-level bodies and SDOs. Regional-level 
bodies seek to harmonize standards across Europe, ensuring all member states and firms 
have equal and non-discriminatory access to standards and thus the ability to participate 
in standards markets. This openness does not necessarily extend outside of Europe as 
European standardization bodies have selected exclusionary standards and made 
standards incompatible with foreign ones in order to protect the European market. Once a 
standard is formally adopted in Europe, it may also be referenced in laws and regulations, 
thus making it possible to develop closed national markets using unique technology 
standards. 
 For scope, here the United States and European technology market is very similar. 
In both cases, firms, states, and SDOs alike seek to build global markets. The ideal is to 
have one’s technology adopted internationally. Europe attempts to create the initial scale 
necessary to tip markets in favor of their technology by building an integrated common 
market. For the United States, firms attempt to build international markets through their 
technology sophistication, alliances or competitive strategies. In the European case, 
however, it remains possible that when a standard fails to achieve international success, it 
will be relegated to regional or national status, thus creating a regional or national market 
with limited scope. 
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Case Studies 
 Europe and the United States make excellent side by side comparisons as their 
standardization systems were actively involved in developing alternative technologies for 
the same standardization classes. In the following examples, we can clearly see how the 
two standardization systems stand side by side – showing the differences which spring 
from their respective statist and non-statist institutions. The following examples compare 
the development of television standards and mobile telephony – showing both the 
changes which have taken place over the past half century in both regions but also 
highlighting the degree of continuity in the midst of European integration and deepening 
economic globalization.  
Color Television Standards: NTSC vs SECAM (and PAL) 
 Color Television was developed long before it became ubiquitous in American 
and European homes. The earliest experiments revealed color broadcasting was possible 
as early as the late 1920s and early 1930s (Baird 1929). Before black and white 
televisions became widely commercially available, color television technology had 
proven itself at least technologically feasible. In 1949, the FCC first attempted to select a 
national color television standard for the United States (Besen and Johnson 1986). As 
detailed below, the United States and European experiences with color television 
standards varied widely. 
 Like black and white television, color broadcasting requires the use of radio 
spectrum to transmit audio and video data which can be received as analog waves, 
converted back into images and sound and then played through a vacuum tube display. 
The analog color transmission technology would hold sway until the 1980s when digital 
broadcasting became increasingly common – and replaced analog entirely in the United 
States in the 2000s (Hart 2005). Color television standards are differentiated by their 
number of “lines” in a broadcast image. More lines yield a sharper image. Incompatible 
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line counts mean broadcasters need expensive converter technology not only to send 
signals which can be accepted but also to convert video content originally filmed using a 
different standard. The basic technology for color television worldwide throughout this 
period was essentially the same – a dominant de facto standard created by RCA. Indeed, 
the alternative technologies developed in France and Germany were based heavily on 
RCA’s existing technology. However, modifications in the number of lines would make 
their markets wholly separate from the de facto standard established by RCA. 
 In the United States, the standard for color television broadcasting reveals the 
limits of the state in attempting to mandate a technology standard. In the case of black 
and white television, in 1939 RCA-NBC launched a freely available public 
monochromatic broadcast in New York. The FCC, however, insisted that the station hold 
off service until a transmission standard for television could be approved. In response, 
industry actors with prompting from RCA formed the National Television System 
Committee (NTSC) which developed standards for monochromatic TV in just nine 
months (Besen and Johnson 1986). With a standard thus developed, NTSC – an industry 
body – submitted the standard to the FCC. In April 1941, the FCC accepted the NTSC 
proposal and permitted monochromatic TV broadcasting in the United States on a certain 
number of spectrum bands. 
 Like other United States standardization efforts, NTSC was formed from private 
industry actions. The impetus for the NTSC came from the Radio Manufacturer’s 
Association. However, the standardization body was open to all “technically qualified” 
industry members, even if their companies were not part of the Association. This was a 
private industry association, not a state creation. The NTSC had nine panels, 168 
committee and panel members and settled on a compromise number of lines (for 
monochromatic transmission) of 525. This compromise was a balance between the initial 
1936 Radio Manufacturers Association recommended 441 lines and Philco engineers 
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who suggested 800 lines. 525 was a compromise between the two, albeit one worked out 
in the NTSC – without government interference. 
 With a single standard agreed-to by American industry, the FCC mandated the 
525-line 60 cycle monochromatic transmission standard for all television broadcasting in 
the United States. Smooth adoption of the standards was possible because the 525-line 
standard had already been clearly tested by Bell Laboratories from 1936 to 1938. Further, 
there were no substantial competing technologies. This made it easy to ensure adoption 
and meant the FCC did not have to choose between competing technologies. In such 
circumstances, the United States standardization system works well. Once the standard 
was established, a variety of electronics firms were able to produce compliant sets and 
components for those television sets, thus producing a competitive market wherein prices 
could fall sufficiently to make television broadly affordable.34 
 In color television, however, the FCC would attempt to assert its authority over 
the preferences of industry, believing that the smooth adoption experience with 
monochromatic broadcasts could be repeated once the FCC had set a common standard. 
In 1949, CBS petitioned the FCC to launch color broadcasts using a “field-sequential 
system” of 405 lines, 144 fields per second. Unlike the earlier standardization push led by 
NTSC, there were competing color technologies available. RCA recommended a “dot 
sequential system” and Color Television, Inc (CTI) recommended a line-sequential 
system. The three standards were all incompatible and the RCA and CTI proposals were 
still highly unreliable and experimental. Given the rapidly growing interest in color TV 
broadcasting, FCC opened panels for inquiry in 1949 but instead of allowing a private 
industry body to develop the standards, it opted instead to develop the standard under its 
own auspices. 
                                                 
34 The pent-up demand for consumer goods meant a spectacular boom in television sales after World War 
II. With a single common standard, sets from any manufacturer could be guaranteed to work and could be 
substituted, thus allowing for an efficient competitive price mechanism.  
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 FCC testimony lasted eight months as engineers offered conflicting claims for the 
CBS, RCA and CTI standards. Their demonstrations often gave erratic performance. 
Although CTI dropped out because its technology proved unsatisfactory, RCA and CBS 
dug in. The CBS standard was incompatible with existing monochromatic receivers and 
would require either an adapter (costing roughly $25 each) or a redesign of all boxes. 
RCA’s standard was compatible with existing TV sets but expensive and complex. The 
original RCA submission required three separate receivers (Red, Yellow, and Blue) 
which were then combined by kinescopes to produce the color image. 
 The FCC wanted to approve a standard quickly before the installed base of 
monochromatic TVs grew too large and thus would require major retrofitting. The FCC 
chose the CBS standard as it had been submitted first and was demonstrably better tested 
and reliable than the RCA standard. Further, the RCA standard produced dot-like and 
inferior color and was clumsy and bulky for home use. The CBS standard started 
broadcast (and manufacture) in 1950. 
 Despite the FCC’s initial ruling on the standard, in January 1950, would-be and 
current television manufacturers rejected the mandate to use the CBS standard. The 
NTSC convened a color TV standards body of its own accord. The FCC was hostile to 
NTSC’s efforts, seeing NTSC as needlessly repeating the work the FCC had already 
completed. Indeed, FCC engineers refused to attend NTSC field tests until 1952. 
Nonetheless, given the lack of backward compatibility for the CBS standard, NTSC’s 
goal was to make a quality and affordable color standard compatible with existing 
monochromatic receivers. In 1953, NTSC approved its standard and petitioned for FCC 
approval. As with the earlier monochromatic standard, the NTSC color standard was 
heavily based on RCA technology, but the technology had been thoroughly reengineered 
and researched with input from multiple companies. The FCC approved the new standard 
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to replace the CBS standard in 1953.35 The final NTSC standard was based on 525 lines 
and 30 images per second. Backwards compatible with existing television sets, 
consumers who had purchased monochromatic receivers under the 1939 standard could 
still view color broadcasts – albeit in black and white. The CBS standard, in contrast, 
came across as static on monochromatic receivers. 
 With an industry-developed and adopted standard in place, US color television 
broadcasting began. However, the relative expense of color sets meant the 1950s and 60s 
primarily saw expansion of monochromatic TV ownership. Nonetheless, as with 
monochrome TVs, the US system had produced a technology market. Consumers could 
freely choose among different styles of televisions and multiple vendors, confident that 
the sets would be able to pick up television broadcasts. The standards themselves 
contained protected intellectual property, primarily belonging to RCA. The company, 
however, was willing to license, albeit for a significant fee. This benefited RCA’s 
position in the market and raised the costs of would-be manufacturers in the US and 
overseas. The standard was open insomuch as the developer – NTSC – was open to 
professionals able to understand and contribute to the technology. It was also available 
for license to anyone willing to pay. In terms of scope, however, the market would have 
to fight for international recognition. The licensing fees RCA levied on manufacturers 
meant European countries would try to develop alternative standards. 
 In France, the battle over color television took place a decade later. As predicted 
by the theory, the statist nature of France made for a different approach to television 
standards and created a very different market. As noted above, France has a long tradition 
of strong state involvement in the economy. In the 1950s and 60s, government promotion 
of indigenous technological capability was considered an area of primary importance and 
                                                 
35 In the meantime, the CBS standard had struggled to grow its market. While broadcasts were possible, 
color broadcasts came across as static on black and white receivers. Users perceived this as a problem with 
the network, damaging CBS’s competitiveness. CBS ended color broadcasts early in the 1950s, only to 
resume them later using the NTSC standard. 
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vital for national security. To that end, the state sought to control access to the domestic 
market in order to ensure a captive market for French products and technologies. 
 Unfortunately, French membership in the European Community meant that tariffs 
and other traditional protectionist tools were increasingly banned, especially with the 
coming of the Common Market in 1968. Standards, however, remained a possible avenue 
for erecting walls around French technology – creating markets with limited scope but 
reserved for French firms. Adopting a unique technology standard could afford French 
television set, recording equipment, and content producers a significant amount of 
protection as foreign products would need to be converted to match French broadcasting 
standards, thus raising their costs and reducing their competitiveness against French-
made compatible products. 
 In the 1960s, the French government pushed the Compagnie France de Television 
(CFT) to develop an alternative color television standard which could be internationally 
marketed to compete with NTSC, or else be used to protect the French market. Since 
conforming to a standard is necessary for television broadcasts to be sent and received, a 
unique French standard would effectively protect French products from foreign 
(especially German and American) competition. CFT was eager to develop a proprietary 
standard – with state support – and license the technology in order to recoup some of its 
massive losses sustained during its efforts to create a French computer industry 
independent of IBM.  
 In 1956, Henri De France filed the first patent for the SECAM standard 
(Sequential Color with Memory). SECAM was in some ways superior to the NTSC 
standard, particularly as regards color fidelity and image resolution. Unlike NTSC, 
SECAM used 625 lines and 25 images per second. However, even with its government 
pedigree and technological sophistication, SECAM was not universally accepted even 
within France. There was resistance from segments of industry and even parts of the 
central state apparatus. The three main French electronics manufacturers saw no need for 
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haste in selecting a standard since their monochromatic television set market was not yet 
saturated. Further, French firms were concerned with how best to compete under 
conditions of European economic integration. Manufacturers wanted to produce for 
whatever standard would be adopted across Europe. At the time, France utilized a unique 
monochromatic standard, thus locking French firms into a closed and isolated French 
market with limited scope. French electronics manufacturers were thus eager to utilize an 
international standard – thus increasing their potential market size.  
 French firms also resisted SECAM based on the licensing prices. Although Henri 
de France’s patents made the standard uniquely French, the basic technology remained 
95% American, mostly RCA. Manufacturers would be forced to pay licensing fees for 
both the American and French patents. As would be expected for an IP Creator-Licenser, 
CFT sought to use its SECAM patent portfolio to provide a steady source of income. 
 Intense state effort overcame industry resistance. President Charles De Gaulle 
sent representatives to meet with the French Electronics Industry Association, hosted 
banquets and appealed to French patriotism. Prosaically, De Gaulle’s representatives 
promised low royalty rates for French firms and guaranteed that companies would be 
allowed to test the potential SECAM equipment, thus reducing fears about producing low 
quality or technologically problematic goods. 
 The French government was also divided over the standard. The Organisation de 
Radiodiffusion et Television Francaise (ORTF – the French Broadcasting Organization) 
opposed adopting a unique standard. ORTF did not support SECAM because acquiescing 
to it would have taken responsibility for broadcast standardization away from ORTF. 
ORTF found trying to convert programming from NTSC to SECAM or vice-versa to be 
costly. ORTF’s primary interest was in using whichever standard facilitated export of 
French programming. Despite ORTF’s resistance to SECAM, orders from the highest 
levels of the French government ordered ORTF to support SECAM. Although this 
increased antagonism between ORTF and politicians, ORTF complied. 
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 Once adopted within France, the SECAM standard was highly successful. 
Although the NTSC standard was easily adaptable to the 50 field, 625 line system used 
by French broadcasters, SECAM managed to keep the French television hardware market 
protected. French TV manufacturers were thus able to build an industry which by the 
1970s was generating 0.5% of French GDP.  
 As an IP Creator-Licenser, however, France was not content to just push SECAM 
for the domestic market. The goal of CFT, as well as French manufacturers, was to have 
their standard adopted as widely as possible across Europe. With looming economic 
integration and falling tariff barriers, French manufacturers stood to gain if they produced 
competitive goods for compatible foreign technology markets. However, in seeking to 
maximize royalties from the technology embedded in the standard, CFT refused to 
license the SECAM patents to Germany – Europe’s leading economy – on low-priced or 
free terms. Germany’s AEG Telefunken tried to enter into a royalty-free arrangement for 
the SECAM patents through CFT as the two firms had historically strong links and had 
shared both senior staff and technologies – including on a royalty-free basis – in the past. 
CFT, however, had set their business model on recouping their sunk costs in SECAM 
through patent licensing fees. Thus, even the fraternal AEG was unable to get a free 
license. Without the royalty fee, CFT and other patent holders felt they would gain 
nothing from Germany because German manufacturers could produce better quality 
electronics than French firms could. Royalty-free licenses would enable the Germans to 
make inexpensive equipment and thus take sales away from French firms.  
 Unable to secure low-cost or free licenses for the French or American 
technologies, Germany developed its own system, PAL (Phase Alternating Line). The 
standard was based on SECAM (using 625 lines and 25 frames per second) and was 
partially compatible. With a converter, PAL-compliant TV sets could receive SECAM 
broadcasts although only in black and white. With PAL available as a European 
alternative, the French realized that it would be difficult to ensure the broad or pan-
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European adoption of SECAM. This meant the government would need to fight to 
preserve or gain as much market scope as possible.  
 By 1966, there was intense global competition between NTSC, PAL and SECAM. 
The predecessor of the ITU Radiocommunication Sector division, CCIR (Comité 
consultatif international pour la radio), convened a conference to debate an international 
color television standard. Unfortunately, the US, French and German proposals all 
offered similar quality and cost, thus leaving little justification for choosing one standard 
over others. In the end, voting split three ways between backers of each standard, with 
none gaining clear support. As a result, CCIR refused to formally adopt any standard, 
preferring to allow multiple standards to co-exist. As a result, the world divided into three 
blocs: NTSC, SECAM and PAL. Each standard enjoyed a monopoly in its respective 
region although there were multiple providers for each standard. 
 In order to increase the scope for SECAM, the French government took the 
standard and its affiliated technologies to the Soviet Union. In exchange for promises of 
Russian support – along with its satellites – in CCIR, the French offered to license 
SECAM to the Soviet Union on a royalty free basis. The French and Soviets also 
promised to work jointly on further research, to expand economic and scientific ties and 
to provide assistance developing production systems for SECAM-compatible equipment. 
The agreement with the Soviet Union was useful in building the prestige of SECAM. 
Soviet support helped SECAM build market scope in emerging non-aligned countries in 
the Middle East. The countries of French West Africa also adopted SECAM. This region, 
in addition to Metropolitan France and the Eastern Bloc became the full market for 
SECAM. 
 The effort to develop SECAM could broadly be considered a success. French 
producers had captive markets at home and abroad for both TVs and equipment and 
programming. The industry did earn significant revenues. However, the German PAL 
system was adopted as the standard throughout Western Europe. The European market 
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would have been far more lucrative for French companies, but the inability to reach an 
agreement with Germany weakened the French position in Europe.  
 SECAM resulted in a somewhat confused market. French manufacturers and 
broadcasters in third-world countries had to pay license fees to CFT. However, the Soviet 
Union received RF licenses as part of the Franco-Soviet Accord. Thus, the French 
manufacturers did not receive licensing benefits from the Soviet market. Arguably 
SECAM was not an open standard or market either. Development had been restricted to 
French firms and licensing was done on a highly selective and discriminatory basis. The 
interest of protecting French technology and firms had trumped even the interests of 
French firms in having an open and integrated market. State power had managed to 
suppress the interests of firms in order to create the desired protected market. Finally, in 
terms of scope, while SECAM was able to expand internationally, the standard was less 
widely – or lucratively – accepted and used than NTSC or PAL. French state power had 
managed to create a new market, but did not succeed in making it international; hence it 
chose to protect whatever scope it was able to secure. 
Mobile Telephony: From 1G to 3G in the United States and Europe 
 As economic globalization has deepened, the standardization procedures – and 
hence technology market formation – in the United States and Europe remain remarkably 
stable. The United States remains a non-statist IP Creator with strong firms taking the 
main role in guiding standardization and selecting the de facto standards for the United 
States. On the other hand, the European case shows that much of the French system as 
increasingly been expanded to the regional level through various European Union-level 
standardization bodies – most notably for ICT in the form of ETSI. 
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 Since the introduction of commercial mobile telephony in 1979, there have been 
four “generations” of technologies governed by different incompatible standards.36 The 
generation shift has been defined first by the fundamental shift in technology from analog 
transmission to digital (1G to 2G), and then two shifts toward ever increasing data 
capabilities (3G and 4G). The first generation of mobile telephony has its origins in the 
early car phones designed by Ericsson and research institutes in the Soviet Union in the 
1950s and 60s. The first commercial “cellular” technology, however, was developed in 
the 1970s using analog signals and based on hexagonal “cells” where a moving phone’s 
signal would be connected to one tower and passed to a second as the phone moved from 
one hexagon into another. The automated handoff of signal made truly mobile telephony 
possible. This feat, however, could be accomplished in multiple ways, thus allowing for 
multiple incompatible standards in the first generation of mobile telephony.  
 The second generation of mobile telephony (2G) saw the exponential growth of 
mobile telephony use worldwide with markets expanding from single countries to regions 
and finally encompassing the entire globe. 2G was characterized by a shift from analog to 
digital signals and a move from frequency division multiplexing toward more efficient 
code division and time division multiplexing. In the third and fourth generations, 
standards moved toward reliance on code-division multiplexing and then once again to 
frequency division (in 4G). These evolutionary standards generations were characterized 
by significant increases in phone data transmission rates. With an installed global user 
base and increasing desire for data rich phone connectivity, 3G and 4G standards were 
designed for international adoption and global scope. 
 A major challenge for standards developers in moving from one generation to the 
next was how to ensure backwards and forwards network compatibility. When a system 
                                                 
36 “Incompatible” here means that equipment or handsets designed to work with one standard cannot work 
without conversion technology with equipment conforming to a different standard. However, mobile 
phones are still “compatible” in the sense that calls from phones on one standard can be competed to calls 
on other standards. 
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of base stations is upgraded, users still need to be able to connect their existing phones to 
the upgraded network. Similarly, users with more advanced phones need to be able to still 
use basic or even advanced functionalities (with appropriate reductions in speed) when 
connected to base stations of earlier technology generations. Backwards compatibility 
would become a major area of competition in American and European standards as 
developing technologies which were not backwards compatible could limit market scope. 
 European states began developing a series of incompatible analog mobile 
telephony services in the early 1980s. France, Germany, Scandinavia (mostly Sweden 
and Finland), and Italy all launched development efforts which resulted in multiple 
incompatible standards (Funk 1998; Funk and Methe 2001; Funk 2002; Funk 2006). 
None of the standards had significant technological advantages over the others but their 
adoption as the standard of choice in different national markets created closed national-
scope monopolies. Mobile phones in France could only be operated on the France 
Telecom network using the RC2000 standard, just as phones in Germany would have to 
operate on the C-Netz standard. Crossing the border between the two countries would 
require purchase of a new phone in order to make phone calls as the incompatible 
technologies could not send or receive signals on the other national network. French 
phone manufacturers and their analogs in Germany, Sweden, and Italy enjoyed captive 
markets for their products. With no clear technological advantage, it was difficult, for the 
standards bearers in these countries to convince other countries to adopt their technology. 
France and Germany briefly attempted development of a common analog standard in the 
early 1980s but simultaneously worked to develop their unique proprietary standards. 
With the promises of greater – and guaranteed – returns from the unique standard, 
cooperation broke down. Countries without their own standards preferred to adopt the 
standard with the largest installed base, and thus the greatest availability of products, 
usually at the lowest price. In the first generation of mobile telephony, this fell to the 
United States. 
 138
 In the mid-1970s, AT&T began testing analog mobile radio-based phones using a 
standard called AMPS (Advanced Mobile Phone System). At the time, no other US firms 
had developed or proposed an alternative standard. Being first to market AT&T applied 
for permission from the FCC to launch an AMPS test network in 1975, which was 
granted to Illinois Bell in 1977 (King and West 2002). With only one technology 
available, and the compete domination of the US telephony market by AT&T – and its 
later divested children in the Regional Bell Operating Companies – the FCC chose the 
existing industry standard. The United States thus became the world’s largest single 
market for mobile telephony. 
 Foreign telecommunications regulators took notice of the American standard and 
pushed for adoption. AMPS became the official standard for mobile telephony in 
Australia, Korea, and elsewhere – quickly becoming the first de facto global standard for 
mobile telephony. This accords with the position of the United States in the model 
proposed by this dissertation. The standard was created by industry, developed and 
implemented and only after the fact approved by the FCC. The state had little role in the 
development of the standard and simply acknowledged what industry had already chosen. 
The standard was also intended to have as broad of scope as possible. Through the 
licensing of Bell Labs, it was possible to expand the number of countries using the 
standard. However, the standard itself was largely closed, being the product of AT&T 
research in collaboration with a few other closely related firms – notably Motorola – 
which conducted research in miniaturizing handsets to make them truly portable. 
 Although the United States was able to create the first international market for 
mobile telephony, AT&T would not be able to repeat its success in the second generation 
of mobile telephony. The 1983 breakup of AT&T into the Regional Bell Operating 
Companies and divestiture of all firms from mobile telephony weakened the incentive to 
continue research as well as fragmenting research proposals. The Regional Bell’s made 
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excellent profits from their existing landline business and long-distance telephony and 
did not aggressively pursue or invest in mobile.  
 At the same time, the FCC deepened its hands-off approach to standardization. As 
multiple 2G standards became available in the early 1990s (D-AMPS, GSM, cdmaOne), 
the FCC refused to endorse any particular technology – whether American or foreign.  
The FCC announced in 1988 that firms would not need regulatory approval in order to 
introduce new technologies. Firms would thus be responsible for developing and 
implementing standards in the United States. The market leaders: Motorola and 
Qualcomm, however, were working on two different approaches – Motorola with GSM 
and Qualcomm with cdmaOne.  
 Qualcomm, an R&D-intensive firm, was established in 1985 and conducted 
research on code division multiplexing for wireless communications. Although 
Qualcomm designed and produced its own base stations and phones in the early 1990s, 
these were unreliable. The firm has since exited the product business in general (selling 
its base station division to Ericsson and handset division to Kyocera). Instead, Qualcomm 
focusses on the development and licensing of core technologies. Qualcomm’s CDMA 
technology was superior in many aspects to the GSM standard as CDMA made more 
efficient use of spectrum than the Time Division Multiplexing-based GSM system. 
However, unlike GSM which could count on political support to coordinate multiple 
firms to working on a single technology, Qualcomm had to form its own alliances and 
seek interested manufacturers as well as commercial developers able to carry on the task 
of turning core technology into usable products. Qualcomm’s model is thus based 
entirely on the licensing of its technologies.  
 Qualcomm and Motorola devices were incompatible and unable to operate on 
networks using the other’s standard. With the US market thus broken into two 
monopolies, American standards and technology struggled to gain the attention of foreign 
markets in order to expand American-based standards worldwide. 
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 Given the massive capital costs in creating mobile telephone networks, firms were 
hesitant to adopt any standard which was not certain to gain long-term global market 
acceptance. Without state support, foreign buyers doubted the long term viability of US 
standards. Market shares for both were thus very low compared with the European 
standard, GSM. 
 Here the legacy of America as a non-statist IP Creator shows a possible, if 
negative, market outcome. As the state lacks sufficient power to strongly coerce industry 
into cooperating or selecting a given technology, where firms have strong but divergent 
interests, a common standard will fail to emerge. The result is a fragmented market with a 
narrower scope. 
 The fragmented and protected national markets for mobile telephony in the 1980s 
had heavily constrained the technology markets for mobile telephony in Europe. In 
response to the fragmentation and weakness, the European Community began pushing for 
an integrated approach to the next generation in mobile telephony. In 1982, the 
telecommunications operators of Europe signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
creating the Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) which would coordinate the research efforts 
to produce and adopt a common digital signal-based technology standard for the 
European market. The institution of GSM would later be transformed into a formal 
European-level standardization organization – ETSI. GSM would then become the 
acronym for Europe’s 2G standard: Global System for Mobile Communications. GSM, 
and later ETSI, would use formal voting and approval methods using national-level 
representation to determine intellectual property policies, the openness and scope of 
telecommunication standards in Europe. Through coordination of all actors in a single 
developmental effort, GSM and ETSI would ensure that all member states would 
conform to a common standard. Like the French government, GSM and ETSI are able to 
override the interests of resistant countries so long as a supermajority of member states 
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agree to the terms of a standard being debated. This ensures a common standard will 
emerge. 
 By the early 1990s, European member states were rolling out GSM-based mobile 
networks. These rapidly expanded. With a common market, prices for equipment and 
handsets fell. Overseas telecommunications regulators began adopting GSM as their 
standard – and using European (or Motorola) handsets and base station equipment. By 
2005, 75% of global mobile telephony utilized the GSM standard (Bekkers and 
Updegrove 2012).  
 In terms of IP, the original MoU for GSM had called for all standards-essential 
patents submitted for inclusion to be made available on a worldwide royalty-free basis. 
Both the French and German governments pushed instead for universal RAND licensing 
rather than royalty-free terms. Both France and Germany sought to maximize the 
potential returns to their respective telecommunications equipment firms by encouraging 
pan-European adoption of their standard as well as allowing for broad paid licensing to 
bring in further revenues. However, GSM voted to support an alternate technology 
proposal from Ericsson based on non-proprietary technology. Ericsson’s non-proprietary 
proposal used Time Division Multiplexing and was considerably less expensive for 
manufacturers. In the end, GSM used significantly less standards essential patents than 
later standards, some 380 in 1998 – many of which were double counted due to filing in 
multiple countries (Bekkers and Updegrove 2012). The primary inventor, Ericsson had 
no SEPs to speak of. The largest single patent holder was Motorola. Ericsson was already 
a world-leading telecommunications equipment manufacturer. Ericsson believed it 
enjoyed a competitive advantage in production of goods using its technology and thus 
could still compete with other firms even without the licensing revenues. The RF offer of 
core technology made Ericsson’s technology submission far more attractive than the 
more expensive and proprietary French and German systems. 
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 Supporting rapid diffusion and inexpensive licensing, GSM voted in support of 
the Ericsson proposal. Although favoring the non-proprietary Ericsson proposal, GSM 
still supported IP rights – as one would expect given Europe’s status as a region of IP 
Creator countries. Allowing submission of other technologies for which licensing fees 
could be charged, GSM encountered a snag from Motorola. Motorola indicated it would 
not agree to RAND licensing. Rather, Motorola insisted it would retain the freedom to set 
licensing fees on a bilateral basis and be able to discriminate among firms to whom it 
would license. European firms unable to secure a cross license were either unable to 
produce GSM equipment at all or else forced to pay high prices to license Motorola’s 
technology. Licenses for firms without an agreement with Motorola had to pay patent 
royalties of 10-13% of the wholesale price of their goods (Bekkers and West 2009). This 
limited their competitiveness. In total, patent license fees accounted for up to 29% of the 
price for a GSM production license – a major cost obstacle for firms outside the cross-
licensing with Motorola and the other leading firms (Bekkers, Duysters et al. 2002). 
Despite these challenges, the common European standard created the world’s largest 
market for a single technology, one with multiple vendors. 
 By the mid-1990s, both American and European firms began looking forward the 
next generation of mobile telephony – 3G. Increasing user density in cities as well as 
greater demands for data capabilities meant the technology would need to become more 
efficient. In moving to the 2.5G era, ETSI adopted an intermediate standard known as 
EDGE. EDGE was a code division multiplexing standard, unlike the early TDD-based 
GSM. This should have offered an advantage to Qualcomm, the primary developer of 
CDMA technologies. However, to stymie the development of Qualcomm and ensure a 
repeat of its global success with GSM, ETSI voted for a 3G standard incompatible with 
Qualcomm’s first generation cdmaOne standard (Grindley, Salant et al. 1999). ETSI’s 3G 
standard, Wideband-CDMA (which used significant amounts of Japanese technology), 
was backwards compatible with GSM but not cdmaOne (Funk 2002). Accordingly, most 
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countries adopted WCDMA rather than Qualcomm’s own 3G standard, CDMA2000. 
Lack of backward compatibility with GSM limited the appeal of CDMA2000 in many 
global markets, especially given the massive dominance of GSM networks. WCDMA 
would repeat the success of GSM in dominating worldwide markets by building on its 
technology compatibility and the legacy of GSM infrastructure worldwide. 
Conclusion 
 These cases illustrate the means by which differing technology markets have 
emerged in the United States and Europe. In the United States, companies took the lead 
in the absence of state leadership. Where the state does take action, it does so reactively, 
officially confirming whichever standard industry has already approved. In the cases 
where the state has tried to intervene and set standards, it has failed to do so. The state is 
not a powerful actor in standardization in the United States. At the same time, the state 
can also refuse to support any particular standard, preferring to allow all competing 
technologies and have their respective markets compete for dominance. The goal of 
American firms remains the building of markets with the largest scope possible, in order 
to maximize their returns. Firms such as Qualcomm and Motorola seek to preserve the 
most freedom possible when licensing technology, in order to maximize their revenues 
and shape the competitive environment. The US market is open to multiple standards but 
each standard is as closed as desired by the industry group or firm which created it. There 
is no government or normative effort to create open standards which all may utilize or 
contribute to. 
 Europe differs significantly. Here, strong states enforce their vision for markets 
and seek to promote the particular interests of their national firms. At the country-level, 
powerful government ministries and standardization bodies enforce conformity on firms 
within the country through adoption of single standards. At the regional level, these 
bodies are subordinate to more recently created bodies such as ETSI which seek to 
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harmonize European standards in order to form a truly common market for technology 
with multiple participants. However, the openness of standards is still restricted by the 
European-level organizations, just as it was at the country level. Participation by non-
European firms is limited and formal rules privilege European-based firms. As Europe 
legally mandates that all standards pass through formal organizations, not just receive de 
facto approval by firms or alliances, European technology markets are set up to favor 
European firms, even at the expense of alternative technologies. Like the US, however, 
the intended scope in global with the hope of using the common technology market under 
a single standard as a means of building economies of scale and thus affording an 
advantage to European firms over their American, Japanese, and (increasingly) Chinese 
competitors. Europe’s technology markets will remain more closed and the role of the 
state in ensuring they are will continue into the future. 
 The next chapter looks at the newest entrant into the world of technology 
standards, China. The chapter explores how China’s combination of relative 
technological innovation weakness with a strong state has produced technology markets 
which are open and global in scope but also frequently constrained in strategic industry 
sectors. Furthermore, China’s approach to intellectual property differs greatly from the 
United States and Europe, preferring to support low-cost options even at the expense of 
licensing revenues for firms in order to promote manufacturing and widespread adoption 
of Chinese standards. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORY AND POSITION: TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS IN 
CHINA 
 
 Consider China, the world’s second largest economy, largest emerging market, 
and most spectacular economic success story of the last three decades. The hyperbole 
used in describing China’s economic performance, industrialization, and technological 
upgrading hides a truth – China has indeed emerged on the global economic and 
technological stage. Yet, China’s emergence has clearly revealed that its markets do not 
operate in the same way as other developed, or even developing, countries. The strong 
role for the state in the economy and the relative position of weakness – in terms of core 
technology development and contribution – of Chinese firms means markets in China 
take on different forms from those in other countries. 
 This chapter explores the case of standardization and technology market 
formation in China. China’s standardization system is a hybrid of the statist European 
approach and the non-state model of the United States. China’s standardization system by 
law and tradition places the central state as the leading actor. At the same time, reforms 
have attempted to increase the role played by companies in the development and 
initiation of standards. This hybrid system allows for significant variation in 
developmental processes and outcomes in different standards. Even as this hybrid system 
has emerged, it is important to note that China’s technology standardization system 
remains highly dynamic and is undergoing continuous transition and transformation. 
Different standardization efforts – as detailed below – show the tension between a 
traditionally dominant and leading state and increasingly strong firms seeking their own 
interests. In some cases, such as TD-SCDMA, the state was able to force firms (in this 
 146
case China Mobile) to adopt the chosen standard. In other cases, such as WAPI, the state 
has backed down and allowed industry to have a greater say in which standard will be 
used. While China is decidedly statist both by law and tradition in standardization, there 
are limits to the ability of the state to impose its desired standard on industry. 
 Existing research has shown that China has a highly fragmented political system 
with intense rivalry among different branches of government and different levels. This 
competition undermines the image of a highly coordinated strong state able to fully 
implement its technology development and market-creation preferences. This has strong 
implications for the future of China’s standardization; while the country may aspire to 
develop a coordinated French-style system, it is more likely to drift increasingly toward 
an American-style approach where industry leads where it will, albeit strongly checked 
by the state. 
 China is an aspiring technology superpower. To achieve its goals such as 
becoming a world-leading technology innovator by 2020, China’s state uses its authority 
to shape technology markets as best it can to afford advantages to Chinese firms 
(Suttmeier and Yao 2004; Cao, Suttmeier et al. 2006; Pan 2006; StateCouncil 2006; 
Kennedy, Suttmeier et al. 2008; NPC 2011). However, given the position of the Chinese 
economy in the fragmented global economy, the perspectives of firms and state are often 
at odds, producing standards without demand from industry or defaulting to international 
standards even where the state has used its authority to push indigenous alternatives. 
Where the state has been most effective has been in shaping approaches to intellectual 
property so as to improve the competitive position of Chinese firms. It has also been 
effective in creating protected markets using mandatory standards, however, not to the 
exclusive degree seen in Europe or Japan. 
 For standardization in China, the central state always has a large role. 
Interviewees considered the preponderance of state influence and the guiding role it takes 
as the defining feature of Chinese standardization. Even where a standard is primarily 
 147
developed by enterprises, there is a strong degree of reliance on the state for direction, 
funding, and approval.  
 China is also an IP Taker in the global economy. While China has robust and 
rapidly progressing capabilities in technology innovation, these capabilities are primarily 
in incremental and second-generation innovation. China’s ability to create core 
technologies which define the architecture for whole systems remains weak. Accordingly, 
we see that the state uses standards to influence markets, intending to downplay the role 
for intellectual property and instead emphasize dissemination of technology and low cost. 
This market shaping comes from direct state intervention as well as from indirect 
influence of non-corporate actors in standardization – government sponsored 
development bodies such as CESI and the leading role of research institutions and 
universities in standardization. The state in China takes it upon itself to determine market 
outcomes, and uses standards to attempt to create the markets characteristics it feels are 
most beneficial for Chinese firms. At the same time, increasingly independent and 
capable Chinese firms push back against state-led standardization efforts they feel are not 
in their interests. Examination of the Chinese standardization system reveals the extent to 
which the different actors involved in standardization determine the structure of the 
markets and how benefits will be distributed within those markets. 
 In this chapter, I first outline the history and current status of China’s national 
standardization system as it has emerged and evolved over the last thirty years, with 
particular emphasis on the legally mandated leadership role for the state and the lack of 
clarity on the roles and responsibilities for non-state actors in standardization. This 
section looks at the formal and informal organization, institutions and channels of 
influence in Chinese standardization. Of particular emphasis in the role of the 1989 
Standardization Law of China and the ongoing evolution of China’s patent laws. These 
laws form the basic framework for standardization within which different actors seek to 
maximize their advantages and shape markets to suit their desired vision. The next 
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section explores the position of China within the fragmented global production system. It 
defines China as primarily an IP Taker but notes that the country aspires to a greater IP 
creation capability and role in the global economy. The section briefly notes how China’s 
position shapes the perspectives on standardization and technology markets for both state 
actors and firms. After this background, the chapter turns to a series of case studies of 
standardization in China. These case studies look at four standardization efforts in China: 
TD-SCDMA, WAPI, IGRS, and AVS – showing how China has developed different 
standards while adhering to principles for standards based on its position in the 
fragmented global economy.  
China’s Statist Institutions of Standardization 
 Scholars of Chinese political economy differ on their interpretations of her 
government policies and the efficacy of those policies, yet all agree that the Chinese state 
is heavily involved in the management and even day-to-day operation of the economy. 
Predictably, China has strongly statist institutions of standardization which cement the 
government as a leading actor in creating and molding markets for technology. State 
interests – as shaped by China’s position in the fragmented global production system – 
are expressed in the market structures which have emerged in China. 
 This historical section considers the history of standardization in China and the 
development of the formal organizations and institutions through which standardization 
takes place. I emphasize the centrality of the state, not so much as a regulator but as a 
strategic actor in standardization. The second portion looks in detail at the various state 
and non-state organizations involved in standardization in China and how these relate to 
each other and to the central state. With the leading actors thus defined, the chapter then 
turns to the position of China in the fragmented global production system and how this 
determines the perspectives on key standardization and market features. 
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History of Standardization in China and the Role of the State 
 While China was among the world’s first civilizations to emphasize 
standardization and to realize the benefits of common standards for market formation and 
sustenance, technology standardization – as in the West – only became important with the 
advent of industrialization. Accordingly, China’s technology standardization system 
emerged only in the last seventy years. The formal structure of China’s technology 
standardization system today took shape through a series of revolutions, reforms, and re-
reforms since 1949. Key developments in the development of the technology 
standardization system took place in the early 1950s, 1980s, and again in the late 1990s. 
 For 2000 years, imperial governments sought to establish and enforce uniform 
standards as part of their nation-building and economic policies. Standards were set and 
maintained for weights and measures, metallurgy, and coinage. However, as China never 
experienced mass-production-based industrialization, it had little experience with 
technology standards as they were emerging in the 19th century. It was in the West that 
the concept and different models – formal and de facto – for standardization emerged. 
After the 1911 Xinhai Revolution, China began tentatively integrating itself into the 
Western-centric international technological order. China’s halting attempts at 
modernization and industrialization from the 1910s through the 1940s led it to integrate 
itself at least officially into the Western-led global technology standardization system.  
 In 1920, China joined the ITU. China was also one of the 25 founding members 
of the modern ISO in 1946. Despite these efforts, China’s internal and external conflicts 
as well as general technological and industrial backwardness meant the country had little 
if any influence in the global standardization system. China’s participation gave it an 
insight into the operation of the international standardization system but China had little 
to contribute, especially in cutting edge technologies. 
 As argued in research studying industrialization and modernization during the late 
Qing and Republican periods, China had begun developing scientific and technological 
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capabilities oriented toward the West. However, whatever institutional development 
managed to take place during this period was undone by the 1949 revolution and 
establishment of the People’s Republic of China. That year, the Republican government 
of the Kuomintang collapsed and fled to Taiwan and the Communist Party – which soon 
firmly aligned itself with the Soviet Union – took power. Historical institutionalists argue 
that historical legacies are most easily broken in the context of war, revolution or other 
crisis. China in the late 1940s and early 1950s experienced all three. Such standardization 
institutions and expertise as had been developed since 1911 were thoroughly destroyed. 
Indeed, many of the experts fled with the defeated KMT government to Taiwan. China 
thus had to completely rebuild its standardization system.  
 As part of the process of “Building Socialism” under Soviet tutelage and “leaning 
to one side”, that is toward the Communist Bloc, in the early 1950s, China’s new 
government established wholly new institutions and organizations for standardization. 
From 1950 to 1955, China’s government was restructured along Soviet lines. This meant 
creating industrial ministries to govern the economy and a central planning agency to set 
economic targets in a series of five year plans.  
 For standardization, one of the most important reorganizations was the division of 
government administration into industrial ministries. Modeled on the Soviet system, 
China established a standardization department under the National Technology 
Commission in 1955. In keeping with the functional division based on type of economic 
activity, a separate standardization body for agricultural standards was established in 
1964 under the National Science and Technology Commission. 
 During this period, which might loosely be considered “the Soviet period”, or 
planned economy period, standardization was strictly utilitarian. As markets played 
virtually no role in the Chinese economy, standards were to support the plan. Standards 
mandated the shape, quality and characteristics of different industrial goods so as to 
ensure their ability to work and be utilized by other agents in the planned economy. For 
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example, during this time, a standard might classify the depth of threading on screws. 
Adherence to this standard – both for screws and for screw holes – was essential to 
ensuring plan targets could be filled. Throughout the planned economy period, 
standardization in China was effectively mandatory regulation. Where standards for 
different goods were set, industrial enterprises were obligated to follow the standard. 
 The growing inefficiencies of the Chinese planned economy during the 1960s and 
70s have been explored elsewhere (see, for example: Naughton, Shirk, Garver, Ernst). 
After Mao Zedong’s death and the purge of the Gang of Four in 1976, a more pragmatic 
leadership sought to realize the “Four Modernizations” of agriculture, industry, science 
and technology, and national defense. Modernization in part would be facilitated through 
opening to the West and the rest of the world. Accordingly, China rejoined the ISO 
effective on September 1, 1978.  
 During the “Reform and Opening” period beginning in 1978, China’s central and 
provincial leadership began increasing the scope for markets in China’s economy. 
Administrative reforms during this time sought to both increase the efficiency of planning 
and to grasp the vitality of markets for fostering economic growth, increased incomes and 
technological innovation. In the 1980s, reform came to standardization as well. In 1982, 
the National Standards Association was created to administer standardization. In 1984, 
China passed its first Patent Law, creating the first concept of a system of protected 
intellectual property. Most importantly, the National People’s Congress passed the 
Standardization Law in 1989, creating the legal basis for standardization in China, 
cementing the centrality of the state in standardization. 
 As mentioned above, under the planned economy, technology standards were 
indistinguishable from compulsory regulations. Industrial firms were required to comply 
with such standards; indeed compliance was essential to the smooth operation of a 
planned economy. Only if components adhered to rigid standards could they be 
guaranteed to be usable by other factories as allocated by the plan. The Western concept 
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of voluntary standards which define a product, service or technology but are open to 
amendment and are free to be ignored by enterprises was completely alien to the system. 
Interviewees noted that it was not until the late 1990s that general awareness of voluntary 
technology standards and their economic influence became widespread. 
 It is important to remember that while the 1980s was a decade of reform and the 
introduction of market forces into the economy, the broader industrial economy at that 
time remained almost entirely planned and state controlled. Small businesses, workshops 
and even small private enterprises began to proliferate – particularly in the countryside – 
but the urban economy remained largely unchanged. Throughout the 1980s, state-owned 
(and then planning-based) enterprises contributed over 70% of industrial output 
(Naughton 2007). Such market forces as had begun to take effect in the state industrial 
sector were primarily limited to administrative reforms – typically restricting the power 
of the Party Secretary and empowering professional managers – or permission to sell 
surplus output on open markets, so long as it was produced using market-sourced inputs. 
This was the era of Chen Yun’s “Bird in a Cage” economy. The state-owned and planned 
economy was to remain dominant. Market forces, like the songbird, could provide vitality 
but needed to be constrained. The economic primacy of the state remained unchallenged, 
as did the importance of government direction. This system changed by the 1990s as the 
private and collective (non-state-owned) segment of the economy outgrew the planned 
economy (Shirk 1993; Naughton 1995). 
 In the climate of the still state-dominated 1980s, China drafted and adopted the 
Standardization Law (NPC 1988). The National People’s Congress adopted the law in 
1988 (effective January 1, 1989) after several years of development and debate. As the 
plan and state overwhelmingly dominated the economy throughout the years the law was 
developed, it enshrined planning and state leadership in the standardization system. It 
remains the sole legal basis for China’s standardization system – even though the 
institutions have developed beyond the basic requirements of the law over the last 
 153
twenty-five years. As one interviewee put it, when describing the sometimes arbitrary 
actions of a state-led SDO in China: 
 
“If (the SDO) feels they cannot give MNCs a logical reason for their 
decisions, they will use the old 1989 Law as an excuse. This happens in 
top down cases where high-level government strategy has tied the 
organization’s hands. When this happens, they can simply cite the law – 
arguing that there is nothing they can do to help MNCs since the law 
makes no provision for them” (Author’s Interview). 
 
 Since the Standardization Law remains the legal basis for the standardization 
system in China, it is important to understand the context in which it was developed and 
hence the types of perspectives and powers it fosters. 
 During the 1980s, market reforms posed an ideological challenge for China’s 
leadership. While still members of the Communist Party and officially dedicated to the 
goal of building and preserving “socialism” Deng Xiaoping’s reforms explicitly rejected 
some of the basic tenets of socialist economics: comprehensive planning and collective 
ownership of farming. 
 Communist Party leaders agonized over how to justify these changes without 
undermining the justification for rule by the Communist Party. The ideological solution 
was the “Socialist Commodity Economy” (Liu 1991). This school of thought argued that 
the “Commodity Economy” was indeed essentially a market-based system of exchange 
where there is profit motive and prices set by supply and demand as opposed to a 
traditionally socialist system of fixed prices and planning. However, great pains were 
taken to differentiate the “Socialist Commodity Economy” from a “Capitalist Commodity 
Economy.” The latter involves blind pursuit of profit for personal, not firm or national, 
gain. It involves the fetishism of capital and worship of money that destroys social and 
familial relations. The “Socialist Commodity Economy” on the other hand, is run with a 
healthy appreciation of the needs of the whole – individual, enterprise, and state. Profits 
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are to benefit all, not just the entrepreneur. A major feature of the “Socialist Commodity 
Economy” is also the prevalence of state ownership but the clear end to planning and 
quotas and subjecting enterprises to market forces to make them more efficient.  
 This somewhat confused ideological position meant that while enterprises were to 
be encouraged to pursue profit, this goal had to be tempered. Attempts at controlling 
“Spiritual Pollution” throughout the 1980s had limited success (Baum 1994). However, 
while losing control over the daily lives of the people, the continued dominance of State 
enterprise meant the government would continue to wield disproportionate power over 
the economy, particularly in key sectors. The government would continue to control key 
areas of the economy, including technology standardization. By law, since 1989, the State 
remains the only source for authority in standardization. The private sector has no legal 
standing in standardization. Since 1989, China has developed more standards 
development organizations, both state-controlled and nominally independent, but all in 
the context of a legally dominant government. China’s economy has also grown far larger 
and far more sophisticated. The next section details the current institutions and 
organizations in China, accounting for their historical antecedents and influences as well 
as the mandated and institutionally established roles they play in standardization today. 
State and Non-State Institutions of Standardization 
 The legal mandate that China’s state lead the standardization process is based on 
the Standardization Law, drafted and debated from 1985 to 1988.  Given the time in 
which it was developed and adopted, the law reflects views on standards embedded in the 
then-extant reality of a planned economy and official economic philosophy still trying to 
differentiate China’s system from Western capitalism. The law formally enshrines a 
strong leadership role for the government. One interviewee effectively summed up the 
importance of the law by remarking on the difference between standardization 
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institutions in China and the United States: “What makes standardization special in China 
is the leadership of the state” (Author’s Interview).  
 Like the WTO TBT agreement with its emphasis on the market creating and trade 
enhancing aspects of standards, China’s Standardization Law was intended to encourage 
international trade, technology interoperability, adoption of international standards and 
development of standards for the protection of health, safety and the environment. The 
law created the legal basis for China’s institutions and formal organizations of 
standardization. Figure 3 offers a brief summary of those articles in the law which 
interviewees noted are most influential in China’s standardization institutions. Any 
discussion of China’s institutions and how these act to determine standards, and markets 
for technology, must therefore begin with this law. Most importantly, the law requires the 
state take responsibility for standardization. There is no provision in the law for non-state 
leadership or independent standardization organizations such as IEEE or W3PP. All 
standards development must begin and end with government action.  
 Under the aegis of the Standardization Law, China’s SAC has formulated a series 
of standardization policies. In 2004, for example, SAC issued a draft policy which 
formally declared that the state should guide national standards which: “grant bearing on 
industrial development and competitiveness.” Further, state guidance should address IPR 
and standard issues “so as to improve the proportion of self-proprietary technologies in 
Chinese standards” (Slater 2009). A draft regulation from SAC the same year would have 
forbidden the use of proprietary technology in mandatory national standards or else 
require royalty-free or RAND licensing, regardless of the patent holder’s wishes (SAC 
2009; Willingmyre 2010). While this policy was not adopted, it remains under 
consideration in various forms. The policy points to the importance and power of 
government involvement in standardization with the intent of shaping technology markets 
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to the benefit of Chinese firms – by lowering the costs for intellectual property and 
















































Figure 3: Standardization Law of China 
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 The role of intellectual property in China’s technology standards and markets 
stems from the laws and policies enacted to govern patents in general and standards-
essential patents in particular. The National People’s Congress passed China’s first patent 
law in 1984. The law has since been revised three times to shape the role of IP in China’s 
industry with the most recent changes have been proposed in 2008. The 2008 reforms 
attempted to balance private and public interests and national innovation strategy while 
strengthening protections for IPR holders. Essentially, the reforms sought to enable the 
state to realize goals of broad dissemination of technology at low prices will also 
encouraging China’s innovators through improved protection of their IP. 
  A fourth revision is currently undergoing review. When initially made available 
for comment, the fourth revision included provisions making it possible to demand 
compulsory licensing of essential patents for Chinese standards (SIPO 2012). After 
receiving 400 comments, this proposal was again returned for further revision. 
Commenters strongly rejected the proposals regarding mandatory licensing which was 
seen by many, particularly large foreign enterprises, as an attempt at forcing technology 
transfer. Nonetheless, within China’s SDOs there are policies designed to effectively 
mandate licensing, albeit on a RAND basis, not RF. 
 In 2010, the China National Standards Institute (CNIS), a research body under 
SAC, proposed the Disposal Rules for the Inclusion of Patents in National Standards 
(Willingmyre, 2010).37 The initial January 2010 draft contained language broadly 
considered inimical to the interests of IPR holders. After receiving comments, a 
subsequent revision was produced in April 2010. However, this draft still contained 
                                                 
37 CNIS is a research institute under AQSIQ. Like SAC, CNIS has a .gov.cn Internet address. Established in 
1990, CNIS is a research and education think tank responsible for developing standardization theory, 
strategy and education for China. CNIS makes standards for service industries and serves as a consulting 
body for groups seeking to develop or propose recommendations for standard development projects to 
SAC. CNIS’s relationship with SAC is not direct although many CNIS workers have also spent portions of 
their career in SAC. As evidence of the somewhat confused relationship, when asked when CNIS was 
established, an interviewee answered “In the 1950s, under Soviet guidance.” 
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ambiguities with regards to granting licenses. For example, the April 2010 revision stated 
that “For purpose of patent licensing, the licenser should fill out the Patent Licensing 
Declaration Form” but it does not clarify whether this language means a declaration of 
intent to negotiate licensing terms, or if it firmly commits the IPR holder to a license 
simply by filing the paperwork. Further, there is uncertainty over the language governing 
“essential patents” which makes it appear that commercial necessity, as opposed to 
purely technical, can obligate a firm to license their technology to would-be adopters 
conforming to a standard. The proposal remains under revision. 
 The State Council body responsible for standardization in China is the Standards 
Administration of China (SAC). SAC (established in 2001) is the successor 
administrative body to China’s various standards administrative bodies going back to 
1955. While still directly under the State Council, unlike earlier departments, SAC itself 
is not officially part of the government. SAC is an officially a non-governmental 
organization under the State Administration of Quarantine and Inspection (AQSIQ). 
AQSIQ, in turn, is a sub-ministerial commission directly responsible to the State Council 
but not under any specific ministry. In this way, AQSIQ is much like the State 
Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) which is also a commission which answers to the 
State Council but does not have direct ministerial representation.38 
 Interviewees varied on their perspectives over whether or not SAC should be 
considered a government office. Officially, it is considered an “Institutional 
Organization” (事 位业单 ) under the control and direction of AQSIQ.39 Like ANSI, this 
means it is not actually a government office even though it represents China at the 
                                                 
38 Sub-ministerial commissions like AQSIQ and SIPO do not have their own representative ministers on the 
State Council. Their leaders do not attend State Council meetings unless specifically called – usually by the 
Vice Premier. They are not responsible to other ministries but can be influenced by the policies or 
preferences of ministries and commissions with State Council representation. 
39 Institutional Organizations are non-profit bodies offering a social service to satisfy a cultural, scientific, 
health or other demand. They are considered part of state institutions and some are part of the official civil 
service and employ career bureaucrats. Dating back to the time of the planned economy, Institutional 
Organizations are initiated by the government but are not explicitly part of the state structure. 
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international level in the ISO and IEC. This distinction, however, is academic as SAC is 
funded directly through the central government. SAC’s website is listed as a .gov.cn 
domain, the same domain used for state ministries and commissions. Further, SAC 
employees receive the same benefits and career stability as other government officials. 
Government interviewees tended to emphasize that SAC was not formally part of the 
government. Nonetheless, most interviewees in industry and standards development work 
said that the “Institutional Organization” status was meaningless. In their interactions 
with SAC, interviewees said they treated SAC officials the same as they would 
representatives of any other extension of the Chinese bureaucracy.40 
 SAC is the ultimate arbiter of standardization in China. Only SAC may issue the 
identification numbers used to designate a standardization effort as a prospective national 
standard. National standards are identified by use of a GB (国标 国家 准标, short for ) 
standards number. To date, SAC has approved, published and implemented 
approximately 27,000 national standards. Of these, approximately sixty percent are 
“internationally comparable” whether to ISO/IEC or foreign country standards. This 
means roughly 40% of China’s national standards – not including industry or regional 
standards – are different from international standards in the same sector, or else are 
standards for sectors for which no international standard yet exists (Author’s Interview). 
 As the final approver and publisher of national standards, standards submitted 
from industrial ministries or regional governments must be approved by SAC before 
becoming national standards. When adopting foreign or international standards, SAC 
must perform the analysis and approval. Like European standardization, only formal 
standards have legal standing in China – and these all must pass through the government 
standardization apparatus – SAC. 
                                                 
40 This is similar to many state-industry relations in China’s political economy. Any group with state 
affiliation is generally treated as a formal extension of the state meaning it has significant power over 
industry, and firms seek connections and favor with such bodies. At the same time, however, like all state 
bodies, it is subject to influence from industry and firms increasingly lobby the state to support their 
interests, not just accept state pronouncements. 
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 The day to day work of standardization falls to an array of mostly government-run 
or affiliated standards development organizations. Most of these SDOs were established 
under the various industrial ministries. Once provided a GB number by SAC, these 
standardization efforts are fast tracked for approval as national standards. Otherwise, 
standards are first developed as industrial standards, approved by their ministries, and 
then submitted for approval as national ones although not all industrial standards become 
national standards.  
 Industry standards apply only to firms or other agents in a specific industry, not to 
the entirety of the national economy. Although industry standards can be made for any 
industry, the majority of these that make headlines – and controversy – are in electronics 
and ICT. Such industry standards are administered by MIIT.41  
 MIIT directs two standards development organizations which handle the work of 
developing specific industry technology standards: the China Electronics Standards 
Institute (CESI) and the China Communication Standards Association (CCSA). CESI, 
first established in 1963 under the Ministry of Electronics Industry (one of MIIT’s 
predecessors), is responsible for electronics and near-field wireless communication 
standards. With its focus on near-field communications, CESI has direct representation in 
the IEC through its representatives who sit on JTC1 (the Joint Technical Committee 
between ISO and IEC for consumer and business ICT standards). Although created by 
MIIT’s predecessor, CESI is administratively under SAC – insomuch as CESI’s industry 
standards are submitted up to SAC for consideration as national standards. CESI still 
receives its funding from MIIT, however. Rather than be financially independent, MIIT’s 
official position is that CESI needs guaranteed funding in order to act as an independent 
third party standards developer. Hence, state funding is always guaranteed. In addition to 
                                                 
41 Before the creation of MIIT in 2008, standards for the electronics and IT industries were created by the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII). MII was formed in 1998 by merging the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) and the Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI). The two ministries had been 
in charge of long-range communication and electronics industry standards, respectively. 
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its state budgetary allowance, CESI also receives fees for performance standards 
compliance testing of products and selling testing equipment. 
 CESI has adopted a pragmatic view of intellectual property. According to its 2007 
IP Policy, CESI acknowledges that intellectual property is important in standards but 
preference is given to actors which submit patents for consideration in the most open 
manner possible – meaning RAND or RAND-RF. CESI’s IP policy is used as a template 
for the various technical committees working on industry standards in ICT – such as AVS 
and IGRS as detailed below. CESI IP policy offers four types of IP declarations to firms: 
RF, RAND, Patent Pool, and No License. The Patent Pool option is becoming 
increasingly popular and widely promoted by CESI whose members are interested more 
in disseminating their technology and winning brand attention than they are in direct 
monetization. Low cost patent pools are intended to foster quick and widespread 
adoption. One interviewee explained CESI’s perspective on embedded IP in standards: 
 
“We never believed that adopting or using international standards is 
damaging for industry, but if we adopt standards with barriers like patents 
which cannot be licensed, then that would be damaging. Similarly, if a 
patent was licensed under unfair terms – since we should get special 
consideration as a developing country – that would be to our disadvantage. 
Although we make a lot of products in China, we are still comparatively 
underdeveloped. The question is how to balance the legitimate interests of 
both the IP holders and the licensees who must pay. In CESI, as a 
standards maker, when a firm joins a working group, the group must be 
balanced for mutual benefit. So IP holders and licensees must be willing to 
negotiate. To facilitate negotiations, CESI sets rules for disclosure, when 
firms must submit contributions, or at any other point. Furthermore, 
whether or not a firm offers a license, if it is a member, it is obligated to 
disclose” (Author’s Interview). 
 
 The second MIIT-directed standardization body is the China Communication 
Standards Association (CCSA), responsible for long-range communications, particularly 
mobile telephony and wireless data. CCSA was established in 2002 by merging the 
administration and activities of six telecommunications and long-range network 
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communication standards working groups that had been established by MIIT’s 
predecessor ministries – the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications and the Ministry 
of Information Industry. As a testament to enduring historical legacies, CESI and CCSA 
roughly correspond to the earlier division of responsibility between the Ministry of 
Electronic Industry and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications before their 
merger in 1998. This division of labor is not without precedent, however, as Europe 
similarly divides near-field and long-range network and communication standards 
between CENELEC and ETSI. Creation of CCSA was a pragmatic decision to streamline 
the administration of working groups in this functional area. CCSA provides experts to 
China’s delegations to the ITU for international-level standards negotiations. 
 In both CCSA- and CESI-sponsored technical committees and working groups, 
there is a similar structure. In their working groups, there is always a government 
representative, sometimes sent directly by the SDO or else sent from MIIT. The 
government representatives sit on the secretariat of the working group. Officials are only 
responsible for administrative matters to ensure the development process follows the 
Standardization Law concerning deliberation, consensus, public comment and revisions. 
Nonetheless, the government remains both the source of funding for standards 
development organizations and the developer of long-term strategy. As stated by one 
interviewee: 
 
“As for the government, they are one step behind but one step higher. 
They can see further and plan for the future. But the actual work in 
standards is left to the experts. In our committees, there is a CESI 
representative in each group. Sometimes there are also representatives 
from MIIT. Fortunately, 80% of MIIT officials have a technology 
background so they at least understand science. The government, however, 
does not have a strong day to day influence apart from provision of funds 
and setting the overall direction.” (Author’s Interview) 
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 China’s technology standards system formally follows a combined bottom up and 
top-down approach to standardization. While the state remains the primary initiator of 
standardization activities and the final approver and implementer, there is a role for non-
state actors as well. The system created by the Standards Law allows for the creation of 
enterprise standards.42 While some interviewees scoffed at the idea of non-state 
standards: “How can there be an enterprise standard? There is no such thing” (Authors’ 
Interview), it is legally possible for firms to establish standards through their internal 
policies and then register the standard with local authorities. The conception is that the 
firm will make standards for quality, safety or technological sophistication above and 
beyond those demanded by industrial or national standards. 
 In practice, some of China’s large firms are able to dictate standards by fiat. This 
occurs when the company enjoys a preponderance of economic influence in the national 
or regional market. Hence, any standard it adopts internally will become the de facto 
standard for the region by virtue of the firm’s economic weight. To illustrate, some 
interviewees noted that China’s power generation companies enjoy regional semi-
monopolies. In such circumstances, a firm such as Southern Grid can mandate 
transmission standards which become effectively binding. Supplier firms and 
subcontractors are obligated to conform to the standard since there is no alternative to 
working with the monopolist. As explained by one interviewee: 
 
“A standard can become a standard even without going through the SAC. 
When an extremely powerful company like National Grid or Southern 
Grid adopts an enterprise standard, the firm forces the hand of other 
companies. To supply to these companies – which are the only game in 
town – you must conform to the standard.” (Author’s Interview) 
                                                 
42 As noted in the main description of the Standards Law, there is a category for sub-national regional 
standards as well such as would be set by local or provincial governments. Although China’s highly 
fragmented political system would seem to encourage further fragmentation and market confusion through 
expansion of incompatible local standards, none of the interviewees in government, academia, or industry 
mentioned regional standards as posing any threat to commerce or technology development. Indeed, 
regional standards were only mentioned in a handful of interviews, and then only in passing. 
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 Although able to set standards as they see fit – so long as they also conform with 
established national and industry standards – China’s large enterprises are generally also 
state-owned – in part or in full (Thun 2006; Huang 2008; Breznitz and Murphree 2011). 
This means that they are also subject to state pressures to set their internal standards in 
accordance with national policy. In heavily regulated and oligopolistic industries such as 
telecommunications and power generation in China, firm standards effectively become 
national standards. This actually affords the Chinese state with a further avenue for 
mandating standards. While WTO rules do not permit the adoption of exclusive national 
standards when international alternatives exist, firms are free to adopt internal standards 
as they see fit. Since they completely dominate their industries in China, their internal 
standards effectively become mandatory national standards. This can effectively get 
around WTO restrictions on protectionism by the state while accomplishing the same 
goals in practice. As noted by one interviewee: 
 
“It actually wasn’t the Chinese government which forced foreign mobile 
phone makers like Apple and Microsoft to conform to the WAPI security 
standard. China’s phone network operators like China Mobile and China 
Unicom set their own security requirements for WiFi security, which 
meant the phone makers had to conform to the WAPI standard since only 
WAPI met these requirements.” (Author’s Interview) 
  
 Apart from their independent standardization capabilities, large firms are also 
active in China’s formal standards development organizations. The government strongly 
encourages such participation, but unlike France where large enterprises can be 
controlled by strong state leadership, large Chinese enterprises resist mandated 
technology sharing or low-priced licensing of technology to their competitors. In the 
IGRS home networking standard, one interviewee described the difficulty of getting 
multiple large technology companies to actively contribute their intellectual property: 
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“The IGRS working group was formed in July 2003 back when the entire 
project was still completely under Lenovo, under the supervision of the 
then Ministry of Information Industry. However, the legal documents that 
prospective working group members had to sign mandated full technology 
disclosure for all members. This was problematic since Lenovo led the 
group. Companies such as Great Wall balked at disclosing their 
technology to their competitor. This discouraged potential members and 
contributors.” (Author’s Interview)  
 
 The fact that one large firm or another tends to dominate a given standards 
development effort also makes it difficult for large firms to cooperate due to their 
intrinsic lack of trust. The result is that standardization often becomes the responsibility 
of a single firm. In the cases below, this was a challenge for standardization in the TD-
SCDMA and IGRS cases. China’s state is strong but unable to force companies to 
completely cooperate, thus complicating efforts at technology upgrading. 
 Apart from large firms, the major contributors to China’s technology standards, 
and hence actors of major importance in market formation, are research institutes and 
universities. China’s technology innovation system differs greatly from the ideal 
innovator as proposed by Schumpeter. Rather than large enterprises leading technological 
development, much of the most basic research that leads to potential breakthroughs 
occurs in China’s universities and research institutes. These labs now work in close 
cooperation with one another and the state – which is the primary source of their funding 
– to produce technologies which may serve as the basis for technology standards. 
Research institutes’ greater levels of experience with R&D and technology for standards 
means university labs tend to have a much greater role in standardization in China. In 
particular, university researchers are heavily represented in working groups and technical 
committees. Interviewees estimated that most working groups were approximately fifty 
percent university researchers and fifty percent company representatives. In some cases, 
interviewees noted that university representatives accounted for virtually the entire 
working group, often implying that industry had no interest in the standard.  
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 One of the institutional reasons for the importance of university labs and research 
institutes is the emphasis government funding now places on standardization. University 
professors are rewarded with greater opportunities for travel and research funding if their 
technologies are incorporated into standards. Further, many national funding projects 
explicitly mandate the development of technologies relevant for establishing new 
technology standards. Accordingly, professors dedicate their R&D teams and efforts to 
producing standards-relevant technologies. They also actively participate in the formal 
processes of standardization (working groups, technical committees, lobbying) to ensure 
their technologies are included. 
 Small firms in China have a weak role in standardization. Although now 
encouraged to participate in formal standards bodies, small firms tend to lack the R&D 
capabilities to contribute significantly to standards protocols. Similarly, many lack to 
resources to sustain long-term involvement in standards development. At the same time, 
however, many small firms have been eager participants, sending representatives to 
working group and technical committee meetings in China’s various standards 
development organizations. According to interviewees, these firms are not promoting 
their own technology. Instead they are seeking the good publicity as technologically 
sophisticated firms that they receive by participating in standardization. There are some 
direct subsidies such as government grants for standards participation but the amounts are 
generally small and insignificant for even small firms. Small firms’ involvement provides 
access to highly ranked engineers and managers in major Chinese firms and government 
ministries. These connections are highly valuable for increasing the sales and business 
opportunities of small firms. Firms that otherwise would be unable to speak to influential 
managers at large firms can use standardization meetings to network and draw attention 
to their capabilities as well as conformance with the standards promoted by larger firms. 
In this way, standardization also facilitates market activity by helping lower transaction 
costs and communication barriers between agents. 
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 With the major actors in China’s standardization system thus defined, with an 
emphasis on the leading role for the state, the next section details China’s position in the 
global economy. 
China’s Position in the Global Economy: IP Taker/Aspiring IP Creator 
 Before the Industrial Revolution, China was arguably the center of the global 
economy. In the midst of this economic plenty, China was a world-leading innovator. 
Joseph Needham’s research on Chinese science and technology notes the hundreds of 
firsts in science and engineering accomplished by pre-modern Chinese dynasties. 
 Despite the significant economic and scientific achievements of early China, the 
country did not experience an industrial revolution. By the beginning of the 19th century, 
the incredible productivity of industrialization and mechanization in Europe and the 
United States left the traditional Chinese economy far behind. At its nadir, China 
accounted for less than 4% of the global economy in the 1970s. In 1978, China’s per 
capita GDP was $165 (in constant 2000 dollars). Its industry was heavily reliant on 
Soviet technology imported in the 1950s, simplified and spread throughout the economy 
(Garver 1993). China’s most powerful computers were transistor-based mainframes 
designed and built in the 1960s and only capable of 110,000 calculations per second 
(Ling 2005). In contrast, the CDC 6600 designed by Cray in 1964 was capable of 3 
million calculations per second. China also faced high levels of un- and under-
employment, intense rural poverty, rising discontent and cynicism among urban residents 
and general dissatisfaction with the state of China and the communist party (Baum 1994). 
 To tackle the growing crisis of faith, the leadership of the communist party 
initiated economic reforms (Shirk 1993; Naughton 1995). These differed greatly from the 
economic modernization programs popularized by the East Asian Developmental States. 
Economic reforms, development plans and programs in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan 
were methodical and based on progressive strategic visions for industrial restructuring, 
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foreign investment and technology upgrading (Johnson 1982; Amsden 1989; Cheng 
1990; Berger and Lester 2005). Disciplined state bureaucracies carried out the economic 
development plans as dictated by responsible pilot agencies (Japan), a government 
planning agency (Korea) or the ruling party (Taiwan). The state tightly controlled access 
to foreign exchange, aggressively promoted exports and sought foreign investment under 
specific conditions. Foreign firms’ access to domestic markets was constrained and 
contingent upon technology sharing. Where technology was acquired, developmental 
agencies spent up to ten times the amount spent to acquire the technology to pay for 
indigenization, learning and dissemination. While not universally successful, this 
approach controlled the pace and means by which these countries entered the global 
economy, facilitating steady firm upgrading. 
 China’s reforms were more experimental and ad hoc. This approach meant that 
certain areas of the economy would be reformed and opened before others. Furthermore, 
opening different sectors of the economy would be conducted in a fragmented manner. 
Further complicating the process was the “play to the provinces” (Shirk 1993). In order to 
get around resistance to reform from the central government’s industrial ministries, Deng 
Xiaoping encouraged policy innovation by and fiscal liberation for provincial authorities. 
By the early 1990s, the result was a patchwork of reformed and unreformed sectors of the 
economy, regions with widely varying degrees of policy independence, and regions with 
sharply divergent levels of market-led economic activity and entrepreneurship. 
 Indeed, one of the main features of reform was the lack of a vision for the 
endpoint (Segal 2003; Breznitz and Murphree 2011). At the outset, the primary goals of 
economic reform were summarized in the slogan of the “Four Modernizations” of 
agriculture, industry, science and technology and national defense. First mentioned by 
Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964 as the goals for socialist construction in China, the Four 
Modernizations gained prominence after Mao’s death in 1976 (Shirk 1993; Baum 1994). 
In practical terms, the goal was to increase the food supply and achieve self-sufficiency 
 169
in grain, create urban jobs, modernize the education system and earn foreign exchange 
which could be used to then purchase technology for further the entire modernization 
project in a virtuous circle. 
 To accomplish the practical goals of the Four Modernizations, China’s leadership 
was highly pragmatic. In order to avoid resistance to reform that had bedeviled attempts 
at reform in Hungary and other planned economies, the planning apparatus was left 
largely untouched until the early 1990s (Naughton 1995; Weingast 1995). Five-year plans 
continued to be drafted which mandated production quotas for factories, set prices and 
determined where and how resource inputs and human capital would be allocated. 
Factories which wished to continue producing in the old ways were welcome to do so. 
The central state remained committed to stability and ensuring that reform would not be 
blocked. This meant placating established interests and going around them until they no 
longer mattered (Naughton 1994).  
 Rather than attempting to use the instruments of planning to direct investment in 
strategic directions – as done in the other East Asian Developmental States. The market 
economy was permitted to grow up and around the Plan. To foster rapid development, 
local governments were permitted to experiment with different policies. Firms and 
would-be entrepreneurs were allowed managerial freedom to experiment with new 
product lines, human resource relations and work incentives. 
 Throughout this period, however, there was no emergence of a clear mandate on 
reforms or the long-term direction of reforms. Indeed, the very goal of the “Four 
Modernizations” was a vague prescription at best. The objectives or end game of reform 
were never explicitly defined. Throughout the 1980s, there was also a constant battle 
within the central government leadership over the pace and extent of reform.  
 In this context, the rational course of action for both would-be entrepreneurs and 
ambitious local officials was to pursue short-time horizons in business. Knowing that 
economic growth was always rewarded – both with formal promotions and opportunities 
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for graft – local officials were strongly incentivized to maximize levels of foreign direct 
investment and job creation. The fastest means of doing so was to encourage export 
processing or other forms of labor-intensive manufacturing. 
 The rational response of China’s new class of entrepreneurs was to insert their 
enterprises into the fragmented global economy at whatever level was available. With no 
long-term strategy emanating from the center to shape the industrial economy toward 
some normative goal, entrepreneurs were free to make money as best as possible without 
concerns for mandates to upgrade, transfer technology or strong-arm foreign partners. 
Firms thus developed niche capabilities in component supply or final assembly within 
global production chains. While not yielding major technology upgrading, this was able 
to build China into the workshop of the world, albeit without concerted and coordinated 
efforts to secure upgrading by firms. Innovation and IP development capabilities thus 
remained limited. 
 China’s position within the fragmented global economy is thus not the same as for 
other East Asian developmental states. While all engaged in low value-added assembly 
and light industry, Japan, Korea and Taiwan used state influence to push for rapid 
upgrading. China’s large underemployed population also meant that low-value added 
activities could remain profitable for longer, enabling firms to remain focused on 
production and scale rather than innovation. China’s firms developed innovation 
capabilities and competitive advantages in the application of technology and the 
organization of production but much less in the conduct of long-term research to invent 
or wholly redefine products and industries.  
 Thus China developed into an IP Taker in the global economy, with a 
manufacturing economy based on the import and use of foreign technology and 
conforming to foreign standards. Use of foreign standards meant the Chinese economy 
became part of global markets, massively increasing potential customer volumes for 
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Chinese firms. At the same time, China’s government is not content with this position in 
the global economy. 
 China’s 2006-2020 Medium to Long Range Plan for Science and Technology is 
cognizant of China’s enterprises’ degree of reliance on foreign technology (StateCouncil 
2006; Serger and Breidne 2007). Accordingly, there are goal metrics in the plan for 
reducing the percent of foreign technology in China’s products, ideally by making 
equally competitive or better Chinese alternatives. That the plan felt the need to call for 
decreasing foreign IP in the Chinese economy is evidence of the weakness of China’s 
indigenous IP creation system. While still an IP Taker, China pays increasing attention to 
the importance of IP creation and is seeking to build its capabilities toward that end. 
General Condition of Technology Markets in China 
 Technology markets in China accord with the predictions of this dissertation’s 
theory as a Statist IP Taker country. The Statist IP Taker will have active government 
involvement to promote the success of indigenous firms whether through promoting and 
protecting their technology or using its influence to lower the costs of intellectual 
property for firms. China’s government has indeed followed both of these tracks – 
encouraging development of indigenous alternative technologies and attempting to lower 
the prices for technology licenses so as to improve the competitive position of Chinese 
firms.  
 For China’s IP policies, the government strongly promotes the development of 
what is termed “indigenous innovation” and “core technology” or “self-owned 
intellectual property.” The government sets targets for reducing the use of foreign 
technology and its replacement with indigenous alternative – most notably in the target of 
only 30% dependence on foreign technology by 2020. China’s government promotes 
indigenous alternative technologies through provision of funding for R&D projects. 
Interviewees in research institutes, particularly in universities, noted the importance of 
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government funding for sustaining their standards-relevant R&D projects. These projects 
come with mandates that technology development be done with an eye toward inclusion 
of the technology results in indigenous or international standards. One interviewee 
summed up the overall government perspective: 
 
“Some government bodies in China feel that China should develop its own 
standard for every area where there is a foreign standard on principle, even 
if the Chinese technology is inferior. This is done to protect China’s own 
industry. Others feel that China’s technology is actually better in some 
ways that foreign technology but the firms and standard have a lack of 
market maturity so there is a need for protection against foreign bias and 
prejudice against a Chinese standard. More and more China is getting 
better at technology or at least being able to produce comparable and 
cheaper alternatives so China’s standards should be getting better. Also, 
the government my just want leverage over foreigners or to lower royalties 
but eventually all of this spending is going to pay off in technology 
capability building.” (Author’s Interview) 
 
 As suggested by the interviewee’s comments, the Chinese state is actively 
involved in lobbying foreign standards alliances and dominant IP holders to lower the IP 
licensing fees charged to Chinese companies. As manufacturers, China’s firms are 
frequently squeezed by the licensing rates they must pay just conform to international 
standards – effectively a pay to compete requirement. The state intervenes to benefit 
Chinese firms. As stated by a representative of a Chinese SDO: 
 
“Lowering royalty rates, both for foreign standards and by having our own 
cheaper standards, is a major goal in developing standards in China. It has 
always been the goal. It is the goal for associations like ours to keep 
royalty rates as low as possible to encourage adoption.” (Authors’ 
Interview) 
 
 Finally, in the domestic sphere, Chinese firms are increasingly adopting more 
open and inexpensive IP licensing policies. Domestic firms realize their weak position in 
the global economy – a factor of their position as low-end manufacturers in global 
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production chains – and seek to compensate through lower priced technologies. If the 
licensing rates for Chinese technology standards are lower than foreign alternatives, there 
should be greater adoption and utilization of the Chinese standard. The government 
strongly supports these efforts at lowering the prices for IP. MIIT in particular through 
CESI is looking to implement nominal-priced patent pools for a variety of Chinese 
information technology standards. 
 The theory predicts that standards development and hence technology markets 
will generally be closed in a statist country like China in order to benefit domestic firms. 
This is generally the case. Chinese standards are often explicitly or implicitly Chinese-
only in their participation. Foreign firms do not have the same rights and participation 
experiences. Standards development efforts within China are state supported and 
protected. In key sectors such as information security, the state bars foreign participation 
at all. In other cases, interviewees noted that foreign firms are welcome to participate 
insomuch as they are requested to contribute their intellectual property at low or free rates 
but are otherwise discouraged from participation. Foreign firms are also discouraged 
from being observers in standardization bodies through ambiguous policies which appear 
to mandate licensing of technology merely for participating in any capacity in a standards 
development organization or working group.  
 Apart from indigenous technology development efforts and support, however, 
China’s technology markets are generally very open. Because of the need to have access 
to international technologies and produce goods compliant with international standards, 
China maintains a policy of broadly accepting international standards and permitting their 
use within China. Chinese firms usually prefer international standards to domestic ones 
due to the better reputation of foreign technologies and the greater degree of 
sophistication of standards development and testing by large foreign SDOs. 
 Finally, the scope of China’s technology markets is, as suggested by the general 
openness principle, usually international. China’s firms prefer to utilize standards which 
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plug them in to international markets. The exception is in sectors deemed critical by the 
state. Here, China will create explicitly domestic standards with limited range, even at the 
risk of setting China apart from the rest of the global economy. As will be discussed in 
the WAPI case, attempts to mandate a narrow scope standard also meet with domestic 
resistance from enterprises geared toward selling into foreign markets. To protect itself 
from accusations of using technical barriers to trade, China also widely submits 
technologies for consideration as international standards. The goal is ultimately to create 
global-scale markets for Chinese technologies or at least to permit the restrictive use of a 
Chinese standard since it has also been approved as an international option.  
 The following section offers four case studies of standardization in China. Each 
shows how the combination of strong state influence and the position of China in the 
global economy determined the market outcomes of the standardization effort. 
Case Studies 
 This section considers four standardization efforts in China. Each effort shows 
adherence to the logic of this dissertation. The strong role of the state and the position of 
China in global production chains determine the content of the standards and the markets 
which ensued. This section considers a variety of standards: TD-SCDMA, an 
internationally accepted and certified third generation mobile telephony standard, WAPI, 
a highly controversial wireless internet security standard, IGRS, an emerging standard for 
home inter-device networking, and AVS, China’s alternative to MPEG-4 audio and video 
encoding. Each standard successfully shaped a new market, mostly with the strong 
assistance of the state as well as new approaches to intellectual property.  
Time Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA) 
 TD-SCDMA is China’s first major successful international standard and has been 
widely considered as a sign of the increasing technological sophistication of Chinese 
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enterprises and the increasing innovative capabilities of China more broadly (Marukawa 
2010). The technology behind TD-SCDMA is a combination of both the European and 
American technological approaches to multiplexing (the use of a single transmission 
band to transmit multiple signals more or less simultaneously – and thus make more 
efficient use of limited spectrum). The CDMA portion is based on Qualcomm technology 
while the TD portion comes primarily from Siemens of Germany. The “Synchronous” 
aspect was developed by a firm in Austin, Texas (Cwill) established by Chinese students 
residing in the United States. TD-SCDMA, by combining multiple approaches to 
multiplexing promised to allow for high upload and download rates while also allowing 
for efficient use of spectrum in crowded areas where many users place high data demands 
on a small number of base stations. 
 TD-SCDMA, by virtue of its technologies, was developed with significant input 
from many actors. However, the final developmental stages and the implementation of 
the standard – and hence market creation, fell to a narrow range of actors.  In 1995, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (today part of MIIT) and the State Planning Commission (today’s 
National Development and Reform Commission) made development of a Chinese 3G 
mobile standard a key project of the Ninth Five Year Plan (Zhou 2004). Seeing the 
success of European firms with the globally popular GSM standard and the royalties 
earned by Qualcomm’s CDMA standard in the United States and Korea, China’s 
leadership sought to repeat these technological and economic successes through 
development of an indigenous standard that would showcase independent Chinese 
technology (freeing Chinese firms from reliance on expensive foreign standards and their 
embedded patents) and potentially earn overseas revenues as a globally competitive 
standard.  
 Developmental work fell primarily to the Chinese Academy of 
Telecommunication Technology (CATT), a research institute under the Ministry of Posts 
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and Telecommunications. To continue commercial development of the standard and 
compatible transmission equipment, CATT created a commercial entity – Datang 
Telecom. Overall supervision of the standardization effort was the responsibility of 
CCSA. Siemens of Germany contributed its TD-CDMA technology, developed as a 
possible 3G standard to replace GSM in Europe. When Europe went with Nokia and 
Ericsson’s WCDMA, Siemens went to Datang who agreed to collaborate on an 
alternative 3G standard. Firms such as Motorola also contributed proprietary technology 
and assisted in performing simulations before the standard was submitted for ITU 
consideration. In simulations, TD-SCDMA actually performed better than WCDMA 
(Authors’ Interviews). In the Siemens-Datang collaboration, Siemens provided the “egg” 
or “seed” technology and Datang completed the technology integration process. 
However, although the kernel of the technology existed, there was no complete 
production chain including chips for TD-SCDMA. Therefore Datang went to Samsung 
and Philips and Texas Instruments. The idea was to license TD-SCDMA to them for chip 
development but they did not express strong interest in the standard. In the end, TD-
SCDMA was jointly developed by the Chinese Academy of Telecommunication 
Technology and Siemens and commercialized by Datang Telecom. After being 
successfully approved as an international standard by the ITU in 1999, the standard took 
another eight years of development and testing before being formally launched on 
December 31, 2008. 
 Although there was frequent speculation that China would only allow its 
telecommunications operators to use TD-SCDMA, China did not create an entirely closed 
market. Instead, at the end of 2008, MIIT licensed all three international standards – one 
for each telecommunications operator. The standards were thus allowed to compete but in 
effect each operator enjoyed a monopoly of compatible phones. For China Unicom – 
licensed to build a network using the WCDMA standard – this was a boom as only it 
could offer a 3G capable iPhone. 
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The IP policies of TD-SCDMA accord well with the predictions of this 
dissertation. Development of indigenous technology was given strong state support as 
noted above, but foreign technology was also permitted and licensed, albeit with strong 
efforts to license the technology on favorable terms. The Chinese state used its financial 
resources – over $700 million by some estimates – to support the development of TD-
SCDMA technology, primarily through Datang Telecom. State support for IP 
development for TD-SCDMA was justified by a variety of interviewees – not only those 
affiliated with the companies involved in developing TD-SCDMA or receiving state 
largesse. One interviewee noted the primary reason why the state needed to support IP 
development for standards like TD-SCDMA:  
“In a given technology, there are dominant foreign technologies which 
China must overcome. The state is necessary to give the time and space to 
develop a technology sufficiently and get it into the market. If a 
technology can be given the space and the time to develop, Chinese 
technology has at times been even more advanced than technologies 
overseas. However, foreign firms have the advantage of name recognition, 
brand and technology trajectory in their favor. Hence the state must lead 
the local market to even given Chinese technology a chance.” (Author’s 
Interview) 
 
Other firms such as Huawei and Zhongxing Telecom – China’s leading 
telecommunications equipment manufacturers – were strongly encouraged to join in the 
technology development efforts. Interviewees noted, however, that as both firms were 
already active in research for the WCDMA standard, they showed little interest in TD-
SCDMA. 
Most importantly, TD-SCDMA proved very beneficial to China’s 
telecommunication equipment industry as the ultimate tool with which to reduce royalty 
payments on the other two international 3G standards. After China developed the TD-
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SCDMA standard, nine companies in the WCDMA alliance capped the royalty rate they 
asked from Chinese companies at less than five percent of the sales price for hardware 
(Fan 2006). In a similar fashion Huawei used the threat of TD-SCDMA to negotiate 
lower royalty payments for domestic and international CDMA products with Qualcomm 
(Sinocast 2006). These reductions in royalties accord with the predictions that an IP 
Taker will seek to build markets with the lowest IP prices possible – using state power 
where possible to accomplish this goal. 
For openness, TD-SCDMA was generally an open standard – and hence an open 
market. Foreign and domestic firms were all encouraged to participate in development of 
the standard. Indeed, the majority of the core standards-essential patents in the final 
standard were foreign. Of the 148 Time Division Duplex patents filed with China’s State 
Intellectual Property Office, over seventy percent are held by foreign companies (most 
notably Siemens and Qualcomm) (Ernst 2011).43 Nokia, Ericsson, and Siemens provided 
thirty-two, twenty-three and eleven percent, respectively, of the total patents for TD-
SCDMA. Datang only contributed roughly 9% of the core SEPs. Thus, it is clear that 
foreign participation in the standard was generally encouraged. 
Further openness could be seen in the initial development of TD-SCDMA. In the 
1990s, the central government and research institutes leading the project invited MNCs to 
add their technology to the pool and help educate researchers on the detailed steps 
involved in standardization. Over time, however, the development of TD-SCDMA fell 
increasingly just to Datang Telecom. CCSA increasingly restricted direct foreign 
participation in development, forcing would-be foreign enterprises to partner with local 
                                                 
43 As a standard based on time division multiplexing, as opposed to code or frequency division, the TDD 
patents are essential to the standard and among the most critical.  
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vendors. This was intended to upgrade Chinese firms’ capabilities. However, it had the 
general effect of cooling foreign enthusiasm for the standard, again reducing participation 
primarily to Datang. 
The market was also not fully open. Once completed, the decision to offer 3G 
licenses to China’s mobile telephony companies required a direct push from MIIT. For 
years, China’s leading mobile phone company – China Mobile – had pushed to receive a 
license to offer 3G services. China Mobile favored WCDMA, the global standard 
compatible with its existing GSM network. Instead, MIIT offered the WCDMA license to 
China Unicom, a CDMA2000 license to China Telecom and forced China Mobile to 
adopt TD-SCDMA. This was designed to create demand for TD-SCDMA equipment and 
to create a dedicated market for those products – one led by China’s largest and most 
powerful telecommunications firm. Had MIIT not forced China Mobile to develop a TD-
SCDMA-based 3G network, China Mobile would not have done so. While the market 
was open or any firms seeking to produce goods compliant with the standard, the demand 
side was constrained due to the issuing of only a single TD-SCDMA license. 
Finally, in terms of scope, TD-SCDMA was intended to be a global standard. In 
1999, Datang Telecom, with CATT and Siemens, submitted TD-SCDMA to the ITU as a 
prospective international 3G standard. Upon review of the application, the ITU approved 
TD-SCDMA as one of the three international 3G standards. However, despite being 
available for international licensing, TD-SCDMA found little interest outside of China. 
As an IP-taker in the global economy, China’s technology was generally perceived as less 
developed, or certainly less reliable than the already tested and proven European and 
American 3G standards. Further, as mentioned above, even China’s own mobile 
 180
operators were disinclined to offer services using the technology. Indeed, in the years 
following the 2008 introduction of 3G services, China Mobile’s overall share of the 
telecommunications market – and 3G services in particular – fell as China’s users 
preferred the more reliable and established China Unicom WCDMA network. Despite its 
international certification, TD-SCDMA ended up restricted to China – and really to a 
single operator. Had the Chinese state not acted, it is likely that TD-SCDMA would not 
have been adopted or utilized at all. It took state power to create the standard, and state 
power to force enterprises into adopting the standard and hence creating a market, albeit 
one with limited scope, for TD-SCDMA goods. 
Wireless Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) 
One of the most famous cases of state-led technology standardization in China 
was the Wireless Local Area Network Application and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) 
networking encryption standard. In the late 1990s, Western and Japanese electronics 
engineers submitted the protocols for wireless local area networking (WLAN). Submitted 
and approved through the IEEE apparatus, the WLAN standard received the number 
designation 802.11. Better known by its brand name, WiFi, 802.11 rapidly became the 
global de facto WLAN standard to which electronics manufacturers all conformed. This 
created a single global market in WLAN equipment, with parts and systems 
interchangeable across borders and device platforms. 
However, researchers noted early on that the initial versions of 802.11 contained a 
security flaw. It was possible for a relatively sophisticated hacker to tap into a user’s 
WiFi uploads, downloads, and traffic by using software to mimic the identity of the 
user’s computer, thus enabling the hacker to monitor all traffic. Chinese researchers in a 
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small startup firm called IWNComm developed a suite of encryption and user 
authentication algorithms which fixed the security flaw, making it much more difficult to 
eavesdrop on a user’s WiFi signal. WAPI, as the standard came to be known, was not a 
complete WLAN suite. It was only a set of security protocols designed to increase the 
trustworthiness and security of standard 802.11 use. One interviewee explained the 
justification for WAPI: 
“802.11 was like selling pants with a hole in them. I will not buy pants 
with a hole. The WiFi alliance said they had fixed the security hole with 
the different upgrades to WiFi, including 802.11i in 2004, but the old 
security flaw was still there. WAPI alone can fix this problem” (Author’s 
Interview). 
  
 IWNComm was established in 2000. Most of the founders had worked as 
university researchers. In keeping with the statist origins of much of China’s technology, 
much of the technology which later became the core of IWNComm’s patent portfolio in 
WAPI traces its roots to university research dating back to 1992. The initial 7 million 
RMB (roughly $825,000 at the time) in startup capital for the firm was self-raised 
although subsequent research was sponsored through government grants. Beginning in 
2002, IWNComm established an independent revenue stream based at least 50% on 
licensing its wireless security patents. Although IWNComm supplied most of the core 
patents and the basic security algorithm, the entirety of the WAPI standard was, like TD-
SCDMA, officially the product of dozens of firms and universities working in concert. 
 Foreign enterprises were not involved in the development of WAPI, although they 
were aware of the research project. Intel Capital even proposed to invest in IWNComm in 
2001-2002 but IWNComm refused the capital injection because, according to 
interviewees, “they felt that Intel did not respect them.” Aside from provision of some 
early research funding, the government was less overtly active in development of WAPI. 
However, the standard was sponsored by CESI.  
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 Once IWNComm and its partners had completed the WAPI standard, the working 
group passed the standard to CESI and on to MIIT to begin the legal process to become a 
standard at the industry, national and international level. In 2003, MIIT announced that 
all WLAN products in China would have to be WAPI compliant and use its encryption 
method. WAPI was to become a national mandatory standard for information security. 
However, the standard itself remained largely closed. Only eleven – all Chinese – firms 
had access to the encryption algorithms. Other firms which sought to make their 
technologies compliant would be forced to partner with these companies and, they 
argued, open their core technology to potential competitors. Intel and other foreign 
companies saw the WAPI initiative as a thinly veiled attempt at industrial espionage. 
Since the algorithm was closed, companies seeking compliance would need to share their 
proprietary technology architecture and algorithms with the eleven WAPI firms and 
allow the WAPI firms to make the necessary patches to integrate WAPI. 
Domestic and foreign firms strongly opposed the compulsory use of WAPI. MIIT 
shortly backtracked on its initial plans to require all WLANs to use the WAPI encryption 
method. The plans to impose the WAPI requirement were postponed indefinitely in late 
2003. Foreign firms argued that IEEE’s 802.11 was the international standard and that as 
a WTO member, China could not refuse to use the established standard.  
In response, MIIT passed the WAPI standard to SAC for submission to the ISO as 
a potential formal international standard. The entire effort largely fell apart. Chinese 
delegates were unable to secure visas to ISO meetings in the United States. The 802.11 
standard announced the 802.11i version which corrected the security flaw. ISO argued 
that there was no need for a supplementary standard since the flaw had already been 
corrected. ISO technical committee members voted to reject WAPI. 
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WAPI, however, has since been adopted, implemented and enforced for certain 
devices in China such as smart phones. This was done without direct state requirements. 
As an interviewee explained: 
“It actually wasn’t the Chinese government which forced the foreign 
mobile phone makers to conform to WAPI; it was the requirements of the 
three Chinese phone network operators which required foreign mobile 
phone makers to make their phones WAPI capable” (Author’s Interview). 
 
However, China’s three telecommunications operators all demanded that their 
WiFi capable phones also include the WAPI security features. Since China only has three 
operators, this demand made WAPI compliance mandatory for mobile phones being sold 
in China. Despite the failure of the attempt to make a market by legal state fiat, the WAPI 
requirement by China’s operators created the demand necessary for a market to emerge. 
 In this market, IWNComm is the primary beneficiary of licensing fees. However, 
in order to promote adoption, IWNComm set its license rate for its roughly 600 patents at 
a nominal amount. Further, IWNComm tried to encourage adoption of WAPI by entering 
patent sharing agreements with over 300 firms. These agreements are to make it easier 
for manufacturers and brands to make their technology WAPI compliant – and to do so in 
a cost-effective manner. Describing the IP policy for WAPI, an interviewee said:  
 
“We never really optimized the royalty rates or returns from our patent 
portfolio. In WAPI, we have embedded patents but with our partners like 
LG, Nokia and Samsung, we signed an agreement and made the royalty 
rate very low – 80000 RMB up front and then a 1 RMB per unit ongoing 
license. This nominal fee helped secure a market for WAPI by getting 
partners on board but it means our revenues are low.” (Author’s Interview) 
 
 While the IP policy was designed to encourage adoption and increase the size of 
the potential demand for WAPI technology, the standard itself and hence the core of the 
market was and remains closed. The development process was opaque, conducted largely 
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by IWNComm and a few partnering universities and research institutes with limited 
outside input. The core encryption algorithm was closed. Only eleven firms had access to 
the algorithm. They thus enjoyed a protected market in consulting and development work 
making products compatible with the standard. Other firms could not independently make 
their goods WAPI-compliant. This closed structure necessarily constrained the market. It 
also made many firms wary of participating in the WLAN market in China at all due to 
fears of IP theft. 
 After failing at the ISO in 2004, WAPI was limited in scope to China. Initially, 
the only scope for the market was among government offices which were ordered to 
procure WAPI-compliant products. However, many government units ignored this 
requirement and simply purchased general 802.11-compliant goods throughout the 2000s. 
With the adoption of WAPI as the basis for enterprise security by China’s three mobile 
telephone companies, however, the scope of WAPI’s market expanded to all WLAN 
capable smart phones sold in China. This created demand for WAPI-compliant signal 
encryption chips, helping stir production of WAPI-compliant components as well. 
 As a statist IP-taker, the WAPI case in an illustration of the limits of China’s push 
for indigenous technology development and upgrading. While state support and resources 
can create a new technology, this is not sufficient to produce the market. Indeed, 
mandating the use of a standard is not allowed under WTO rules, thus making it difficult 
to create markets by state fiat. At the same time, however, China’s state is able to act 
through its major state owned enterprises, thus created mandatory compliance without 
having to pass regulations which will not stand up to WTO scrutiny. WAPI also 
illustrates the low importance attached to monetization of intellectual property in China’s 
technology markets. Adoption in products and widespread use are considered more 
important that making solid short-term returns through licensing fees. This perspective 
will become even clearer in the next standard – the IGRS home networking standard. 
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Intelligent Grouping and Resource Sharing (IGRS) 
 IGRS is one of the firs attempts to develop a standardized set of technologies for 
goods which may constitute a home-based Internet of Things. In its early form, IGRS 
mostly concentrates on resource sharing among information processing devices such as 
mobile handsets, computers, televisions, cable receivers. The technology thus 
concentrates on resource management and communication to enable networking and 
information sharing across short range – household or office size – space between 
information technology goods, electronics and information devices. IGRS version 2.0, 
currently under development, aims to expand capabilities from the WLAN level to wide-
area networks and eventual ubiquitous access at the metropolitan level or larger. IGRS-
based systems are designed to be effectively automatic, eliminating the need for complex 
system managers and IT departments. Fully operational, an IGRS-based system should be 
self-constructing. New devices, if compatible, will integrate themselves automatically 
into the system, contributing their resources and connecting to those of the other devices 
in range. Hence, when IGRS capable devices are within range of one another, they will 
automatically synch and begin resource and data sharing. Devices will also be able to 
work in tandem with one another, enabling capabilities or processes that would be 
impossible for one device working alone. IGRS became the basis for the first 
international standard for 3C Convergence (Content, Computers and Communications), 
adopted in 2012 by ISO/IEC JTC1 – some nine years after the IGRS Working Group was 
established. 
 Unlike other standardization efforts in China, IGRS did not begin with research 
institute or university researchers. Instead, large firms were the leading actors. The 
research underlying IGRS technology was initially an initiative within Lenovo, China’s 
largest PC manufacturer. On July 17, 2003, the Ministry of Information Industry created 
a formal Working Group for IGRS. Although development had begun “outside” the state 
apparatus (although Lenovo is a partially state-owned firm with strong research ties to the 
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Chinese Academy of Sciences and is considered a national champion), for a standard to 
be created, there legally had to be a government authorization and formal working group 
(IGRS 2012). Designation as a working group by MIIT made it possible for Lenovo’s 
research on a suite of 3C integration protocols to be considered for adoption as an 
industry or national standard. 
 For the next 18 months, Lenovo and a small group of cooperating companies and 
laboratories tested the protocols and presented their research results to MIIT. In June 
2005, MIIT formally approved IGRS as China’s recommended industry standard for 
device interconnection and resource sharing. Testing and improvements by the IGRS 
Working Group through the MIIT Electronic Standardization Institute Information 
Product Standard Compliance Certification Test Center were completed on August 30, 
2005 with MIIT experts approving of the new standard. IGRS’s protocols were then 
passed to SAC for submission to the ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC1). In 
meetings with JTC1, MIIT sent representatives from CESI – the MIIT SDO formally 
responsible for the IGRS working group in China. MIIT thus offered strong support for 
developing and promoting the standard internationally. 
 Leadership by firms instead of universities or labs proved problematic for IGRS. 
The working group was explicitly led by Lenovo led until 2006. The IGRS working 
group thus experienced difficulties attracting members due to the conflict between 
MIIT’s legal requirements regarding IP sharing and de facto Lenovo leadership (Author’s 
Interview). As a formal working group under MIIT auspices, members were obligated to 
full technology disclosure. However, Chinese firms involved in IGRS such as Great 
Wall, Konka, TCL, Hisense and TCL balked at sharing their technology with Lenovo, 
fearing that they would be giving away secrets to a major competitor.  
 In the debate over standards as public, private or semi-public goods (Kindleberge 
1983), the IGRS case shows that the Chinese state was necessary to push through the 
public goods benefit of standardization. As Ferrell and Saloner (1985, 1986, 1988) note, 
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even where all firms would benefit from standardization, there may be hesitancy to join a 
standards effort or choose one competiting standard versus another. So long as 
standardization does not take place, the public good benefit of a universal platform 
remains unrealized. In China, state power was able to push through the IGRS standard 
and realize the benefit of a broad platform. 
 In 2006, IGRS was formally split away from Lenovo – relieving the firm of any 
commercialization and conformity testing responsibilities. Under the new arrangement, 
the government working group would be responsible for engineering and protocol 
development and a new incorporated IGRS corporate entity would handle royalties and 
certification of compliance (Author’s Interview).  
 While it may seem counterproductive to involve the state in an industry-initiated 
standardization effort, in the context of China’s political economy, it actually increased 
the efficacy of the standard development project. In the years after the group was given 
state recognition and split away from formal control by Lenovo, membership increased 
from 59 to 170 members (April 2006 to June 2012). Despite being formally separated, 
Lenovo remains the leading company, serving as corporate chair for the IGRS Working 
Group and Core Members Committee (Hu 2008). Thus, as a “semi-public” good, Lenovo 
as the leading contributor and most influential working group member, stands to benefit 
the most from development and implementation of IGRS, even as all participants benefit 
from a common platform on which all can develop goods and services. 
 The constitution of IGRS also formally grants different types of memberships 
which give members greater or lesser influence over the path of the standard (IGRS 
2005). There are five categories of membership ranging from core member to observer. 
Core membership consists of the original five founding members of IGRS and the next 
top eight technology contributors. Core members have significantly more influence over 
the direction of the standard, including technology adoption, IP policy, and approval or 
rejection of protocols than other categories of membership (Author’s Interview). 
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Interviewees stated that the major difference in membership categories came down to 
having to pay different levels of membership dues – higher categories of membership pay 
higher dues – and being required to participate more actively in the life and operation of 
the standard and its working group. Members which do not “actively promote” the 
standard in their products, submit technologies, evaluate proposals and work to build the 
brand awareness of IGRS will not be eligible to become “promoting” or “core” members. 
To date, no foreign firms have become core members, although there are several now at 
the promoting member level including Korea’s LG and Cisco. The stability of the core 
membership committee makes it clear that the group is unlikely to change in 
composition. Interviewees also noted that a representative from CESI sits on the core 
members committee as well, serving in his capacity as the state representative. While 
membership is open to any companies, the core membership committee – with significant 
influence over the strategic direction of the standard is effectively closed. This limits the 
number of firms able to strongly shape the standard and means certain actors have greater 
ability to push their interests in the standard, and the market for goods which ensues. 
 IGRS’s approach to intellectual property is designed with the interests of China’s 
major electronics manufacturers in mind. Having historically been subject to expensive 
licensing fees from foreign enterprises and experienced difficulties securing non-
discriminatory licenses in the past, IGRS’s constitution mandates that members allow 
non-discriminatory licensing of any technology they contribute to the standard (IGRS 
2005). Further, “contribution” means full disclosure of potentially relevant patents, all of 
which will be available for license. In order to facilitate non-discriminatory licensing and 
make it easier to spread IGRS, the working group and its incorporated entity are also 
trying to develop a patent pool. Again based on the negative experiences of China’s 
manufacturers, the IGRS patent pool will publish all relevant licensing fees early and 
clearly, making it possible for would-be adopters to know in advance the exact costs of 
making standards-compliant products. 
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 As further evidence of the influence of China’s position in the global economy, 
IGRS sets low rates for licenses. While there is no official policy in the IGRS constitution 
mandating low license fees, the members seek to disseminate their technology as widely 
as possible. It is therefore seen to be in members’ self-interest to keep rates low. As the 
member firms, particularly the top contributors have invested significant resources – and 
received significant state support – in developing their technologies for IGRS, all see it as 
in their interest to have the electronics industry worldwide adopt the standard. In order to 
overcome resistance, firms thus demand low costs in order to encourage adoption within 
China and elsewhere. 
 IGRS is not a closed standard but its leadership group – the 14 member Core 
Members Committee is stable and exclusively Chinese (IGRS 2012).44 Any actors, 
however, whether a member (at any level) or not may contribute technology and 
proposals to the standard. Furthermore, many small firms have joined IGRS as regular 
members or observers without any technology or expertise to contribute at all. They use 
the standard as a networking opportunity to meet with high level managers in China’s 
leading electronics companies, thus increasing the opportunity to get noticed and form 
partnerships. In interviews, it appeared that this coordinating function was one of the 
greatest contributions of IGRS to China’s electronics industry. The market which is 
emerging for IGRS products will ideally be highly competitive and open due to low 
licensing fees and mandatory non-discriminatory licensing of technology. At the same 
time, however, the Chinese state will continue to shape the standard through its 
representation on the Core Members Committee and by lobbying with the dominant large 
firms to ensure the standard promotes China’s broader interests both in the electronics 
industry and in international standards forums. 
                                                 
44 One of the core members, ASTRI, the Hong Kong Applied Science and Technology Research Institute, 
is not incorporated in the Mainland but has a wholly owned Shenzhen subsidiary established in 2008 to 
cultivate its research consulting and contract business with Mainland China. 
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 After being approved as a joint ISO/IEC standard suite in 2012, the scope for 
IGRS is global. Firms anywhere in the world are permitted to utilize the standard and 
produce goods compliant with the terms of the protocols – so long as the necessary 
licensing fees are paid. To date, however, the standard has not yet found a large market. 
One of the major problems, as with all “network of things” technologies, is lack of 
understanding of what it is, and what value IGRS adds on top of existing basic home or 
office wireless networks or Internet-based sharing and backup tools. Just as with TD-
SCDMA, international approval of the standard has drawn increased attention to China’s 
growing technological innovation capabilities, but this has not translated into increased 
demand for the products. Indeed, ISO/IEC has opted to approve multiple standards for 
the same types of technology, thus limiting the market-creating power once wielded 
when only a single standard would be created. Interviewees stated that resistance to IGRS 
stems mostly, as it has for many of the standards discussed here, from China’s position as 
an IP taker without a reputation for innovation or quality technology creation. Even 
within China, there has been limited acceptance of IGRS. Building a market will require 
greater state push to stimulate demand or else greater action by China’s leading firms to 
create an environment attractive enough for other firms to begin producing for and 
consuming IGRS. 
Audio-Video Standard (AVS) 
 AVS is the Chinese standard for sound and video encoding, decoding and 
compression. The standard competes with the dominant international market for MPEG-4 
devices in the optical storage media such as Blu-Ray Discs or disc-based game systems 
such as the Microsoft X-Box, digital downloadable media including online embedded 
sound and video as well as digital broadcast media for television and mobile applications 
industries. Standards like AVS and MPEG translate the analog sound and light waves of 
audio and video recordings into digital format (1s and 0s) which can be easily 
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compressed and stored on media such as CDs and DVDs. Compressed data in digital 
format can also be broadcast much more efficiently than analog signals. Both AVS and 
MPEG-4 (sometimes referred to as AVC) are successors to the long-standing MPEG-2 
standard which dominated digital media formats through the 1990s and into the 2000s. 
The MPEG standards are the product of the Moving Picture Experts Group, a joint 
committee under ISO and IEC, established in 1988 to coordinate standards for video 
compression and transmission (MPEG 2010). 
 Compared with MPEG-2, both AVS and MPEG-4 have much greater 
compression capabilities (so more data can be stored per unit space on a disc). This 
enables not only smaller discs but also greater sound and video quality as more 
information can be stored in the same amount of space. The AVS standard is comparable 
to the international MPEG-4 standard. MPEG-4 is officially known as H.264 and was 
developed jointly by the ITU-T Video Coding Experts Group and the ISO/IEC JTC1 
Moving Picture Experts Group. Both AVS and H.24 have similar compression and image 
quality characteristics. Test results showed that AVS technology was twice as efficient in 
data compression as the MPEG-2 standard, thus making it comparable to H.264 (AVS 
2012). 
 AVS was developed using contributions from multiple sources in a collaborative 
working group. However, unlike H.264 which is dominated by representatives of major 
electronics firms, roughly half of the intellectual property contributed to AVS has come 
from Chinese universities and government research institutions. H.264 was initiated by 
the existing joint ISO-IEC technical committee as part of its ongoing standardization 
work. In contrast, when the AVS development effort was initiated in 2002, the major 
contributing members were all university labs or research institutes, all of whom had 
existing projects in audio and video encoding technologies. Chinese firms, while active in 
the production of equipment using similar encoding technologies such as those in AVS, 
had only weak research capabilities. As a result, they did not contribute much technology 
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to the standard.45 AVS was a state-initiated standards development effort led by 
government actors in the form of university labs. Participation by firms was highly 
limited.  
 AVS began through the separate efforts of researchers in different universities and 
government research institutes. Throughout the 1990s, different research groups had 
conducted work on compression, encoding and decoding technologies for audio and 
video. In the early 2000s, Chinese manufacturers came to dominate production of 
electronics, especially digital video players. Despite dominating world output – some 
seventy-five percent of world DVD player production by 2003 – Chinese manufacturers 
faced a severe profit squeeze from licensing fees charged by MPEG-2 and the 
international DVD alliance (Kanellos 2004; Linden 2004). Each MPEG-2 capable device 
had to pay a $2.50 license. The DVD alliance (including its encoding and compression 
technologies) charged an initial license fee of $21.00 per player. Licensing fees became 
the most expensive part of the wholesale price of a DVD player. 
 In light of these difficulties, the Ministry of Information Industry launched an 
initiative under its Department of Science and Technology to create an inexpensive 
Chinese alternative to the established compression technologies. The Department of 
Science and Technology provided funding, set up the initial working group, and 
coordinated related industrial activity. The Ministry’s goal was to sponsor creation of a 
technology comparable to the next generation MPEG standard and significantly better 
than the MPEG-2 standard while charging less than either of the international standards 
for licenses. Building on the existing research from different institutes, the first version of 
AVS was submitted to MIIT in January 2005. The draft was approved as an industry 
standard in April that year. 
                                                 
45 Although not the major initial contributors of technology, companies have joined the AVS working 
group and industry alliance. Today, the AVS group has 91 members of which 20% are universities. 
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 How has AVS shaped the market for digital compression technologies and digital 
electronics in general? For IP, AVS takes an approach unique even within China. While 
the official policies of the AVS alliance only call for a standard RAND commitment from 
firms which list relevant technologies, the group in practice favors RAND-RF or listing 
standards essential patents in its newly created patent pool (AVS 2004; Author’s 
Interviews). Since the 1990s, MPEG has also used a patent pool managed by the MPEG-
Licensing Authority to handle licensing payments and set the terms of a license. While 
the H.264 patent pool contains nearly 1000 patents in over 100 patent families, AVS has 
only 50 patents in its patent pool. Some of the difference in number may be attributed to 
the age of the respective standards. JTC-1 (the MPEG development group shared by ISO 
and IEC) has been in existence since the 1980s. Over 20 years, the group has 
accumulated significant intellectual property. However, AVS participants claim that a 
significant portion of the so-called essential patents in the H.264 patent pool is actually 
unnecessary. Many of the technologies in the pool – which licensees must pay for – are 
only incrementally different from existing embedded IP or are actually not essential to 
the standard. This means the patent pool, managed by MPEG-LA forces licensees to pay 
for large number of unnecessary patents.  
 In contrast, the AVS working group claims to have far more stringent 
requirements for the inclusion of technology in the patent pool. Only truly unique and 
essential patents are included in the pool. Further, the price for licenses of all patents in 
the pool was announced even before the AVS standard had been completely developed. 
This meant that would-be adopters could know ex ante the real price for using the 
standard. In contrast, the hard IP norms of H.264 and its contributors meant the MPEG 
standards would be developed with only a RAND promise without detailing the actual or 
potential costs involved. 
 In the case of the AVS standard, Chinese enterprises have utilized two strategies 
to shape IP in the market for compression technologies. The AVS working group policy 
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is to include essential technologies in a patent pool which will charge a low flat rate 
(initially about $0.12 per device) for adopters. In response to the low rate charged by 
AVS, MPEG-LA set a new, significantly lower rate for Chinese manufacturers using the 
MPEG-4 standard. While MPEG-2 charged $2.50 per device, AVC’s rate was $0.15. 
Interviewees agreed this was in response to the competitive challenge from the Chinese 
standard. By setting a low royalty rate, the Chinese were able to force a foreign 
competitor to lower their rates as well. Thus, whether a manufacturer uses AVS or AVC, 
they will pay significantly less than they would have otherwise. Further, AVS licenses 
are free for content providers and broadcasters whereas MPEG requires payment up to 
$6.5 million for licenses to broadcast content using the AVC standard. 
 AVS, as an attempt to create an alternative to an established international standard 
and technology was largely closed to foreign participation. Officially, the AVS alliance 
and its associated working groups are relatively open, with the only stipulation being that 
members must be in China. The constitution of the AVS working group states: “Any unit 
or organization that is registered in Mainland China and is an independent legal entity 
under Chinese law may apply to be Official Member at will, provided it agrees to abide 
by this Constitution” (AVS 2004).46 Entities not registered in Mainland China may only 
seek observer membership. Furthermore, the status of “registered in Mainland China” is 
somewhat ambiguous. Interviewees noted that it was not clear whether this meant an 
enterprise had to simply have sales or representative offices in China or if this meant 
having a locally incorporated subsidiary, preferably engaged in R&D which was being 
patented in China (Author’s Interviews). In terms of membership in AVS, the 
constitution notes that there is a difference between being a “full” and “observer” 
member: the right to vote. Observers may attend meetings and even contribute to the 
                                                 
46 In contrast, voting membership in standards bodies such as IEEE’s 802.11 local wireless networking 
working group is awarded to individuals, not enterprises. Gaining voting membership is simply a matter of 
attending 2 out of four consecutive plenary meetings and paying the meeting fees. At the next meeting, an 
individual can vote IEEE. (2012). "About IEEE P802.11 and How to Participate.". 
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development of the standard but do not have a vote in the incorporation or rejection of a 
given technology submission or draft protocol. 
 Having begun as research in universities and government research institutes, AVS 
remains close to the state. It is thus in some ways considered a strategic project designed 
to break the control foreign IP holders hold over standardized technologies in digital 
electronics. In the early years of AVS, representatives from MPEG visited China to 
discuss incorporating AVS technology and the entire working group into the broad 
MPEG working group structure. AVS refused, insisting on keeping the technology and 
standard distinct. 
 While development of AVS is largely closed and restricted to outsiders, the 
licensing of the standard is truly non-discriminatory. Any actor willing to pay the license 
rate may utilize the technology. This has been instrumental in building domestic support 
for the standard and its technology. Today, the market, while still utilizing only Chinese 
technology and led by Chinese developers, is open to all comers. It has since found 
increasingly wide market acceptance, including by China’s local and provincial television 
broadcasters, for whom the free licenses are highly appealing. Although H.264 has much 
lower fees than the previous generation, for broadcasters, the costs can still be onerous, 
thus making AVS appealing. A limit to the acceptance of AVS is among very large 
Chinese firms. In particular, China’s three mobile telephony operators have all opted to 
use H.264 as the basis for their IPTV transmission. For these firms – the most profitable 
SOEs in China – the license fees required by MPEG-LA are not considered a problem 
(Author’s Interview). 
 The scope of AVS is limited by the same problems plaguing most countries in the 
IP Taker category of the global economy. Chinese manufacturers are recognized as 
sophisticated, inexpensive and able to produce high quality goods. However, Chinese 
technology is generally seen as backward, especially when compared with existing 
internationally developed standards. That IEEE cannot legally make standards in China’s 
 196
system also limits the ability to cooperate with the international standardization apparatus 
in this industrial area. The result collectively is that AVS has found a welcome market 
within China but a weaker one overseas. China’s market for compression technologies 
remains open, however. Most compression chips now support both the H.264 suite and 
AVS. This means AVS must solely compete on price with the better established 
international standard. So long as China remains seen primarily as a manufacturer, it will 
be difficult for Chinese technologies to take root outside of China or supplant established 
technologies – especially those made through no long-standard and established 
permanent working groups. 
Conclusion 
 As a latecomer to the world of technology standards, China presents a case quite 
different from those of the United States and Europe. China is not yet a developed IP-
Creator able to set international standards by virtue of its early movement in technology 
or single market unity. At the same time, however, China exhibits similarities to Europe 
in the power and influence of the state over the standardization process. Like France in 
the 1960s and ETSI in the 1990s, China’s government attempts to build markets for 
technology in order to advance the interests of Chinese firms. At times such as with TD-
SCDMA and WAPI, this involves creating a protected market with a dedicated source of 
demand. In other cases, the state acts on behalf of IP Taker enterprises to pressure IP 
holders – both foreign and domestic – to offer low licensing fees. This helps improve the 
competitiveness of Chinese firms, even without their taking control over or creating 
entirely new markets of their own accord. 
 China’s institutions of standardization place the state at the center, making it the 
initiator, financer, and leader of most standardization projects. Accordingly, the state is 
able to wield great influence over technology markets – especially as regards shaping IP 
norms to encourage low priced licenses and creating protected markets when desired or 
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necessary. China’s position in the global economy is such that its firms emphasize 
manufacturing and treat intellectual property as just one among many industrial inputs. 
The state acts on their behalf to encourage inexpensive domestic licensing and to pressure 
foreign IP holders, even in standards to which China contributed no technology of its 
own, to lower their rates for Chinese firms. China’s position in the global economy also 
means that it has a strong desire to create its own internationally competitive technologies 






 Technology standards at first seem unglamorous. They are derived through 
complex processes of negotiation, testing, examination and debate by engineers speaking 
an obscure tongue. Else, they are the product of dynamics specific to firms or small 
groups of firms – often as a black box. Standards themselves are collections of protocols, 
hundreds or thousands of pages in length, which few but engineers can hope to 
understand or appreciate. So why study them? 
 Simply stated, standards matter since they build markets. They do so through 
reducing transaction costs, increasing the size of potential customer bases and reducing 
uncertainty over future trends in the market. Scholars have long looked at other 
institutions and policies believed relevant for the creation, operation, and sustaining of 
markets. Hence, it is only logical to look at standards as well.  
 What makes standards so interesting is that they are explicitly politically created. 
Standards are the product of negotiations among actors with very different perspectives 
and preferences. These negotiations are political insomuch as not all actors have the same 
level of influence in the standardization process. Some have no seat at the table at all. 
Others are prominently at the head of the table and direct the discussions. Since standards 
are politically created, this means that markets for technologies, influenced as they are by 
the defining characteristics of standards, are politically determined as well. The process 
of standardization sets the terms for competition in the market, arranges the distribution 
of gains, and the scope of the market. By setting these terms, in a way technology 
standards actually rig markets to the advantage of some and the detriment of others. 
 To recap where we have been, the link between standards and markets for 
technologies involves three steps. At the far left are the ultimate causal independent 
variables: historical institutions and a country’s position within the global economy. It is 
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these variables that determine outcomes in standardization. Historical institutions 
determine which actors are involved in technology standardization and their relative level 
of influence over the process. Specifically, historical institutions determine the level of 
influence that the state wields over standardization. Strong states are able to build 
markets by mandating standards or coercing firms into following one technology or 
other. Weaker states must allow firms to decide for themselves which technologies to 
standardize. Position in the global economy determines the perspectives of these actors – 
whether government or firms – concerning the proper role for intellectual property in 
markets and the balance between monetization of IP and production in seeking profits.  
 Specifically, these independent variables determine the values of our intervening 
standardization variables: intellectual property policies, openness and scope. These then 
dictate the values of the same variables in technology markets – the dependent variable in 
this dissertation.  
 To test this model, this dissertation examined case studies in the United States, 
Europe and China, exploring how their different standardization systems and positions 
within the global economy determine their approaches to standardization and hence the 
characteristics of their markets for specific technologies. The case studies do not suggest 
that there is an ultimate golden standard for standardization. Each of the national 
approaches is able to produce standards which then shape markets for those standardized 
technologies. However, the nature of those markets varies widely. 
Bringing it Together: the Cases of Japan and Korea 
 This model and approach is not limited to the case studies from whence it was 
derived. It also can shed light on the performance of other states which produce their own 
standards. Naturally, this is a somewhat limited set of cases on which to draw as most 
countries in the world are neither active participants in standardization nor even involved 
in the process in more than a peripheral manner. There are a handful of other countries 
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which have taken an interest in technology standardization as a means of shaping and 
building markets for technologies with the intent of security sustained competitive 
advantages or growth for their economies: India, Brazil, Russia, and Taiwan to name a 
few (NationalAcademies 2012). 
 This dissertation often mentioned the case of Japan in its discussions of the 
political economy of standardization, particularly as regards the impetus for created 
global norms of volunteer and open standards under the WTO. Japan provides an 
interesting case of a technologically sophisticated country that owing to its predilection 
for protection, developed closed standards which limited their scope to the domestic 
market, thus building highly sophisticated but limited markets within Japan (Funk 1998; 
Funk and Methe 2001; Funk 2002; Funk 2006; Kushida 2008; Kushida 2011). As foreign 
participation was discouraged and institutionally difficult – the technology sharing 
agreements among Japanese firms largely barred foreign firms from participating – there 
were few parties interested in spreading Japanese standards worldwide. The markets thus 
remained restricted to Japan. In the long run, Japan’s emphasis on closed and limited 
standards isolated the country, cutting it off from developments in global ICT – based on 
different standards – and severely harming the competitiveness and position of Japanese 
firms. Similar problems took place in France in the 1980s and 90s as emphasis on 
indigenous standards such as Minitel isolated the country and its firms from 
developments in the emerging Internet. 
 In mobile telephony, Japan’s loss of status has been particularly egregious. Japan 
was the first country to deploy commercial mobile telephony using an analog standard 
called NTT, doing so in 1979. It was also able to develop two versions of second 
generation mobile telephony, both ideally suited to Asian market conditions of dense 
cities with high concentrations of would-be simultaneous users. It also developed a core 
portion of the third generation technology which would be incorporated with European 
technology as WCDMA. Throughout this time, however, Japan’s approach to 
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standardization was based on its history of forming cooperative bodies of Japanese firms 
to conduct research, share technology, and commercialize new products. The sharing of 
technology was limited to Japanese firms with comparably-sized patent pools. This 
approach to standardization privileged Japanese firms to the near total exclusion of 
foreigners. The result was foreign firms developing their own alternative standards, often 
in large consortia and promoting these worldwide. By the 4th generation of mobile 
telephony, Japan’s technology contribution had become insignificant. Of the major patent 
contributors to the 4G LTE standard, Japan only had one major firm, NEC, which only 
contributed approximately 0.5% of the patents by value. In comparison, China’s firms 
Zhongxing Telecom and Huawei contributed a total of 6.6% of the patents by value (LG 
2012). 
 The same data set reveals how careful attention to and participation in standards 
has greatly facilitated the economic upgrading and growth of a country. When compared 
with the other major participants in technology standardization, Korea is a major late-
comer. Indeed, Korea’s emergence as a high-technology innovator has largely taken 
place since the 1990s. In the case of mobile telephony, Korea went from having almost 
no industry or R&D capability in the 1970s and 80s to becoming the second largest 
contributor of patents by value to the 4G LTE standard – some 33.5%, second only to the 
US’s 42.3% (LG 2012). 
 Broadly speaking, Korea can be considered a developmental state (Amsden 
1989). It has a strong government with a dedicated focus on promoting industrial 
development and sustained economic growth. However, unlike Japan – the archetypical 
developmental state (Johnson 1982) – Korea’s science and technology policies and 
institutions have been externally oriented. Korea’s government has been highly strategic 
in pursuing avenues for technology upgrading and raising the capabilities of Korean 
industry. An interesting illustration is the success of Korea in mobile telephony. 
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 In the early 1990s, Korea’s government began to consider issuing mobile 
telephony licenses to Korea’s telecommunications operators. However, the government, 
in keeping with its developmental focus, wanted any such adoption to not only create a 
market for mobile telephony but also to facilitate the development of Korea’s 
technological capabilities in this sector. Early negotiations with the GSM alliance – 
including Motorola, the leading patent holder unwilling to license or share technology 
with non-established firms – showed that while it would be possible to license GSM 
patents and so deploy a GSM system, it would not involve any technology transfer. On 
the other hand, Qualcomm was actively seeking partners for testing and development of 
its cdmaOne standard – particularly how it could integrate with existing wireline 
telephone systems (Yoo, Lyytinen et al. 2004). The decision to adopt cdmaOne within 
Korea was intended to create a single market for mobile telephony, as well as a platform 
with opportunities for innovation. The standard was relatively open insomuch as Korean 
firms were welcome to participate. The standard also had global reach as Qualcomm was 
aggressively marketing the standard in the US, China and elsewhere, thus meaning 
conforming to the standard would have a large market and many potential customers. 
Within Korea, as Qualcomm is not an equipment firm, Korean firms would have market 
dominance due to their position as standards developers, thus ensuring a solid revenue 
stream with which future investments could be made. The result was an integrated mobile 
telephony market in Korea, rapid penetration of mobile telephony and expansion of 
services at low prices. 
 By the 2000s, however, there was increasing fragmentation. As Korea and the rest 
of the world moved into the 3G and 4G era, mobile Internet became the new technology. 
However, there were no global standards for mobile Internet. Within Korea there were 
three separate incompatible standards in use. The result was, as the existing literature 
shows, a fragmented and inefficient market for mobile Internet in Korea. In keeping with 
Korea’s state-guided but firm-led and externally oriented approach to standardization, the 
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government created the Korea Wireless Internet Standardization Forum to coordinate 
efforts and develop a single standard for mobile Internet. With broad participation by 
Korean firms – operators and manufactures as well as research institutions like the 
Electronics Technology Research Institute – a single standard emerged – WIPI (Yoo, 
Lyytinen et al. 2004; Lee and Oh 2008). Korean firms, due to their broad participation all 
had a stake in the new market and ensured its success. At the same time, Korea’s 
openness to the rest of the world meant the standard was compatible with both the 
WCDMA and CDMA2000 3G mobile standards then in use worldwide. By keeping 
open, Korea’s potential market scope remained global. 
 Markets for mobile telephony goods in Korea have blossomed. Samsung and LG 
are globally competitive brands as well as producers of network technologies. The 
markets stemming from Korean standards in mobile telephony have facilitated strong 
revenue streams which have been plowed back into research and development, allowing 
Korea to rapidly emerge as a global force in telecommunications. Careful and strategic 
use of standards to create competitive and innovation-spurring national markets 
facilitated this accomplishment.  
“The Wealth of Nations”: Why We Should Concern Ourselves with Standards 
 Adam Smith’s magnum opus – The Wealth of Nations concerned itself with the 
same question that mercantilists had addressed over the preceding centuries: how does a 
country secure national wealth, and accordingly, power. Unlike the mercantilists who saw 
the route to wealth through protection of markets, national monopolies and other 
uncompetitive approaches, Smith argued that openness and competition would bring 
wealth. It was the role of the state, Smith argued, to ensure that competition took place. 
Once this regulatory role was accomplished, the market would do the rest and secure 
prosperity for a country. Smith’s insights remain relevant today. The question is how can 
and should states best ensure competition and market performance? 
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 These questions are more relevant than ever in light of the current global 
economic climate. Growth and social well-being in the post 2008 Financial Crisis World 
seems to be increasingly elusive. While certain economic metrics (like stock market 
valuations) continue to show sustained success, the whole of the economy appears to 
remain weak – and is broadly perceived as such. Europe, despite its potential in good 
governance, strong human resources, and long-term familiarity with technology and 
innovation, has been underperforming in terms of setting and or leading international 
standards for the last decade. Many Europeans fear that their countries have lost their 
traditional areas of competitiveness in artisanal goods or heavy industry but have not 
managed to replace these industries with sustained competitiveness in high technology 
innovation. Europe as a whole seems to stumble from one debt crisis to the next while 
facing a growing wave of discontentment over the entire integration process. China is 
desperately seeking an alternative source of economic power to continue its growth and 
modernization. Part of this is the prosaic concerns of an economy that is outgrowing its 
old low-wage, capital-intensive model and needing to become far more efficient and 
knowledge-intensive. A second portion, however, is the question of national power. 
 This final point bears repeating as it is significant for all of the cases and indeed 
every country in the world. From a political science perspective, the goal of economics is 
to yield the wealth necessary for national power. American and European concerns over 
their lagging economies are based on fears of domestic social instability if the economy 
falters as well as concerns of losing their leading positions in the world, especially to 
rising countries in East Asia. Going back to the days of the Meiji Restoration in Japan, 
there has been a concept, repeated in China, Korea, and elsewhere that economic wealth 
and national security are inseparable. In the case of Japan and China, this was pithily 
summed up in the 4-character phrase: “富国强兵” – Rich Country, Strong Army 
(Samuels 1994). There is a healthy literature exploring the link between economic wealth 
and national power. For the purposes of this conclusion, however, suffice to say, 
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countries have a profound and necessary interest in the health, sophistication, and relative 
position of their economies in the global economy. A country that is poor and peripheral, 
no matter the determination of its arms, will only be a bit player in global politics. 
Conversely, rich, sophisticated economies at the center of global industries wield 
enormous power and influence. From a realist perspective, it only makes sense to seek 
economic power since this is the root of security in an anarchic world. For mercantilists, 
it is simply about looking out for one’s own and glorifying the motherland, even – or 
perhaps expressly – at the expense of others. Even for liberals who believe in a mutually 
beneficial global economy where all can benefit, there is an understanding that the 
“blessings of liberty” are only meaningful if the people are content – which is a function 
of wealth. 
 This dissertation has shown that standards determine the way that markets for 
certain technologies will form and the characteristics of those markets. Depending on the 
national vision for how to best acquire wealth and power – domestically and 
internationally – governments and industry will do well then to carefully consider their 
national approaches to standardization. While all approaches – formal and de facto, state-
led and firm-led, closed and open – can produce standards, the markets they produce have 
very different patterns of distribution, degrees of technological sophistication and long-
term viability. 
 This dissertation does not argue that there is a single ideal form for 
standardization. The literature is replete with scholars who argue for the merits of one 
system over another, typically arguing that there is a single “standard” to which all 
countries should conform if they wish to produce standards (Blind, Steen et al. 2009; da 
Silva 2010; Ernst 2011; Ernst 2013). Nonetheless, all methods of standardization are able 
to produce markets. However, countries are constrained by their history and position in 
terms of the types of technology markets they will produce. 
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 To illustrate, in the United States, the attempt by NIST to set national standards 
for the smart grid in order to improve energy efficiency have proven highly problematic. 
While in the end, NIST may be able to create a standard, the difficulty will have shown 
through in the time it took to develop and implement the standard. This suggests that for 
technologies which require significant coordination across many actors or industries, the 
US non-state system of standardization has a difficulty creating markets.  
 In Europe, historical institutions have created a highly dirigiste system of 
standardization reliant on governmental bodies and EU-level formal organizations. 
However, there is evidence of efforts by the EU to reform its reliance on formal 
organizations and allow for greater industry leadership. Recent reforms to CEN and 
CENELEC permit the fast tracking of certain ICT standards which have already been 
approved by industry bodies – whether IEEE or an industry consortium. These reforms 
seek to gradually change the institutions of standardization in Europe, making them less 
reliant upon and beholden to state interests and the voices of multiple veto-wielding 
interest groups. By giving industry a more direct pathway to creating standards – while 
maintaining the overall standardization system with its emphasis on formal standards – 
Europe may be able to gradually shift norms more toward the leadership of industry and 
away from often cumbersome bureaucracies. Nonetheless, Europe will continue to 
emphasis balancing interests through formal standardization (Winn 2005). 
 China often struggles to balance its legally mandated state leadership over 
standardization and the traditional interventionist role for the government with a desire to 
promote independent technological initiative by firms. Efforts by groups such as CESI, 
however, reveal that there are approaches trying to increase the role played by non-state 
and non-academic actors in standardization. Through encouragement of firm participation 
– often facilitated by access to resources – China may be able to gradually shift away 
from state control toward a more firm- and industry-based technology standardization 
system. However, by law and tradition, China will remain highly statist in its approach to 
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technology standardization. Markets will also reflect the position of China as an IP Taker 
meaning there will still be emphasis on inexpensive intellectual property, thus 
differentiating Chinese technology markets from those in the West.  
Contribution to the Literature 
 For too long, standards have been viewed as a background condition which 
simply exist for markets, rather than as an active force for the creation of those markets. 
This dissertation has shown that not only are standards the basis of markets for 
technologies but that the politics of standardization helps determine the structure of those 
markets. 
 Since the 1980s, there has been economic interest in standardization as an end in 
itself – studying the conditions under which standardization can be expected to occur. It 
has been acknowledged that once there is general standardization of a technology, the 
nature of competition changes from one based on features and technological 
sophistication to one based on price. Standardization has been modeled mathematically, 
showing how different variables determine the likelihood of success – that is establishing 
a standard. 
 Unfortunately, the two literatures have never taken the next step, showing that 
standardization is an intervening variable between national institutions and the structure 
of the global economy and specific market features and structures for given technologies. 
This dissertation has drawn this connection, showing the salient aspects of standards 
which in turn shape the values of different market features. 
 In future research, this basic model and proposed theory needs to have hypotheses 
generated and tested. Do the predicted relationships hold true in all cases? Does the 
mechanism accurately show the relationship between institutions, standards and markets? 
Greater in-depth study of standardization in other industries such as automobiles, 
chemicals, and perhaps metals should further help to test this theory, based as it is on the 
 208
ICT industry. In less networked industries, do technology standards build markets in the 
same way? Are the same variables salient or are there other causal variables which 
determine the structure and performance of markets? Like all research, this dissertation 
leaves open many questions for future research. It has, however, shown the way into an 
entire new stream of quantitative and qualitative studies. This research will be 
particularly policy relevant as it concerns the institutions of standardization and how 
these work – and may thus be reformed – to shape markets. Better understanding and 
control over the process of standardization in different political economies will open new 
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